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Abstract 
Despite decades of investigation and dialogue, the means of controlling agency 
costs in the modern corporation remain unclear. Research traditionally focuses on 
independent monitoring of management, with studies concentrating on the 
relationship between board independence and firm performance; the results, 
however, remain unclear and often contradictory. This thesis aims to broaden the 
research tradition by consolidating this research stream and opening up a new 
perspective by investigating how agents may circumvent independent monitoring. 
Meta-analysis was employed to pool the results from extant literature on the 
overarching relationship between board structure and firm performance. Results 
indicate that there is no robust, practically or statistically, significant relationship 
between either board composition and firm performance or board leadership 
structure and firm performance. Next, a behavioural approach for decision making 
was used as an explanation of agency costs. Through a series of experiments, it was 
demonstrated that the structure of the decision process, particularly the presentation 
of information, can make naïve, independent decision makers subject to potential 
manipulation. Specifically, the presentation of recommendations to directors may, 
through anchoring heuristics, bias decision making irrespective of other information 
presented. Taken together, the results indicate that independence may be less 
important than the agent’s motivation to misdirect the monitoring process. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH 
Last year, the ASX Corporate Governance Council released the third edition of 
Australian “Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations” (CGPR 
(2014)1), encouraging companies to adopt a prescriptive model for their corporate 
governance practices. Principle two of the CGPR (2014: 14) encourages companies 
to “structure the board to add value”; that includes appointing a majority of 
independent directors (recommendation 2.4) and separating the roles of the chair and 
the CEO (recommendation 2.5). 
In the past two decades, the relationship between board structure and firm 
performance has been one of the most researched corporate governance topics. 
Research into board structure has involved, among other variables, the ratio of 
inside- outside directors (Arthur, 2001; Bonn, 2004; Bonn, Yoshikawa, & Phan; 
2004; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003a), director interlocks (Chua & Petty, 1999), board 
leadership structure (CEO/ chairperson roles held jointly or separately) (Matolcsy, 
Shan, & Seethamraju, 2012; Henry, 2008), the ratio of female directors (Erhardt, 
Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008), and board size 
(Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003a). This stream of 
research has, mostly, investigated the links between board structure variables and 
financial performance. 
In a broader context, corporate governance research has followed an approach 
that predicts organisational outputs (e.g. financial performance, survival of IPOs and 
determinants of CEO pay) given the level of some organisational inputs (e.g. board 
structure, audit quality, institutional shareholding). Although the input-output 
approach to researching corporate governance and boards has provided a rich 
contribution to our knowledge about corporate governance, it has made “great 
inferential leaps” between inputs and outputs with “no direct evidence on the 
processes and mechanisms which presumably link the inputs to the outputs” 
(Pettigrew, 1992: 171). 
                                                 
 
1 Prior editions will be abbreviated similarly yet in accordance with the year of issuance (e.g. CGPR 
(2003)). 
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In other words, little prior research has considered the actual processes of board 
decision making, instead of investigating directors’ perspectives on board decision 
processes. This is clearly evident in the methods employed (i.e. survey design) 
(Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona, 2009; Zhang, 2010; Nielsen & Huse, 2010; Minichilli, 
Zattoni, Nielsen & Huse, 2012). Some researchers have entered boardroom and have 
investigated the actual mechanisms in board processes (Samra-Fredericks, 2000; 
Maitlis, 2004; Parker, 2007; Bezemer, Nicholson, & Pugliese, 2014; Pugliese, 
Nicholson, & Bezemer, 2015). Approaching boardroom to investigate board decision 
processes may require employing methods such as observational methods, 
interviewing directors and documents reviews (Samra-Fredericks, 2000; Maitlis, 
2004; Parker, 2007; Bezemer et al., 2014; Pugliese et al., 2015). Overall, however, 
many aspects of board decision making are understudied (Ees, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 
2009) including decision biases (e.g. anchoring and framing effects) and the 
dynamics of boards as groups (i.e. boards’ social norms).  
At a practical level, organisations are an abstraction, in that they cannot take 
action or make decisions. Instead, people make decisions for the organisations. In a 
corporate form organisation, the shareholders give up capital and largely delegate 
decision making to the board of directors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Thus, boards of directors are seen as the ultimate decision making bodies of 
corporations (Bainbridge, 2002; Psaros, 2009). Given this position, many academics 
(e.g. Nesbitt, 2009; Dallas, 2012) and practitioners (e.g. Laker, 2010; Bair, 2011) 
have pointed out that board decision making has a key influence on organisational 
outcomes. 
Board decision making, just like other human decision making settings, can be 
approached using; (1) the prescriptive approach, and (2) the behavioral approach 
(Simon, 1955, 1959). Derived from the normative theory, the prescriptive approach 
stands as a standard model for “how people ought to behave”, whereas the 
behavioural approach aims at describing how people “do behave” (Simon, 1959: 
254). Generally, corporate governance theories are normative oriented theories of 
decision making.   
Corporate governance theories suggest that board structure may shape corporate 
outcomes. Agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983) posits that boards comprised of a 
majority of outside independent directors and chaired by an independent director are 
associated with better financial performance. In agency theory logic, the outside 
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directors provide effective control over agency costs (e.g. shirking, managerial 
discretion). In contrast, stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 
1991, 1994) emphasises a board’s role in facilitating effective decision making. 
Stewardship theory mirrors agency theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), it posits that 
unity in command (that is, where the CEO is also the chair of the board) and an 
informed skilled board (i.e. where most board members are inside directors) will 
improve firm performance.  
Large scale empirical research into the links between board structure (e.g. board 
composition and board leadership structure) and performance has so far provided no 
clear evidence supporting either contrasting theoretical perspective on board 
structure. In the Australian context, for instance, inconsistent findings are detailed in 
section 4.4.2 of this thesis.  
One reason for inconsistent findings may be that assumptions underlying 
normative approaches do not match reality. Unlike the accumulated volume of 
research that has employed the prescriptive approach to researching boards, very few 
investigations have employed the behavioural approach to researching boards. A 
behavioural approach addresses the issue of how boards actually make decisions. For 
instance, as the complexity of boards’ decisions increases (e.g. strategic decisions 
that involve judgment), directors are likely to adapt to the limitations on their 
cognition by employing simple decision strategies or rule of thumb (Bazerman, 
1994). In general, these simplified strategies (named “heuristics”) are “quite useful, 
but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors” (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974: 1124). In agency rationale, such systematic errors extract agency costs, but are 
largely ignored with assumptions of rationality and full information.  
The “adjustment-and-anchoring” heuristic (also known as the anchoring effect 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974: 1128)) is a well-known decision bias that is pertinent 
to judgment situations involving estimates of uncertain quantities. It has been 
demonstrated at the individual level of analysis in both laboratory and field settings 
(Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Epley & Gilovich, 2001; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). 
However, prior research has not yet shown whether directors and boards are 
susceptible to anchoring effect or not. Investigating decision bias (e.g. anchoring 
effect) in board decision making is a new avenue to researching boards, and might 
have important implications to theory and practice. 
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In section 1.2, I outline the motivations that inspired this thesis. Then in section 
1.3, I delimit the research problem with the specific research question. Methods 
employed to answer the research questions are justified as per each research question 
in section 1.4, then section 1.5 outlines the organisation of this thesis and finally 
section 1.6 concludes the chapter. 
1.2 MOTIVATION 
Australian boards have, for more than two decades, more closely followed the 
prescribed governance practice of having a majority of independent directors and 
separating the chair-CEO roles (Stapledon & Lawrence, 1996; Kang, Cheng, & Gray, 
2007; Liu, 2012; Dimovski, Lombardi, & Cooper, 2013; Adams & Ferreira, 2009). 
Recent corporate governance reviews in Australia (i.e. CGPR, 2014) continue to 
emphasise the importance of these prescribed practices in adding value to entities. 
Yet the link between these practices and firm performance in the Australian listed 
environment remains tenuous. In fact, some commentators find that the so-called 
agency costs brought about by the separation of ownership from control are large in 
Australian entities, especially when compared to the US (Fleming, Heaney, & 
McCosker, 2005; Henry, 2004, 2005).  
International evidence, particularly from the US, suggests that the relationship 
between board structure and firm performance may not be as robust as practice 
suggests (for US data see meta-analyses studies by Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & 
Johnson (1998), Wagner, Stimpert, & Fubara (1998), Rhoades, Rechner, & 
Sundaramurthy (2000, 2001)). Findings in these meta-analyses studies provide little 
support for any board structure-performance association. 
While the absence of a relationship in the US studies is informative, it does not in 
any sense prove the negative (i.e. no relationship between board independence and 
performance). It just shows the absence of support for a relationship in a specific 
context (i.e. the US). In other words, arguing for a certain board independence-
performance relationship for the Australian context based on US evidence is not the 
same as providing evidence from the Australian context for such an argument. 
Importantly, any evidence for board independence-performance links from the US 
might not be valid for the Australian context because the US system of corporate 
governance differs substantially from the Australian corporate governance system in 
several important ways: first, unlike the rule-based governance system employed in 
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the US, Australia employs a principle-based governance system whereby firms do 
not have to comply with the normative prescriptions for board composition (i.e. 
independence) as long as a firm explains “why not” (ASX CGPR, 2014: 3). 
Therefore, board independence in the Australian system might be used as a signaling 
device for compliance and board performance. 
Second, CEO duality is notably lower in Australian boards compared to that of 
other Anglo systems (Rhoades et al., 2001; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003a)2, particularly 
for the period studied in those US meta-analyses (Dalton et al., 1998; Wagner et al., 
1998; Rhoades et al., 2000, 2001).While separating the roles of CEO and 
Chairperson is grounded in agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983) to emphasise 
control, CEO/chair duality is grounded in administrative theory to emphasise the 
importance of unity in command for reducing conflict and role ambiguity and hence 
improve decision making (Galbraith, 1977; Weber, 1947; Miller & Friesen, 1977). 
Such differences in practice highlight theoretical and cultural differences between 
governance practices followed in the US and those followed in Australia. 
Third, as with the universal leadership style (CEO duality in the US vs. 
separating the roles of CEO and the Chair in Australia), the proportion of outside 
directors might matter less in the US context given the unity in command as 
represented in CEO duality. 
Given the differences in the corporate governance systems and between Australia 
and other Anglo-Saxon countries, the theoretical and cultural grounds for difference 
in practices such as the greater level of independence of Australian boards (see 
Stapledon & Lawrence (1996); Rhoades et al., (2001); Kiel & Nicholson (2003a); 
Kang et al. (2007); Liu (2012); Dimovski et al. (2013); Adams & Ferreira (2009)) 
and the possibly greater agency costs in corporate Australia (Fleming et al., 2005; 
Henry, 2004, 2005), it is surprising that a large scale empirical evidence (e.g. meta-
analysis) of board independence- performance has not yet been conducted in the 
Australian context. Thus, it seems a natural starting point to understand if director 
independence matters to the performance of Australian listed companies. 
If there is no general relationship between board structure and firm performance, 
investigating the process of board decision making, specifically decision bias, may 
                                                 
 
2 The first sentence in Rhoades et al (2001: 311) is: “In the United states the positions of CEO and 
Chairperson are combined in more than 75 percent of large companies, even though the practice of 
separating the positions is almost universal in countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia”. 
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provide a coherent alternative to organisational outcomes (e.g. agency costs). Thus, 
theoretical concepts from the behavioural theory of decision making, mainly the 
robust phenomenon of anchoring effect, are also investigated in this thesis. 
Given the importance of agency theory to corporate governance, it is arguable 
that management (e.g. the CEO), by employing anchors in boards papers, may 
manipulate directors in the process of board decision making irrespective of their 
independence. As a novelty of this research, it specifically investigates how 
monitoring by boards might be decayed by management’s manipulation irrespective 
of board independence. Thus, the overarching research problem is summarised by the 
following overall question:	
 “Is director independence associated with firm performance and, if 
not, what alternative mechanisms might lead to agency costs?” 
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Although board independence- performance links motivated and inspired this 
research program (section 1.2), investigating these links is not the sole aim of this 
thesis. Instead the thesis aims to provide solid empirical evidence on any robust 
relationship along with alternative explanations that emerge from board decision 
making processes. In other words, both approaches to decision making (the 
prescriptive and the behavioural approaches (section 1.1)) guide this research, and 
hence a thorough understanding to board decision making is sought. 
Research into board decision making has been conceptualised by normative 
theoretical concepts that predict boards’ decisions given the motivation of agents and 
directors; specifically, whether a given director would work for the best interest of 
the company or not (agency theory vs. stewardship theory). Both agency theory and 
stewardship theory assume an economic actor making rational choices, albeit each 
theory has a different logic. Agency theory posits that the interests of a company are 
promoted by monitoring agency costs, where this monitoring is best represented by 
independent boards. On the other hand, stewardship theory posits that the interests of 
a company are promoted by a board’s role in providing advice to the management 
and facilitating the strategic decision making, whereby this is best achieved when the 
board is comprised of a majority of executive directors and the CEO is also the chair 
of the board. 
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Prior research has intensively investigated the relationship between firms’ 
financial performance and each of board composition and board leadership structure. 
In Australia, for instance, this stream of research has investigated different firms, 
industries, and has used different measures for board independence, as well as 
different measures for financial performance. Moreover, many researchers conducted 
their investigations on large scale data sets. For instance, Schultz, Tian and Twite 
(2013) investigate 8,594 company years (see also Capezio, Shields, & O’Donnell 
(2011); Henry (2008); Christensen, Kent, & Stewart (2010)). Yet, the results from 
previous investigations have provided inconsistent findings for the association 
between board composition and financial performance. The same inconsistency in 
results is also evident for the association between board leadership structure and firm 
performance; leading to my first and second research questions:	
RQ1: Is there any association between the insider-outsider board 
composition of Australian firms and financial performance and, if 
so, what is the extent of this association? 
RQ2: Is there any association between board leadership structure 
of Australian firms and financial performance and, if so, what is the 
extent of this association? 
In contrast to the prescriptive approach, a behavioural approach to board decision 
making would suggest that directors, irrespective of their independence, deviate from 
the predictions of normative models of decision making. A behavioural approach to 
board decision making would describe these deviations. The behavioural approach 
directly investigates directors’ behaviours and interactions in the process of board 
decision making. 
A very well-known source of decision bias is anchoring effect (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Anchoring effect is a decision bias pertinent to judgment 
situations involving estimates of uncertain quantities. The effect involves “people 
mak[ing] their estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the 
final answer” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974: 1128). The initial value (i.e. the anchor 
point) might be either suggested in the formulation of the decision situation, or 
alternatively it might result from incomplete self-generated computation. The 
adjustments, however, are typically insufficient (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Epley 
& Gilovich, 2006). 
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Anchoring effect has been demonstrated at the individual level of analysis in both 
laboratory and field settings (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Epley & Gilovich, 2001; 
Northcraft & Neale, 1987). However, prior research has not yet investigated whether 
groups (e.g. board of directors) are also susceptible to the anchoring effect. 
Given the importance of agency theory to corporate governance, and given the 
soundness of detecting anchoring effect in different contexts (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 
1995; Epley & Gilovich, 2001; Northcraft & Neale, 1987), it is arguable that 
anchoring effect might be used to influence (i.e. manipulate) directors’ decisions in 
the process of board decision making. That is, if directors are subject to the 
anchoring effect, they may over-rely on that anchor provided to them in a given 
board paper, and hence they may fail to make adequate adjustments, resulting in a 
suboptimal decision. Importantly, this manipulation might take place irrespective of 
director independence; leading to the third research question:		
RQ3: Does the use of an anchor in a board paper affect director 
and board decision making? 
Directors of a given board can only exercise their power as a group (Bainbridge, 
2002). Thus, directors need to interact and often develop norms as they make 
decisions (Huse, 2005). During the process of decision making, members of a given 
group have been thought to be influenced by, among other factors, the environment 
and inter-personal relationships between the group members (Berkowitz & Perkins, 
1986). Social norms theory (Berkowitz & Perkins, 1986; Berkowitz, 2002; Fabiano, 
Perkins, Berkowitz, Linkenbach, & Stark, 2003) posits that individuals are thought to 
bias in judgment and actions because of peers’ influence, whereby individuals’ 
judgment is biased toward their views to what they think is normal or typical among 
their peers, or the group to which they belong.  
Social norms theory (Berkowitz & Perkins, 1986) would suggest that the 
structure of board papers (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003b) influences directors’ motivation 
and level of questioning (Maharaj, 2009), so that directors are predisposed to agree 
with the recommendation made to them in a board paper recommendation or a draft 
resolution. Thus, directors, irrespective of their independence, may bias in their 
decisions because of the norms they have adopted as being part of the decision 
making group, leading to the fourth question: 
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RQ4: Do boards’ social norms of accepting draft resolutions or 
recommendations affect director judgments? 
Moreover, boards’ decisions result from team interdependence (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999) and generally aim for group consensus (Bainbridge, 2002). Given 
anchoring effects are yet to be investigated at the group level, the final research 
question seeks to understand if group decision making mechanisms amplify or 
attenuate the influence of anchoring in director decision making; that is, if anchoring 
is affected by choice shift or group polarisation (Stoner, 1961; Moscovici & 
Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Lamm, 1976). Formally, the fifth research question is:  
RQ5: Is anchoring exacerbated or ameliorated at the group level in 
board style decision making? 
1.4 METHODS EMPLOYED TO ANSWER THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Study one: Study one (see Chapter four) addresses the first and second research 
questions. I use a meta-analysis (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004) to provide a summary of 
the cumulative knowledge compiled by the studies conducted into the board 
structure-performance relationship. Meta-analysis provides a method of combining 
evidence from different studies, and is particularly useful on controversial topics 
with conflicting evidence from different studies; it is well suited to a topic whose 
empirical work, though large, has resulted in different outcomes (Cumming, 2012). 
Searching for articles to include in the meta-analysis identified 29 empirical 
studies for the two meta-analyses; out of which there were 28 studies for board 
composition analysis and 14 studies for board leadership structure analysis. The 
meta-analysis concentrated on the Pearson product-moment correlation because it 
was universally available. It is a forgiving measure of performance, and if there is 
any generalised relationship predicted by normative theory, we would expect to find 
some significant correlation. The analysis also provides an opportunity to better 
understand if results varied with the measures used in the analysis. Measurement 
differences have plagued our understanding of the board structure-firm performance 
relationship as they present a potential confound on any underlying relationship 
(Dalton & Aguinis, 2013). For instance, does the relationship vary if performance is 
market based versus accounting based or if outside directors are measured as 
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independent or non-executives? Using meta-analysis allows for an evaluation of the 
effects of different measures. 
I checked all correlation values between board composition and firm 
performance as reported in all previous Australian studies, and I found that the 
correlation values range from r (229) = -.219, p < .01 (Hutchinson, 2002) to r (82) = 
.285, p < .05 (Bonn, 2004). Moreover, correlation with values approaching zero were 
also reported (e.g. r (2288) = -.004, p > .05 (Matolcsy et al., 2012b)). 
The meta-analytic procedures applied to the board structure synthesis were also 
applied for the correlations between board leadership structure and financial 
performance. As a result of this analysis, it would appear there is no robust 
relationship between board composition and firm performance, and similarly, there is 
no robust relationship between board leadership structure and firm performance. 
Consequently, this study sets out to find if there is an alternative explanation for 
divergent behaviour by investigating the decision making of boards in study two. 
Study two: Study two (see Chapter five) addresses the third, fourth, and fifth 
research questions. Since the results of study one indicate there is no robust 
relationship between firm performance and board structure, it was necessary to 
investigate what other mechanism might explain the lack of influence that 
independence appears to have as a control on agency costs. On reflection, it would 
seem reasonable that if the agent (management) could subvert the rational decision 
making of the principal’s monitor (i.e. the board), then this might go some way to 
explaining the lack of a robust relationship in study one. 
Study two involves an experimental design for a hypothetical board decision. It 
involves directors providing approval for setting an upper limit for the salary 
negotiations with a prospective CEO. The experiment is designed to test anchoring 
effect, board social norms, as well as choice shift and group polarisation in the board 
situation. Each participant was provided with a mock board paper that asked them to 
individually estimate the upper limit for the salary negotiation with that prospective 
CEO. Each participant was provided with a board paper that contained several 
potential reference points for the salary decision and involved a stage process of 
individual assessment of the limit followed by a group assessment of the limit, and 
again another individual assessment. The experiment thus provides (1) a first 
opportunity to directly test anchoring in a board of directors’ context; (2) a first 
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opportunity to test anchoring in the presence of several different possible reference 
points; and (3) a first opportunity to examine the effects of any anchoring on a group-
based decision mechanism.  
As a result of the experiment, it is possible to make the causal claim that 
manipulating a recommendation in a board paper can affect an independent, naïve 
decision maker’s decision irrespective of other reference material in a board paper. 
Further, this effect appears to be neither ameliorated nor intensified by group 
decision making. 
Study three: Study three (see Chapter six) complements study two in answering 
the third, the fourth, and the fifth questions. Given the first study primarily employed 
students as participants, there was a significant concern with external validity. In 
study three (Chapter six) I employ the same experimental instrument from study two 
to run an online experiment using directors and CEOs as the participants. Unlike 
study two, however, the constraints of an online experiment meant the experiment 
was only run at the individual directors’ level (no group phase). As a consequence of 
this experiment, I am able to extend the findings of study two and demonstrate 
external validity for anchoring in board papers to real world directors for decisions in 
which they are naïve independents.  
1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The reminder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter two starts by 
documenting the two main corporate governance theories that prescribe 
configuration for board composition and board leadership structure: agency theory 
and stewardship theory. Then, the current need for overall evidence on the 
association between performance and each of board composition and board 
leadership structure is highlighted by reviewing all empirical work into the topic in 
the Australian context (first and second research questions). Chapter two also 
provides an overview of the theoretical concepts from the behavioural decision 
making that relate to this research: bounded rationality, and heuristics and cognitive 
biases. The concept of anchoring is then detailed along with prior research into the 
phenomenon of anchoring, and the importance of investigating anchoring in board 
decision making (research question three) is justified. Finally, Chapter two 
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overviews the two theoretical perspectives on group decision making, and its 
application to the context of boards (research questions four and five). 
Chapter three provides a methodological justification for the three-study 
components of this thesis. Then, the objectivist epistemological position is situated 
within the philosophy of science, after which the quantitative approach and deductive 
reasoning are justified. Furthermore, the sequence of the three studies is explained, 
followed by a summary concluding the chapter. 
Chapter four details the first study.  The objective of the study is to synthesise the 
body of empirical work on the association between board structure and performance 
in the Australian listed corporate environment. This includes the association between 
the proportion of outside directors and performance, as well as the association 
between board leadership structure and performance. Methods for data collection are 
detailed; measurement and operationalisation of variables are discussed; and then 
meta-analytic procedures are explained and results are discussed. Chapter four 
concludes with a discussion of the findings and implications for these findings. 
Chapter five details the second study, a laboratory experiment designed to 
investigate a possible causal mechanism of agency costs in the process of board 
decision making. Three theoretical mechanisms (research questions three, four and 
five) from the behavioural decision making are investigated (anchoring effects, social 
norms theory, and choice shift/group polarisation). The development of the 
experimental instrument is detailed (pilot testing, sample size determination), 
followed by the procedures for conducting the experiment. Then the gathered data 
are analysed and results from ANOVA tests are detailed. Chapter five concludes with 
a discussion of the findings and implications for these findings. 
Chapter six presents the third study of this thesis; the online experiment 
employing directors and CEOs. The aim of the study was to strengthen the external 
validity of the methods used to make the causal claim in study two (Chapter five). 
The procedures are explained, and gathered data are analysed using ANOVA, 
followed by the results and discussion. 
Finally, Chapter seven documents the key findings from each study of this 
research, the implications of findings for research and practice, and the limitations of 
the thesis. A conclusion ends the chapter. 
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1.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has laid the foundations for the thesis. The background to the 
research was introduced followed by the motivation, the research problem and the 
research questions. In so doing, these sections inform the overall aim of the research 
as well as the specific objectives. Then, the methods employed to answer each of the 
research questions were briefly outlined and methodologically justified based on the 
nature of each research question. This was followed by an overview of the 
organisation of the thesis and how each chapter informs the next. With the outline of 
the thesis completed, I now turn to discuss the theoretical foundations of the thesis in 
Chapter two. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
As the ultimate corporate decision makers, boards of directors play a vital role in 
promoting firms outcomes (Bainbridge, 2002; Psaros, 2009). Given this pivotal role, 
board decision making have been implicated in the ongoing corporate scandals and 
collapses of the past 20 years (HIH, James Hardies Industries Ltd (JHIL), Enron). 
Yet, many issues still surround our understanding of boards and the outcomes of 
boards’ decisions. 
Research into board decision making has been dominated by an approach that 
relates corporate outcomes to some prescriptive configurations for board composition 
and board leadership structure. Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983) and stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1991, 
1994) represent competing theories that mirror and rival each other in prescribing 
configurations of board composition and board leadership structure. On the one hand, 
agency theory emphasises boards’ control role, whereby an effective decision control 
is associated with boards that are independent from the management and the CEO of 
the company. On the other hand, stewardship theory emphasises boards’ role in 
providing advice and counsel to the CEO, and thus, efficient and effective board 
decision making is facilitated when the board is chaired by the CEO and composed 
of a significant proportion of executive directors. 
A stream of research has investigated board structure-performance links, yet little 
evidence, if any, has been provided. Forbes and Milliken (1999: 490) justify this lack 
of evidence by arguing that the “assumptions that underlie the search for direct 
demography-performance links have been shown to be unreliable”. In line with this 
argument many governance scholars are now calling for an opening up of the black 
box of boards of directors (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Pugliese et al., 2009; 
Ees et al., 2009). These calls inform a coherent alternative to the prescriptive input-
output approach. 
Drawing upon a behavioural approach to firms (Cyert & March, 1963), a 
behavioural approach to boards and corporate governance may provide better 
understanding of board decision making and its outcomes. Such behavioural 
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approach would explain the outcomes of boards’ decisions by the process of board 
decision making (Huse, 2005). This process of board decision making encloses 
directors’ behaviours (Ees et al., 2009), interactions among directors (Bezemer et al., 
2014), and group processes (Huse, 2005; Forbes & Milliken, 1999) and dynamics 
(Pugliese et al., 2015) in and around the boardroom. 
A behavioural approach to boards requires new theories, methods and techniques 
to help better understand boardroom realities (Ees et al., 2009). Different theoretical 
perspectives from the behavioural decision making may be extended to boards’ 
context. However, the behavioural aspect in this thesis specifically looks into the 
influence of the presentation of the decision situation (the structure of the 
information presentation) on directors and boards. Thus, some relevant theoretical 
concepts from the theory of behavioural decision making are employed for this 
thesis. First, anchoring effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) is thought to confine and 
limit the ability of decision makers in reaching the optimal decision. Second, at the 
group level, the influence of anchors might be subject to the norms of the group (e.g. 
the board) within which directors find themselves. The structure of board papers, 
which is fairly similar across companies (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003b), may reinforce 
some social norms (Berkowitz & Perkins, 1986) in board decision making process. 
Third, when reaching at a consensus, the group-based decision making of boards 
may amplify/ ameliorate a decision bias (e.g. anchoring effect) that is evident among 
individual directors. 
As this research connects the prescriptive approach of researching the links of 
board structure-performance with the descriptive approach of processes and 
mechanisms of board decision making, this chapter reviews the theoretical concepts 
that inspire this research. The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows: 
section 2.2 reviews the two theories that conceptualise board structure: agency theory 
and stewardship theory. Agency theory, its origin and the assumptions informing 
board independence are reviewed in section 2.2.1, whereas stewardship theory, its 
origin and assumptions informing CEO empowerment and centralising of control in 
the hands of the management are reviewed in section 2.2.2. Then, section 2.2.3 
provides a comprehensive review of Australian empirical research into the links 
between performance and each of board composition and board leadership structure. 
This review of empirical research highlights the inconsistency in results into the links 
between board composition and board leadership structure, and performance. As 
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with such review to the empirical research and the inconsistency in findings, the first 
and the second research questions are promoted to highlight the need to consolidate 
the results from prior research. 
The behavioural approach to board processes is reviewed in section 2.3. 
Behavioural economics and bounded rationality are briefed in section 2.3.1. 
Heuristics and cognitive decision biases (e.g. anchoring) are defined and explained in 
section 2.3.2 and this section also details how anchoring effect is a reliable 
phenomenon that has been demonstrated in laboratory and field settings, and how the 
traditional approach of investigating anchoring (i.e. only one reference data point) 
might elicit anchoring. This section also provides a rationale for extending the 
traditional investigation of anchoring to multiple reference data-points investigation. 
Question three then follows the rationale of how board papers offer a good context 
for the novel multiple data-points investigation of anchoring. 
Section 2.3.3 indicates the theoretical grounds for group-based decision 
analysis; social norms theory, and choice shift and group polarisation are defined and 
explained. Then, a rationale for extending these theoretical concepts to board 
decision making is provided to inform the fourth and fifth research questions. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary (section 2.4) that briefs the 
contributions added to the current literature when answering the questions of this 
thesis. 
2.2 BOARD STRUCTURE AND CONTROL 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
Background and genesis of theory 
Standard economic theory assumes that all decision makers are rational, fully 
informed, and motivated to maximise their own interests or utility function (Simon, 
1955; Edwards, 1954). These assumptions underpin agency theory, by far the 
dominant theory used to investigate decision making by senior managers and boards 
of directors (Hendry, 2005; Daily, et al., 2003). 
Early work formalising agency theory built on a centuries old observation that in 
the corporate form there is a separation of ownership from control (Smith, 1776; 
Berle & Means, 1932). One of the main consequences of separating ownership from 
control is information asymmetry, which arises when managers, as part of their work, 
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have more information and details about the company they manage than the owners 
of the company (Eisenhardt, 1989: 59). Given managers’ superior access to 
information (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), and in the case of managing money of others 
rather than their own, managers might not act in the interest of the owners (Smith, 
1776; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Agency theory was originally developed in the sub-discipline of organisational 
economics (Barney & Ouchi, 1986), specifically information economics. It is used to 
describe and model a contractual relationship between the Principal (shareholders), 
who delegates work and decision making, and the Agent (managers), to whom 
delegation is made (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory assumes that if both 
parties to the relationship are utility maximisers, agents will not always act in the 
best interest of the principals, leading to the so-called agency problem originally 
stated as “the problem of inducing an agent to behave as if he were maximizing the 
principal’s welfare” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 309). This problem is quite general; 
it exists in large corporations as well as other organisations and cooperative efforts, 
at every level of management in firms, non-profits, universities, and financial mutual 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
The divergence between the decisions that would maximise principal’s welfare 
and those decisions of the agent, causes a reduction in welfare experienced by the 
principal, that is: the “residual loss” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 308). Fama and 
Jensen (1983: 304) argue that “full” enforcement of contracts would mitigate the 
agency problem and hence eliminate the residual loss, but the costs of full 
enforcement of contracts exceed the benefits. The costs of enforcing contracts 
include “monitoring costs” and “bonding costs” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 308). 
Monitoring costs are incurred by the principal to limit the divergence in agents’ 
actions from acting in his/ her interest, while bonding costs are the ones expended by 
the agent to ensure that he/ she will not take certain actions that would harm the 
principal, or to ensure compensating the principal if he/ she does take such actions. 
However, in most agency relationships, positive monitoring and bonding costs 
(pecuniary and non-pecuniary) will be incurred. In addition, there will be some 
residual loss experienced by the principal due to incomplete contracts. Agency costs 
are the sum of bonding costs, monitoring costs, and the residual loss (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). 
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Agency problem: moral hazard and adverse selection 
There are two aspects to the agency problem as originally formulated: moral 
hazards and adverse selection (Eisenhardt, 1989). Moral hazard occurs when the 
agent does not exert the agreed-upon effort (e.g. shirking or acting dishonestly). 
Moral hazard, on which most governance applications of agency theory focus 
(Hendry, 2002), can manifest itself in two different ways: first, there is the highly 
visible pursuit of tangible and clear benefits for the agents at the expense of the 
principals, e.g. appropriating the firm’s resources, enjoying different perquisites, and 
advancing career opportunities (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001; Narayanan, 1985; Dechow 
& Sloan, 1991; Palley, 1997). Second, there are less easily identified motivations for 
the pursuit of other objectives (e.g. working for the interest of the whole company, 
corporate growth, or company reputation) at the expense of shareholders’ value 
creation (Hirshleifer, 1993). Although, the second manifestation may appear ethical 
and reasonable to the agent or even other stakeholders, it still leads to agency costs as 
it is not in the principal’s best interests (Hendry, 2002). 
Adverse selection refers to the situation where managers may not recognise what 
their principals would like them to achieve, the so-called “honest incompetence” 
dilemma (Hendry, 2002: 100). The effects of “honest incompetence” could act 
unpredictably in any direction; hence, unlike the effects of moral hazard, honest 
incompetence cannot be formally modelled given the utility functions of principals 
and agents. This is one reason why “limited competence is not recognised in agency 
theory at all” (Hendry, 2002: 99). As a result, agency theory concentrates on 
mitigating the agency problem caused by moral hazard. In the case of governance, 
mitigating the agency problems means ensuring that agents act in the shareholders’ 
interests. 
Agency theory and governance mechanisms 
Agency theory has been extended to identify the efficient contract (between 
principals and agents) under varying levels of information asymmetry, uncertainty, 
and motivation. In a simple case of complete information and a perfectly certain 
world, a rational principal would pay for agent’s output, that is, since the principal 
knows what the agent is doing, the principal simply buys agent’s behaviour 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). But in the case of information asymmetry, uncertainty of 
outcomes, and an agent’s self-interest behaviour, it is not easy for the principal to 
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determine if the agent is behaving as agreed-upon or not. Therefore, the principal has 
two options: the first is to monitor the agent’s behaviour by investing in information 
systems, e.g. board of directors. The second option is to contract with the agent, at 
least partially, based on outcomes (Hendry, 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989). Accordingly, 
agency theory posits two key governance mechanisms to controlling agency costs 
associated with moral hazard: (1) aligning the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders by increased managerial equity ownership and/or similar incentive 
mechanisms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and/or (2) controlling the decision process 
through mechanisms such as the board of directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In 
addition, agency theory recognises external corporate control by capital markets 
(Fama, 1980), but this is for the special case of listed entities.  
Equity ownership by managers is perceived as a motivational governance 
mechanism (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), while capital markets control is an external 
disciplining governance mechanism (Fama, 1980). Both equity ownership and the 
external market for control provide mechanisms that control the final outcomes of 
corporate leaders’ decisions, whereas the board of directors is a governance 
mechanism that controls the process of corporate decision making. 
There is an intuitive appeal to agency theory for corporate governance scholars. 
First, the conditions of agency (separation of ownership from control) clearly appear 
to match the agency relationship. Second, it provides a clear role and focus for 
boards to constantly strive to minimise agency costs and protect shareholders from 
managerial opportunism (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
The board of directors and control 
Controlling the agency problem in the decision process is important when 
managers do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). According to Fama and Jensen (1983), an effective system for 
decision control implies separating decision control (ratifying and monitoring) from 
decision management (initiations and implementations). In a governance setting, 
boards control decisions, while management carry out the decision management 
function. This separation of decision functions drives the normative push for boards’ 
independence. As independent boards are less beholden to management, they will be 
more effective in controlling self-serving management behaviour. Thus, we see calls 
to increase board independence through measures such as (1) ensuring there is an 
independent board chair, (2) ensuring a majority of directors are independent, and (3) 
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ensuring key subcommittees (e.g. remuneration and nomination committees) are 
independent (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
The idea of using the board of directors as a way of solving the agency 
dilemma is reflected quite separately in key directors’ duties (Hendry, 2005). 
Directors owe a fiduciary duty to the company (Bainbridge, 2002). This means they 
have a special relationship whereby they are to monitor the performance of the 
company and its management (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) as well 
as to review and oversee the key strategic decisions made by the management team 
(Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). They must do this for the benefit of the 
company, not themselves or anyone else (Baxt & Baxt, 2005). Fama and Jensen 
(1983: 323) remark that the board of directors “ratifies and monitors important 
decisions and chooses, dismisses, and rewards important decision agents”. Therefore, 
controlling behaviour in the decision process is more perceived at higher level 
decisions: corporate strategy, accountability systems, and performance objectives. In 
the agency theory context, this implies the superiority of boards’ control in 
influencing corporate outcomes and performance. 
2.2.2 Stewardship Theory 
Background and origins in psychology and sociology  
Unlike the development of agency theory in the fields of economics and finance, 
stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991, 1994; Donaldson, 1990) has 
developed by encompassing perspectives from psychology and sociology. Thus, it 
recognises non-financial motives of managers, including the need for achievement, 
recognition, and that managers genuinely strive to accomplish tasks assigned to them 
(Donaldson, 1990). Therefore, in stewardship theory perspective managers are being 
conceived as “good stewards” rather than the rational self-interested economic actor 
(Donaldson, 1990: 377). Assumptions and concepts around motivation used in 
stewardship theory are well supported in the organisational literature and 
organisation behaviour research (McGregor, 1960; Herzberg, 1966; McClelland, 
1976). 
Under stewardship theory, managers will naturally seek to maximise 
shareholders’ wealth through firm performance because it is the best way for 
managers (motivated as stewards) to maximise their own utility function (Davis, 
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Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Thus, stewardship theory poses a counter 
argument to agency in that goal conflict between managers and owners may naturally 
result from the separation of ownership and control (Donaldson & Davis, 1991, 
1994; Donaldson, 1990). Improved firm performance generally satisfies most 
stakeholders groups, including the stewards (managers) so maximising firm 
performance is organisationally centred (Davis et al., 1997). Given the absence of 
goal conflict and stewards’ motivation to maximise firm performance, managers (as 
stewards) work to achieve high corporate performance, and they are capable of using 
discretion to improve corporate performance (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
Stewardship theory and facilitating of decision making 
In stewardship theory, governance mechanisms do not aim to control 
management but to enable the most effective coordination of decision rights across 
the company’s hierarchy. Under the assumption that managers are trustworthy 
stewards, an optimal organisational structure is one that delegates managers the 
ultimate power to make decisions, because managers are naturally motivated to act in 
the best interest of owners (Donaldson & Davis, 1991, 1994; Donaldson, 1990). 
Since stewardship theory posits that managers have inner motivation to achieve 
high level corporate performance, governance in stewardship theory is neither 
motivation nor control; rather, it is to facilitating effective actions by managers. 
Stewardship theory holds that performance variation is a function of the extent to 
which organisation structure facilitates executives’ actions in formulating and 
implementing plans for improved performance (Donaldson, 1985). Specifically, 
CEOs need not be challenged by the role per se nor faced with an ambiguous role. 
Good governance, when defined in terms of co-ordination and clear decision 
making, is best achieved with consolidation of decision processes and clarity of roles 
within those processes. Using stewardship logic, there are great benefits, therefore, in 
combining the roles of board chair and CEO. Similarly, stewardship theory would 
suggest that control is centralised in the hands of executive directors because they 
have superior information compared with outside directors. This would also apply to 
performance management as insiders are best placed to evaluate other top managers 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). To summarise, stewardship theory would suggest 
the precise opposite to agency theory in terms of normative advice: that increased 
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ratio of inside directors and joint board leadership structure would be associated with 
better company performance. 
2.2.3 Board Structure, Control, and Firm Performance 
Since boards are the ultimate internal decision making body in a corporate, it is 
reasonable to assume they may play  a major role in adding value to firms (Nicholson 
& Kiel 2004; Daily et al., 2003) with higher firm performance believed to be 
associated with high quality board decision making (Chen, Dyball, & Wright, 2009). 
The recent series of ongoing governance failures and corporate collapses (HIH, 
James Hardies Industries Ltd (JHIL), Enron) provide anecdotal evidence of the effect 
of poor board decision making and have resulted in calls for corporate governance 
reform in Australia and worldwide (Lavelle, 2002; Psaros, 2009). Notably, agency 
theory underpins most of the reform agendas throughout the globe (Psaros, 2009). 
As detailed, agency theory proponents see the boards’ role in controlling self-
interested managers as one of the boards most important roles (Keasey & Wright, 
1993; Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Bainbridge, 1993; Daily & Schwenk, 1996). In agency 
theory perspective (Fama & Jensen, 1983), the board of directors protects 
shareholders from self-interested managers by controlling the process of decision 
making. This view to boards’ role is also driven by directors’ fiduciary relationship 
with the organisation they contract with (Bainbridge, 2003). Directors’ fiduciary 
responsibilities, combined with the theoretical ascendency of agency theory, have led 
the control role of boards to dominate the agenda of corporate governance research 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Ees et al., 2009). (Please refer to section 4.3 in Chapter four.) 
A clear implication for the boards from agency theory perspective is that a board 
composed of a majority of outside directors and chaired by an independent director is 
more efficient in controlling the management and the CEO (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Hence, research into boards’ control role has focused on investigating the association 
between board independence and organisational outcomes (e.g. firm performance). 
In the Australian context, some evidence in support of the positive association 
between board independence and enhanced organisational outcomes has been 
documented. This evidence includes positive association between firm performance 
(accounting-based performance as well as market-based performance) and board 
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independence (Bonn, 2004; Bonn et al., 2004; Singhchawla, Evans & Evans, 2011)3. 
Moreover, positive association has also been documented between board 
independence and other organisational outcomes: decreased likelihood of fraud 
(Sharma, 2004), lower likelihood of earnings management (Hutchinson, Percy, & 
Erkurtoglu, 2008; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart, & Kent, 2005), and increased 
likelihood of survival of new economy IPO firms (Chancharat, Krishnamurti, & 
Tian, 2012). In addition, board independence has been found to moderate the 
negative association between growth and performance (Hutchinson, 2002; 
Hutchinson & Gul, 2004). 
In the same line of support, research investigating different governance issues 
(including board independence and performance) has also reported a positive 
correlation between board independence and accounting-based performance 
(Hutchinson & Gul, 2002; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003a; Chalmers, Koh, & Stapledon, 
2006; Lim, Matolcsy, & Chow, 2007; Hutchinson et al., 2008; Hutchinson & Gul, 
2004; Sharma, 2004; Christensen et al., 2010; Heaney, Tawani, & Goodwin, 2010; 
Bliss, 2011; Monem, 2013; Schultz et al., 2013). Moreover, positive correlation 
between board independence and market-based performance has also been 
documented in prior research (Arthur, 2001; Hutchinson et al., 2008; Wang & 
Oliver, 2009; Capezio et al., 2011; Schultz et al., 2013). (Please refer to Table 4.1 in 
Chapter four.) 
For board leadership structure as suggested by agency theory, a positive 
correlation between the independence of the board chair and accounting-based 
performance has also been reported in Australian corporate governance research 
(Kiel & Nicholson; 2003a; Henry, 2004, 2008; Davidson et al., 2005; Sharma, 2004; 
Bliss, 2011; Chancharat et al., 2012; Monem, 2013; Schultz et al., 2013). Likewise, 
positive correlation between the independence of the board chair and market-based 
performance has been documented in prior research (Bliss, 2011; Matolcsy et al., 
2012b; Monem, 2013; Schultz et al., 2013). (Please refer to Table 4.2 in Chapter 
four.) 
                                                 
 
3 All of these studies aimed at investigating the association between board independence and firm 
performance, whereby regression was employed for all of these studies to provide the evidence. 
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An alternative configuration to board structure is suggested by the competing 
stewardship theory. Proponents of stewardship theory argue that efficient and 
effective board decision making is facilitated when the board is composed of a 
significant proportion of executive directors and the board is chaired by the CEO. 
This prescribed board structure is plausible given the essential assumption from 
stewardship theory that managers are good stewards who work diligently to 
maximise the wealth of the firm’s owners (Donaldson & Davis, 1991, 1994; 
Donaldson, 1990). However, stewardship theory is often considered the opposite of 
agency theory (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007), and hence empirical evidence supporting 
board structure as suggested by one theory would be taken as evidence against board 
structure as suggested by the other theory. 
As detailed in Chapter four, and in contrast to the support for agency theory, 
there is also empirical evidence that a stewardship-inspired board structure is 
associated with superior firm performance. That is, boards composed of a majority of 
executive directors facilitate board decision making and lead to improved corporate 
outcomes (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Boyd, 
1994). 
Evidence from the Australian context has also been provided for a positive 
association between the ratio of executive directors (alternatively, a negative 
association between the ratio of outside directors) and performance (Christensen et 
al., 2010; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003a)4. Supporting the configuration of board structure 
as suggested by stewardship theory, prior research has also reported a negative 
correlation between board independence and accounting-based performance 
(Hutchinson, 2003; Hutchinson & Gul, 2004, 2006; Henry, 2004; 2008; Brown & 
Sarma, 2007; Lau, Sinnadurai, & Wright, 2009; Heaney et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
negative correlation between board independence and market-based performance has 
also been documented in prior research (Henry, 2004, 2008; Bonn, 2004; Bonn et al., 
2004; Chalmers et al., 2006; Brown & Sarma, 2007; Lim et al., 2007; Hutchinson et 
al., 2008; Heany et al., 2010; Bliss, 2011; Matolcsy et al., 2012b). (Please refer to 
Table 4.1 in Chapter four.) 
                                                 
 
4 Both studies aimed at investigating the association between board independence and firm 
performance, and regression was employed for both of these studies to provide the evidence. Although 
the evidence provided includes accounting and market performance for Christensen et al., (2010), Kiel 
and Nicholson (2003a)’s evidence was valid for market-based performance. 
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For CEO duality (one person fulfils the roles of CEO and chair), which is 
recommended by stewardship theory, a positive correlation between CEO duality and 
accounting-based performance has also been reported in corporate governance 
research (Davidson et al., 2005; Chalmers et al., 2006; Bliss, 2011; Chancharat et al., 
2012). Likewise, positive correlation between CEO duality and market-based 
performance has been documented in prior research (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003a; 
Henry, 2004; Davidson et al., 2005; Chalmers et al., 2006; Heany et al., 2010; 
Capezio et al., 2011). (Please refer to Table 4.2 in Chapter four.) 
As we can see from the mixed evidence briefed above for Australian studies, 
there is an inconsistency in results across the different studies as well as within the 
individual studies. For instance, for those studies whose main investigation is boards 
independence- performance links, we can see that some of these studies have 
provided evidence for a positive association between board independence and 
performance (Bonn, 2004; Bonn et al., 2004; Henry, 2008; Singhchawla et al., 2011), 
whereas the rest of these studies have provided evidence for a negative association 
(Kiel & Nicholson, 2003a; Christensen et al., 2010). Furthermore, this inconsistency 
in results becomes more prominent as we screen the correlation between board 
independence variables and performance reported in studies whose main 
investigation is not board independence- performance links. (Please refer to tables 
4.1 and 4.2 in Chapter four.) 
The Australian experience, however, largely mirrors the international research 
agenda. A stream of research has also provided diverse and inconsistent results for 
governance research at the international arena. Similar to those Australian studies, 
this stream of research has provided little, if any, evidence of an association between 
board demography and performance. However, in the US, this mixed evidence has 
been reconciled by employing meta-analysis strategy for all correlations between 
firm performance, and board composition and board leadership structure that have 
been reported in prior research (Dalton et al., 1998; Wagner et al., 1998; Rhoades et 
al., 2000, 2001). 
Dalton et al. (1998) provided evidence that the true population correlation 
between firm performance, and board composition and board leadership structure is 
virtually zero across all studies included in their meta-analyses. On the other hand, 
the overall conclusion from a meta-analysis conducted by Rhoades and colleagues 
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(2000) is that board composition has a small positive relationship with performance. 
A year after, Rhoades and colleagues (2001) conducted a meta-analysis for the 
correlations between board leadership structure and performance. The results 
indicated a statistically significant, yet practically small, positive correlation (r = .06) 
between performance and the independence of the board chair. Interestingly, Wagner 
and colleagues (1998) conducted a meta-analysis for correlations between board 
composition and performance, and they indicated that there is a curvilinear effect in 
which performance is enhanced by the greater relative presence of either inside or 
outside directors. 
Unlike international studies, however, there is no consolidation of the mixed 
findings across the Australian studies. In contrast to the US data which has been 
summarised through multiple meta-analyses (Dalton et al., 1998; Wagner et al., 
1998; Rhoades et al., 2000, 2001), the Australian studies remain isolated and often 
conflicting. While the absence of a relationship in the US studies is informative, 
arguing for a certain board independence-performance relationship for the Australian 
context based on US evidence is not the same as providing evidence from the 
Australian context for such an argument- importantly, because the US system of 
corporate governance differs substantially from the Australian system in several 
important ways5. 
Given the wealth of data provided in Australian previous studies, and the fact that 
the Australian context differs from that of international jurisdictions (Australian 
boards resemble the prescribed governance practice), reconciling differences in the 
Australian results provides an important step prior to delving deeper into 
understanding the board decision making process. Thus, the first and second research 
questions are: 
RQ1: Is there any association between the insider-outsider board 
composition of Australian firms and financial performance and, if 
so, what is the extent of this association? 
RQ2: Is there any association between board leadership structure 
of Australian firms and financial performance and, if so, what is the 
extent of this association? 
                                                 
 
5 For more about such differences, please refer to Section “1.2 Motivation”. 
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2.3 BOARD DECISION MAKING PROCESSES AND DYNAMICS 
Research questions one and two along with the theories (agency theory and 
stewardship theory) and empirical studies that promote them suggest that the key 
mechanism to effective governance lies in a formal set of corporate governance 
mechanisms that are thought related to firms’ performance. These approaches are 
questionable given the “assumptions that underlie the search for direct demography- 
performance links have been shown to be unreliable” (Forbes & Milliken, 1999: 
490)6. 
This input-output approach to the research makes “great inferential leaps” 
between board independence and firm performance with “no direct evidence on the 
processes and mechanisms which presumably link the inputs to the outputs” 
(Pettigrew, 1992: 171). Although the input-output approach in researching corporate 
governance has provided a rich contribution to our knowledge about the association 
between boards’ demographics and performance, it has failed to explain boards’ 
decision processes, or how monitoring/ or advice leads to an enhanced corporate 
decision and hence improved performance. Moreover, the overall conclusion of 
research in this tradition is one of conflicting and ambiguous results (Ees et al., 
2009). Thus, there is a need to employ an approach to the study of boards using 
alternative frameworks that better embrace the process and dynamics of board 
decision making (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Ees et al., 2009; Pugliese et al., 2015; 
Bezemer et al., 2014). 
In contrast to the input-output approach, the behavioural approach to governance 
describes the actual actions and behaviours of directors and boards; hence it may 
suggest different set of mechanisms and controls that enhance boards’ decision 
making (Ees et al., 2009; Hendry, 2005). Drawing upon a behavioural approach to 
firms (Cyert & March, 1963) a behavioural approach to boards and corporate 
governance may provide a better insight into board decision making (Daily et al., 
2003; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). Recently, there have been investigations into 
board processes and mechanisms such as board strategic task performance 
(Minichilli et al., 2009; Zhang, 2010; Minichilli et al., 2012). More recently, the 
actual board decision processes have been closely examined and investigated by 
                                                 
 
6 See also Walsh (1988), Melone (1994), and Lawrence (1997). 
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employing methods such as observational methods, interviewing directors and 
documents reviews (Samra-Fredericks, 2000; Maitlis, 2004; Parker, 2007; Bezemer 
et al., 2014; Pugliese et al., 2015).  
This approach to researching boards moves beyond the monitoring/ advice roles 
of boards, and focusses on boards as problem solving institutions that facilitate 
coordination, and manage complexity and uncertainty of strategic decision making 
(McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Ees et al., 2009). In this view of boards, this thesis 
addresses two main issues in board decision process that have not been examined in 
prior research: first, directors’ susceptibility to decision biases (e.g. anchoring and 
framing effects7), and second, the dynamics of boards as groups (i.e. boards’ social 
norms). Although this behavioural approach is new in researching corporate 
governance, researchers from the corporate governance field can still rely on the 
long-standing traditional research from cognitive psychology (Bainbridge, 2002). In 
general, theoretical frameworks from behavioural economics, psychology, and 
sociology can be employed to theorise the behaviour of directors and boards in the 
process of board decision making. 
2.3.1 Behavioural Economics and Bounded Rationality 
Historically, theoretical foundations for behavioural economics emerged in the 
second half of the last century (e.g. Simon, 1959, 1955; Edwards, 1954). Before that 
time, microeconomics was mostly normative in orientation, with no interest by 
economists in describing what was occurring in the real world (Simon, 1959). 
Therefore, normative microeconomics did not need a theory of human behaviour 
because it was concerned with how economic actors “ought to behave”, rather than 
how “do they behave” (Simon, 1959: 254). 
The rational choice model in normative microeconomics was used to prescribe 
the decision making that is logically expected to lead to the optimal result given an 
“accurate assessment” of values and risk preferences of decision makers (Bazerman, 
1994: 5). Yet, managers’ values and risk preferences cannot be accurately assessed; 
they vary from one manager to another because they are matters of subjectivity 
(Bazerman, 1994). The variation between the rational choice model and the observed 
                                                 
 
7 Framing effect is a decision bias that is induced when the decision’s problem is framed in either 
gains or losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
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behaviour of decision makers has become more salient as economics was moving 
toward new topics (e.g. imperfect competition, labour economics, and decisions 
under uncertainty) that are surrounded by complexity and instability. Therefore, the 
adequacy of the rational choice theory in explaining the observed behaviour of 
decision makers was considered anew (Simon, 1959). Moreover, the utility function 
of rational choice theory, and its characteristics, “if it exists”, can be compared to 
reality, whereby explaining the actual decision process can help better understand 
decision making (Simon, 1955, 1959: 256). 
Bounded rationality (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1955, 1979) is perhaps the 
most well-known economic construct that describes humans’ decisions and their 
departure from the rational choice model: 
Bounded rationality is largely characterized as a residual category: 
rationality is bounded when it falls short of omniscience. And the 
failures of omniscience are largely failures of knowing all the 
alternatives, uncertainty about the relevant exogenous events, and 
inability to calculate consequences. (Simon, 1979: 502) 
In other words, bounded rationality acknowledges limitations on managers’ 
ability to gather, memorise, manipulate, and communicate information that is needed 
to make the rational optimal decisions (Radner, 1996; Bazerman, 1994). It is these 
limitations that may contribute to boards’ and management deviations from agency 
predictions rather than a motivation problem per se.  
“Search” and “satisficing8” are two central mechanisms involved in choice 
decisions that drive bounded rationality (Simon, 1979: 502). If the decision maker is 
not provided alternatives for any choice decision, then he/she must search for them. 
Utility maximisation requires the decision maker to trade-off the marginal return of 
continued search with the costs of that search, a situation that makes a complex 
decision even more difficult. Satisficing suggests that the decision maker forms an 
aspiration as to how good an alternative he/ she should find, and as soon as that given 
decision maker finds an alternative that meets that level, he/ she will terminate the 
                                                 
 
8 Satisficing, a blend of sufficing and satisfying, is a word of Scottish origin (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996).   
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search and choose that alternative, even if a better alternative exists (Simon, 1959, 
1979). 
Given the tremendous volume of decisions facing corporate decision makers, it is 
implausible (if not impossible) for corporate decision makers to follow the 
systematic and time-consuming demands of a traditional rational decision model.  
Instead, managers rely on their intuitive judgment in forming aspirations and then 
searching and choosing between alternatives (Bazerman, 1994). Thus, senior 
managers’ judgment or the “cognitive aspects of the decision-making process” vary 
from that modelled (Bazerman, 1994: 3). Thus, understanding this process is critical 
to governance as judgment constitutes most of managers’ significant decisions 
(Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998).  
Rich experimental research (e.g. Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1977; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, 1992, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) has 
documented that limitations on people’s judgment often introduce biases into 
decision making. In particular, decision makers often settle for acceptable or 
reasonable solutions instead of reaching the best decision possible. Therefore, 
observed decision-making is far from the rational utility maximisation model 
assumed in the traditional economic theory that drives theories such as Agency and 
Stewardship. 
2.3.2 Heuristics and Cognitive Biases 
Although bounded rationality and satisficing posit people’s judgment deviates 
from the rational choice model, they do not explain how decisions are biased. 
Explaining systematic bias in decision making is an important undertaking in helping 
to reduce the negative impact (Bazerman, 1994). In fact, “the deviations of actual 
behaviour from the normative model are too widespread to be ignored, too 
systematic to be dismissed as random error, and too fundamental to be 
accommodated by relaxing the normative system” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986: 
S252).  
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) show that humans adapt to bounded rationality by 
developing simple decision strategies or rule of thumb in complex decision making 
situations. These simplified strategies are called “heuristics”, and they “reduce the 
complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental 
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operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to 
severe and systematic errors” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974: 1124). Although 
undefined, Kahneman and Tversky adopted the term heuristics in their experiments 
to account for the discrepancies between the rational strategies for decision making 
and the “actual human thought processes” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002: 75). 
Since applying heuristics reduces information processing demand, saves time, 
and provides an efficient way to deal with complex decision situations, it is plausible 
that their benefits outweigh their costs. However, disadvantages in using heuristics 
arise when people adopt (or are misguided by) heuristics without being aware of their 
impact on the decision process; that is, where the heuristic unconsciously bias an 
individual’s decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Bazerman (1994: 12) defines 
cognitive bias as “situations in which the heuristic is inappropriately applied by an 
individual in reaching a decision”. Thus, to avoid bias and to achieve the benefits of 
applying heuristics, the decision maker needs to know the advantages of these 
heuristics, their adverse impacts, when and where to apply them, and, when 
necessary, what heuristics to eliminate from his/her repertoire (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974; Bazerman, 1994). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1979; and Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974, 
1981, 1992, 1991) identify heuristics emanating from three sources: first, 
representativeness heuristic: a person who follows this heuristic “evaluates the 
probability of an uncertain event, or a sample, by the degree to which it is: (i) similar 
in essential properties to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient features of 
the process by which it is generated” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972: 431). Second, 
availability heuristic: a person who follows this heuristic “evaluates the frequency of 
classes or the probability of events by availability, i.e., by the ease with which 
relevant instances come to mind” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973: 207). Third, 
adjustment and anchoring heuristic: occurs when the decision maker needs to make 
an assessment based on adjusting an initial value or point to reach a final decision 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Bazerman, 1994). 
Given that directors and senior managers face a large number of complex 
decisions, it is highly likely that directors and managers employ heuristics and 
become misguided by them, especially when they are forced to cope with complex 
and uncertain decision situations (Hendry, 2005; Ees, 2009). For instance, directors 
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and senior managers may cope with uncertainty by simplifying a decision situation 
and structuring its related information based on similar previous experience on the 
same board or other boards (availability heuristic). Given the more routinely a 
particular decision is constructed the more likely it will be recalled in future similar 
decision situations (Ees et al., 2009). There is a high likelihood of directors being 
subject to such biases. While this approach can produce correct or partially correct 
judgments more often than not, using the availability heuristic in a decision situation 
will often lead to accurate judgment (Bazerman, 1994), particularly when the 
availability of information is also affected by factors irrelevant to the judgment.  
The phenomenon of anchoring and decision bias 
A particularly important heuristic that may affect board decision making is 
anchoring, a decision heuristic that individuals use when estimating quantities or 
numerical values. In essence, when an individual needs to estimate an unknown 
quantity or number, they start with information of which they are aware (i.e. the 
anchor) and then adjust around that piece of information to reach a conclusion. 
Unfortunately, this approach can be faulty. As Tversky and Kahneman (1974: 1128) 
explain: 
In many situations, people make estimates by starting from an 
initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer. The initial 
value, or starting point, may be suggested by the formulation of 
the problem, or it may be the result of partial computation. In 
either case, adjustments are typically insufficient. That is, 
different starting points yield different estimates, which are 
biased toward the initial values. 
Anchoring on an initial value was originally explained by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) as an insufficient adjustment from the anchor value and so they 
termed it “adjustment-and-anchoring” (p.1128). The anchoring phenomenon 
contradicts the key principle of rational choice theory of invariance. The invariance 
principle in rational choice theory states that “different representations of the same 
choice problem should yield the same preference. That is, the preference between 
options should be independent of their description” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986: 
S253). Anchoring clearly breaches this principle as people’s estimates of numerical 
values are biased toward the initial value provided to them. 
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Subsequent research has confirmed anchoring effects. However, robust evidence 
that insufficient adjustment is the explaining mechanism for anchoring effect remains 
elusive (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Epley & 
Gilovich, 2001; Mussweiler & Strack, 2004; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). This lack of 
evidence is caused by the two-procedure experiment design in the standard anchoring 
paradigm that does not provide for participants to articulate their decision process to 
see if it is a process of anchoring and adjustment (Eply & Gilovich, 2001, 2006). 
The two-step procedure in the traditional anchoring test involves participants 
responding to two questions. First, the participant is asked to make a comparative 
assessment – whether an anchor provided in the materials (generally an arbitrary 
value) is more or less than the true value of the quantity (i.e. what the participant 
believes is the true value). Second, the participant is asked to provide an absolute, 
best estimate of the true value (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Block & Harper, 1991; 
Eply & Gilovich, 2001, 2006). This procedure has consistently shown that the anchor 
provided to participants is causally related to the estimate of participants – they 
consistently bias their estimates towards the anchor. 
Strack and Mussweiler (1997), Mussweiler and Strack (1999; 2001) and 
Mussweiler, Strack, and Pfeiffer (2000) doubt the insufficient-adjustment 
explanation of the anchoring phenomenon; instead they propose a selective 
accessibility model. Rather than an insufficient adjustment, they posit anchoring is 
produced by the enhanced accessibility of the anchor information. Finally, Eply and 
Gilovich (2001, 2006) argue that the enhanced accessibility explanation would only 
apply in standard anchoring tests; it requires the participant to receive a value for 
comparative assessment (e.g. asking the subjects to indicate if the target value is 
greater or lower than an arbitrary value). This could generate information 
disproportionately consistent with the initial value as required under the mechanism. 
However, when an anchor is self-generated this is not the case and so the insufficient 
adjustment mechanism provides a more plausible explanation of the mechanism 
underlying anchoring. 
The anchoring effect: Why study boards of directors? 
The theoretical focus of this research is not to explain the anchoring mechanism, 
but to extend the standard anchoring testing to (1) cases where there is more than one 
point of reference or benchmark in the information provided and (2) cases of group 
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based decision making. The standard two-procedure experiment design provides 
participants with only one point of reference (the manipulation) whereas board 
papers often provide significant alternative data points for reference. Thus, this 
research departs from standard tests of anchoring in attempting to model this 
approach by supplying participants with multiple points of reference as in an 
authentic board paper. 
The anchoring effect has been demonstrated at the individual level in both 
laboratory and field research (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 
1995; Epley & Gilovich, 2001; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). In the laboratory setting, 
most studies involve students in novel or unusual situations – for instance, the time 
needed for Mars to orbit the sun (Epley & Gilovich, 2001), or the average daily 
number of babies born in the US (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995). However, Joyce and 
Biddle (1981: 142) argue that, “well-developed knowledge structures” are a major 
difference between students solving general knowledge tasks and professionals 
working problems related to their expertise (c.f. auditors- Joyce and Biddle study).  
Prior research has addressed this concern, with the anchoring effect demonstrated 
in numerous real world settings such as auditors formulating judgment based on 
probabilistic data (Joyce & Biddle, 1981) or consumers making purchase quantity 
decisions (Wansink, Kent, & Hoch, 1998). Given these examples and others such as 
the effects of anchoring on property price decisions made by amateurs and 
professionals, prior laboratory research on decisional biases is applicable to “real 
world, information-rich, interactive estimation and decision context” (Northcraft & 
Neale, 1987: 96). To enhance our understanding about judgmental biases in real 
world information-rich context, we need greater understanding of the factors that 
might influence the effect (Northcraft & Neale, 1987).  
Since many of the boards’ decisions involve numerical values (e.g. executives’ 
remunerations, dividends), investigating anchoring effect in board decision making 
would appear a fruitful area for investigation, particularly as there is yet to be an 
investigation in this context. Moreover, some of the boards’ decisions that involve 
numerical values have been under scrutiny for a long time. For instance, the recent 
global financial crisis has renewed the debate about the remuneration of executives 
(Matolcsy et al., 2012b); nevertheless, there has recently been a considerable 
increase in the remunerations of Australian CEOs (Heaney et al., 2010). 
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Investigating anchoring effects in board decision making contexts, however, 
differs from other real-life and laboratory settings because unlike other decision 
processes, boards are thought to separate decision management from decision control 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Agency theory predicts that decisions by boards may be 
subject to systematic manipulation. Specifically, agency theory suggests that an 
opportunistic CEO will seek to manipulate directors. 
Investigating judgment processes (e.g. estimating numerical values) in the board 
decision context can, therefore, provide an important understanding of how managers 
may pursue opportunism. In so doing, it may shed light on agency governance 
prediction. For instance, the traditional agency prescription to control managerial 
opportunism involves appointing independent directors (Eisenhardt, 1989). However 
if anchoring does extend to board decision making, it may show that board members 
are more subject to this manipulation – thus undermining the prescription and 
providing an insight into why research to date has largely failed to identify robust 
and sizable relationships as predicted by agency theory. I argue that the way the 
information is presented in board papers for decision (e.g. using anchors) can 
influence directors’ decisions. That is, a self-interested party (e.g. the CEO or the 
management) may utilise anchors in board papers to manipulate director and board 
decision making. 
Investigating anchoring effects in board numerical decisions promotes an 
exceptional way of testing because board decision making context differs from other 
investigated contexts (laboratory and field) in two aspects: (1) the content of typical 
board papers includes multiple data points. Board papers are the key source of 
information for directors; they contain information needed for deliberations that lead 
to effective decisions (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003b). (2) The structure of board papers, 
which “begins with the resolution that will be put to the board” (Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003b: 158), may provide a unique context to investigate anchoring as directors may 
anchor at the first piece of information they receive (i.e. the numeric value provided 
in the resolution). 
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Prior research into anchoring with its traditional anchoring test (one numeric 
reference data point used for the comparative question9, followed by the absolute 
question) easily elicit anchoring. However, investigating anchoring effects using a 
multiple data-point has not yet been investigated, and this is particularly important 
for two reasons: first, the insufficient adjustment may be diminished when multiple 
data points are used, and hence the use of multiple data points may counter anchoring 
effects. Second, if anchoring effects are still evident when multiple data points are 
employed in a given decision situation, which reference point would a participant 
anchor at? Thus, the third research question is: 
RQ3: Does the use of an anchor in a board paper affect director 
and board decision making? 
2.3.3 Group Decision Making 
Current research has demonstrated that individuals are susceptible to the 
influence of anchors (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman (1974), Jacowitz & Kahneman 
(1995), Epley & Gilovich (2001, 2006), Mussweiler & Strack (2001)). In practice, 
however, the process of board decision making connects individual decision making 
to group based decision making as follows: typically, a given board agenda is sent to 
directors prior to the meeting. This agenda typically contains, among others, the 
strategic issues and matters to be discussed, resolved, or approved by the board (Kiel 
& Nicholson, 2003b). Thus, directors, initially, read and process board papers (e.g. 
agenda) individually. Yet, upon the scheduled meeting, directors of a given board 
make their decisions as group. 
The challenge posed in differing levels of analysis is a major issue in the 
corporate governance research agenda that is growing in awareness (Dalton & 
Dalton, 2011). First, boards’ decisions result from team interdependence (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999) and generally aim for group consensus (Bainbridge, 2002). This 
means that directors interact, lead, and develop norms to make the board’s decisions 
– what is referred to as board decision making process (Huse, 2005).  
Second, a key issue in extending anchoring effects and other cognitive biases to 
directors and boards setting involves connecting the individual level of analysis to 
                                                 
 
9 The comparative question in the traditional anchoring experimental tests asks participants; “whether 
that reference point is higher or lower than the true value” . 
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the group level of analysis (Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998; Yaniv, 2011). Specifically, if 
anchoring is detected at the individual director level, group processes may influence 
(e.g. amplify/ ameliorate) the impact of anchors.  
For this research, two theoretical concepts are used to investigate anchoring 
effects in board decision making: (1) social norms theory (Berkowitz & Perkins, 
1986), and (2) choice shift and group polarisation (Stoner, 1961; Moscovici & 
Zavalloni, 1969). 
Social norms theory 
Social norms theory (Berkowitz & Perkins, 1986) provides one way of thinking 
how bias might be introduced into the board decision process. The theory of social 
norm posits that people’s judgment is biased toward their views on what they think is 
normal or typical among their peers, or the group they belong to. That is, people’s 
judgment will be more aligned to the decision or behaviour they think their peers 
would make. 
Since its first application to alcohol abuse by youth (Berkowitz & Perkins, 1986), 
there has been a growing interest in its application to other issues such as violence 
prevention (Berkowitz, Stark, Fabiano, Linkenbach, & Perkins, 2003) and health and 
social justice issues (Berkowitz, 2002). 
Boards are likely highly susceptible to peer influence. Board decision making 
process (interactions and norms) involves different directors whose backgrounds and 
levels of authority are also different (Langley, 1991). This promotes an informal 
social interactive mode of decision making along with the formal procedures of 
decision making (Langley, 1989, 1991). However, these informal systems and 
interactions might aim at the formal goal of consensus – Maharaj (2009) highlights 
three characteristics of these informal systems: (1) depth and breadth of directors’ 
knowledge, (2) directors’ motivation and level of questioning, and (3) directors’ 
ability to interact. Thus, biased decisions by boards may result from sources other 
than/ or along with the cognitive incompetence (Langley, 1991). 
This study incorporates social norms theory as a mechanism to better understand 
if (or how) directors might alter their judgment on a decision based on what they 
believe their directorship colleagues would expect or do. In governance, directors 
and boards are generally provided a board paper for major decisions and this paper 
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will often contain a proposed recommendation (often called a draft resolution). 
Anchoring would suggest that placing different information in that resolution would 
affect the judgments of readers. Another important aspect of governance, however, is 
the predisposition of directors to agree with recommendations or resolutions put to 
them. Boards made up of directors with a higher propensity (or social norm) to agree 
with a resolution would be more likely to be subject to what looks like an anchoring 
effect based on their acceptance of the resolution.  
The potential problems associated with the group process have been found in 
many current legal cases, with perhaps the most interesting insight into the decision 
process arising from the James Hardies litigation. In Gillfillan v Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission [2012] NSWCA 370, Barrett J sitting in the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal disqualified seven prior non-executive directors of James 
Hardies Industries Ltd (JHIL) from occupying a management or governance role for 
five years based on their individual decisions to approve the release of misleading 
information to the ASX. 
What are interesting for this thesis are the decision process and the potential role 
of peer influence in the decisions reached by each director. The Court noted that the 
board provided a draft announcement to the ASX (this was misleading and the cause 
of the litigation). The chairman then asked: “Is the board happy with that?” All 
directors, present or on the phone, then nodded or remained silent. The chairman 
took the board’s reaction as a sign-off indication and proceeded accordingly.  
Although conjecture, the case of James Hardies’ board is consistent with social 
norms theory. It appears that either the directors did not consider the item at all or, if 
they did, they refrained from voicing their concerns. Justice Sackville noted the 
decision process followed with respect to the announcement was typical for the 
board, and that the directors considered it to have constituted the passing of a 
resolution. The directors, influenced by the reaction (or lack thereof) to the pre-
prepared ASX announcement, approved the misleading release to the ASX. This kind 
of mechanism leads to the fourth research question: 
RQ4: Do boards’ social norms of accepting draft resolutions or 
recommendations affect director judgments? 
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Choice shift and group polarisation 
Prior research in cognitive psychologists has shown that decision bias at the 
individual level may, in some cases, be amplified at the group level (Paese, Bieser, & 
Tubbs, 1993; Yaniv, 2011).  Further, different group-level decision biases such as 
groupthink (Janis, 1972), group polarisation (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & 
Lamm, 1976), and unshared information (Stasser & Titus, 1985) may exacerbate the 
problems involved in biased individual decision making. Understanding the effect of 
moving from an individual to a group-based decision is therefore important to my 
research, because boards make decisions as groups. While anchoring may occur at 
the individual level, if it is ameliorated by the group decision process, it would be far 
less of a concern for governance decision making. 
The anchoring effect may be exacerbated at the group level due to choice shift or 
group polarisation (Stoner, 1961; Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Lamm, 
1976). Both concepts could explain any difference between decisions made by 
individuals before a group’s deliberation and those decisions made after group’s 
deliberation as both suggest that “members of a deliberating group predictably move 
toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ pre-
deliberation tendencies” (Sunstein, 2002: 176). 
Although these two concepts are often collapsed in the literature, they should not 
be considered equivalent. Choice shift indicates the post-deliberation decision made 
by the group, while group polarisation indicates the post-deliberation decisions made 
individually by the group’s members (Zuber, Crott, & Werner, 1992; Sunstein, 
2002). Choice shift denotes “the difference between the arithmetic mean of the 
individual first preferences before discussion (pre-discussion preferences) and the 
group decision”; while group polarisation denotes “the difference between the pre-
discussion preferences and the individual first preferences after group discussion 
(post-discussion preferences)” (Zuber et al., 1992: 50). This research specifically 
tests for both choice shift and group polarisation. 
Prior experimental research investigating whether group discussions intensify or 
attenuate decision biases has yielded diverse and inconsistent results. Some of this 
inconsistency is due to the diversity of experimental designs across the studies 
(Maharaj, 2009; Sunstein, 2002; Yaniv, 2011; Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998). For 
instance, Neale, Bazerman, Northcraft, and Alperson (1986) investigated the framing 
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effect among individuals and groups, whereby each participant responded to a 
decision scenario (i.e. framed either in gains or in losses) at both the individual level 
and then group level. They found that groups were less susceptible to the framing 
effect compared with individuals. In contrast, Paese et al. (1993) employed four 
scenarios and compared group decisions between groups composed of individuals 
who had responded to the same scenario, with groups composed of individuals who 
had responded to different scenarios. Paese et al. (1993) found that framing effect 
was evident at the individual level. However, for the group level, the results indicate 
that framing effect was amplified for groups that had responded to the same scenario 
as individuals, while there was a reduced framing effect for groups whose members 
had responded to different scenarios as individuals. Yaniv (2011) corroborated Paese 
et al. (1993), reporting an amplified framing effect among groups whose members 
previously responded to the same frame; while there was no framing effect for 
groups whose members previously responded to different frames. 
There is a paucity of research on the effects of anchoring on group decision 
making. In a governance setting, boards often receive pre-meeting information in the 
form of a board paper that contains a recommendation. Generally this 
recommendation has specific information or data that anchoring would suggest will 
affect the final decision reached. Given there is no evidence of how anchoring 
translates to the group level, the final research question seeks to understand if group 
decision making mechanisms amplify or attenuate this effect. Since this experiment 
focuses on the context of the board of directors10, however, each participant responds 
to the same scenario at both the individual and the group levels. Formally, the fifth 
research question is:  
RQ5: Is anchoring exacerbated or ameliorated at the group level in 
board style decision making? 
2.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter provides a theoretical framework upon which this thesis draws. This 
theoretical framework is consistent with the two aspects of the agenda for corporate 
governance research: (1) theories that link governance structure to performance 
                                                 
 
10 Directors on the same board typically exposed to the same frame of the decision situation.   
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(agency theory and stewardship theory), and (2) theories from behavioural 
economics and behavioural decision making that may help in developing a 
behavioural theory of boards and corporate governance. Whereas governance theory 
provides insight into actor motivations in the governance system, behavioural 
economics may provide greater insight into how those motivations take form in the 
governance process.  
The research questions follow a progression that first seeks to understand our 
current knowledge of key theoretical relationships in the Australian context before 
providing new ways of thinking about how these mechanisms may work. By 
answering these questions, the research will add to our knowledge of the strength of 
traditional corporate governance relationships and provide additional insights into the 
role of decision biases in governance decision making. Specifically, answering 
research questions three, four and five will provide insight into whether anchoring 
extends to situations involving multiple data points and whether group-level 
phenomena intensify or ameliorate the decision bias of anchoring. With the key lines 
of enquiry documented, the next chapter outlines the approach to the research 
methodology.
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents how this research is designed to address the research 
questions outlined in Chapter two. It provides an overview of the three studies of this 
research, the philosophical stance, the employed approach, and highlights how the 
three studies integrate to address the questions derived from the literature. 
Section 3.2 outlines each of the three studies, and how the multi-method design 
allows for the linking of a traditional investigation of agency costs (i.e. a study of the 
association between boards’ characteristics and performance) to a different approach 
to studying the agency mechanism derived from behavioural approaches to 
economics and psychology. 
In section 3.3, the epistemological and ontological stances underpinning this 
research are posited. Then, section 3.4 provides a justification for the quantitative 
approach and deductive reasoning for this research; this is mainly justified by 
demonstrating the quantitative limitations in prior research. Section 3.5 provides a 
justification for the untraditional sequence of the three studies, and finally section 3.6 
summarises the overall research design. 
3.2 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
To investigate the outcomes of boards’ decisions using both the inputs-outputs 
approach as well as the behavioural approach to board decision making, this research 
adopts a multi-method three-study design aimed at addressing the research questions 
specified in Chapter two. As outlined in that chapter, the overarching research 
problem involves advancing the corporate governance research agenda by 
developing a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying agency costs in 
boards of directors within the Australian corporate governance system. 
Each of the three studies of this research employs a different method; following 
its own logic, each method represents a different way for collecting and analysing 
empirical evidence. Just like all other methods, each of these three methods 
employed for this research has advantages and disadvantages. By acknowledging the 
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advantages and disadvantages of each method, the choice of each method was made 
as to best answer the given research question(s) and hence addresses the overarching 
research problem (Yin, 2009). In addition, the choice of each method was justified 
by a strategy that links the chosen method to the desired outcomes. Thus, the strategy 
sets the claims of why the chosen method for a given study provides the best answer 
for the questions in hand (Crotty, 1998). Table 3.1 presents the three components of 
this thesis. 
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Table 3- 1: The Three Studies Component of this Research 
Study One: Meta-analysis Study Two: Laboratory Experiment Study Three: On-line 
Administered Experiment11 
RQ1: Is there any association 
between the insider-outsider board 
composition of Australian firms and 
financial performance and, if so, 
what is the extent of this association? 
RQ2: Is there any association 
between board leadership structure 
of Australian firms and financial 
performance and, if so, what is the 
extent of this association? 
 
Aims: Consolidate the mixed results 
on the relationship between board 
independence and performance in the 
Australian context. 
 
Sample: All previous Australian 
studies with correlation between 
board independence variables and 
performance. 
 
Method: Meta-analyse all identified 
correlations. 
 
Advantages: Produce strong 
evidence reconciling inconsistent 
results in prior research. 
 
Results: There does not appear to be 
any systematic relationship between 
firm performance and each of board 
composition and board leadership 
structure. 
 
Originality: This is the first meta-
analysis of board characteristics-
performance relationship in 
Australian context. 
 
Limitations of study one: (1) If any 
of the included studies was biased, 
the bias would be reflected in results 
of the meta-analyses. (2) 
Statistically, correlation only 
measures the association between 
two given variables (e.g. CEO and 
ROA) without considering the 
influence of other governance 
variables (e.g. managerial ownership, 
institutional shareholding). 
RQ3: Does the use of an anchor in a 
board paper affect director and board 
decision making? 
RQ4: Do boards’ social norms of 
accepting/ questioning draft 
resolutions or recommendations affect 
directors’ judgments? 
RQ5: Is anchoring exacerbated or 
ameliorated at the group level in board 
style decision making? 
 
Aims: Develop an understanding of 
causal mechanism in common board 
practice that may cause biased decision 
making and increase agency costs. 
 
Sample: 180 students from QUT 
solving a written exercise that is a 
hypothetical board decision situation. 
The exercise involves students in 
estimating a numerical value (i.e. 
setting an upper limit for a salary 
negotiation with a prospective CEO).  
 
Method: In laboratory 3x2 
experimental designs with random 
allocation of students to the six 
conditions run in both group and 
individual level of analysis. 
 
Advantages: Internal validity controls 
to increase strength of causality claims 
around mechanism. 
 
Results: The use of draft resolutions 
with recommended financial figures 
biases both individual and group 
decision making in realistic but 
hypothetical decision situations. 
 
Originality: (1) Provide a 
generalisation to the mechanism that 
theoretically increases agency costs. (2) 
The use of more than one numerical 
reference point. (3) This is the first 
study investigating anchoring effects at 
the group level. 
 
Limitations of study two: External 
validity issues arise in study two as 
students might not be representative of 
directors and boards. 
RQ3: Does the use of an 
anchor in a board paper 
affect director and board 
decision making? 
RQ4: Do boards’ social 
norms of accepting/ 
questioning draft resolutions 
or recommendations affect 
directors’ judgments? 
 
 
Aims: Extend the results of 
study two to the population of 
interest to increase external 
validity. 
 
Sample: A sample of 76 
practicing directors from 
different Australian firms 
(110 firms) solving the same 
exercise from study two. 
 
Method: Online administered 
Experiment facilitated by 
Qualtrics. 3x2 experimental 
designs with random 
allocation of directors to the 
six conditions. 
 
Advantages: (1) Internal 
validity controls to increase 
strength of causality claim 
around mechanism, and (2) 
generalise the results to the 
population of interest. 
 
Results: The use of draft 
resolutions with 
recommended financial 
figures biases initial directors’ 
decisions in realistic but 
hypothetical decision 
situations. 
 
Originality: (1) Provide a 
statistical generalisation to the 
mechanism that theoretically 
increases agency costs. 
 
Limitations of study three: 
The inability to investigate 
group decision making. 
                                                 
 
11 The online experiment was formatted and administered using the web based service “Qualtrics” 
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As detailed in Chapter two, current research has focused on the monitoring 
mechanisms provided by the board of directors. Specifically, drawing upon agency 
theory, a large body of research has linked board monitoring (proxied as board 
independence) to agency costs (proxied as firm financial performance). Yet, prior 
research into the links between both proxies has provided little consistency in results 
(e.g. Capezio et al. (2011); Smith (2009); Christensen et al. (2010); Kiel & Nicholson 
(2003a)). Moreover, current research into corporate governance has overlooked the 
emerging avenues of researching boards in a descriptive perspective that adopts a 
behavioural theorised perspective (Daily et al., 2003; Ees et al., 2009; Hendry, 2002, 
2005). 
To achieve a coherent approach to researching boards, I link the traditional 
approach of researching boards to the behavioural approach. Therefore, the starting 
point of the research is providing overall empirical evidence for the ambiguous and 
conflicting results provided by current research. Using meta-analysis, study one 
(Chapter four) synthesises the extensive body of existing research to consolidate the 
mixed results on the links between board independence and firm performance. This 
meta-analysis includes all Australian studies that have reported the correlation value 
between board independence and performance; this also includes studies from which 
the correlation value can be derived or obtained from the authors. The sample 
includes all Australian studies that have been published before October 2013. 
The results from the meta-analysis indicate that there does not appear to be any 
systematic relationship between board independence and firm performance. The 
results from study one provide a conclusion that monitoring by boards (proxied as 
board independence) does not seem to be the underlying mechanism to explaining 
agency costs because both variables are not correlated in the first place. However, 
because study one does not provide a causal explanation to agency costs around the 
boardroom, and because it overlooks the descriptive aspect of the agency 
mechanisms in the process of decision making, study two (Chapter five) is 
conducted. 
Study two adopts a behavioural approach to researching corporate governance; 
an approach that describes the mechanisms of agency costs in boards’ common 
practice. This behavioural approach promotes a more close investigation of board 
dynamics and processes in and around the boardroom. Conducting an investigation 
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into the causal dynamics and mechanisms of agency costs in boards’ common 
practice requires utilisation of methodology that allows a high control of variables; 
that is, an experiment. By so doing, we may gain a better understanding of effective 
corporate governance (Ees et al., 2009; Huse, 2005). 
Although corporate governance research has not yet provided a solid behavioural 
framework to investigate board and governance issues (Ees et al., 2009), a 
behavioural approach to researching boards  and directors can still rely on the long-
standing traditional research from cognitive psychology and behavioural sciences 
(Bainbridge, 2002). Such a descriptive approach employs different methodologies 
than those utilised in the traditional prescriptive approach (Huse, 2005). 
Study two utilises a highly controlled laboratory experiment aiming to develop an 
understanding of the causal mechanism in board practice that increases agency costs. 
Drawing upon the behavioural decision making domain as demonstrated in cognitive 
psychology, study two investigates the influence of the structure of information on 
boards’ decisions. Mainly, study two investigates the theoretical construct of 
“adjustment and anchoring” in boards’ practice (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974: 1128). 
Using a sample of 180 students from Queensland University of Technology 
(QUT), subjects were randomly assigned to a 3x2 experimental design. Subjects 
were asked to solve a written exercise that is a hypothetical board decision situation; 
the exercise involves estimating a numerical value (i.e. salary negotiation with a 
prospective CEO). The experimental design with random allocation of students to the 
six conditions was run in both individual and group level of analysis. The results 
indicate that the use of draft resolutions with recommended salary package 
(numerical reference point) at the beginning of papers biases both individual and 
group decision making in realistic but hypothetical decision situations. 
Although with increased internal validity that strengthens causality claim, study 
two lacks external validity as QUT students might not be representative of directors 
and boards. Thus, I conduct study three (Chapter six) to complement study two and 
address its external validity concern. Using the same experimental design from study 
two (i.e. only the individual phase), study three is administered on-line and addressed 
to a sample of practicing directors from 110 Australian firms. The results from study 
three also indicate that the use of draft resolutions with recommended salary package 
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(numerical reference point) at the beginning of papers biases directors’ decision 
making in realistic but hypothetical decision situations. 
The three studies together provide an innovative approach to investigating 
outcomes of boards’ decisions using both the inputs-outputs approach as well as the 
behavioural approach to board decision making. The investigation drew upon the 
prescriptive formal structures of boards as well as the dynamics and processes of 
board decision making. This three-study multi-method design brings more 
understanding to the causes of agency costs as it answers the overall research 
question: 
“Is director independence associated with firm performance and, if 
not, what alternative mechanisms might lead to agency costs?” 
3.3 THE APPROACH WITH THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
Once the methods are chosen, and the choice of methods is explained and 
justified within the employed methodology, the philosophical position (i.e. choice of 
reality) starts to be situated. This choice of reality includes deciding on how we make 
sense of this reality and how our understanding of the world is considered knowledge 
(Crotty, 1998). 
To ensure the soundness of this research and make its outcomes convincing, this 
section outlines my epistemological and ontological position as embedded in my 
choice of method and methodology. Epistemology is concerned with the nature of 
knowledge, its possibility and scope; it is a way of understanding and explaining how 
we know what we know and what it means to know (Crotty, 1998; Papineau, 1996). 
Ontology refers to the philosophy of existence, and is concerned with the structure of 
reality and the nature of phenomena; the “what is” question (Gratton & Jones, 2004; 
Crotty, 1998). 
An epistemological position can be situated at any point of the continuum with 
empiricism and rationalism at either end (Ryan, Scapens, & Theobald, 2002). 
However, because epistemological terms are used differently among philosophers 
and researchers, we see epistemological positions termed and explained differently in 
philosophy text books. For instance, as an alternative to an empiricism-rationalism 
continuum, an epistemological position can be situated at one of three major 
epistemological positions: objectivism, constructionism, and subjectivism (Crotty, 
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1998). In order to comprehend my epistemological position in a diversified 
terminological sense, I explain my epistemological position using the above two 
terminologies. I locate my objectivist philosophical position (Crotty, 1998); 
similarly, my empiricist philosophical position (Ryan et al., 2002). 
To aid the discussion of epistemology, Figure 3.1 presents an integrated schema 
for these two epistemological terminologies. Figure 3.1 also presents the ontological 
continuum with realism and anti-realism at either end; so that realism lies at one end 
in consistence with empiricism while anti-realism lies at the other end in consistence 
with rationalism. 
 
 
 
 
 
My epistemological position is an objectivist; which holds that meaningful reality 
exists as such apart from our consciousness. In other words, we know what we know 
by discovering the reality and its meaning; yet, both reality and its meaning exist 
whether we discover them or not. This objectivist epistemological position is 
consistent with the realism ontological view, which emphasises that reality exists 
outside the mind, whether we comprehend its existence or not, it still exists (Gratton 
& Jones, 2004; Crotty, 1998). 
Subjectivist Objectivist Constructionist 
Empiricism    Logical empiricism                                                          Rationalism 
M
y position 
Anti-Realism ontology Realism ontology
Figure 3- 1: Philosophical continuum and my epistemological and ontological position 
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Consistently with the same realism ontological view, the constructionist 
epistemological position also accepts that reality exists outside the mind. Yet, unlike 
an objectivist, a constructionist would not accept meanings outside the mind. A 
constructionist believes that people construct meanings to the reality when 
discovering it. Thus, people may form different meanings to the same reality, and 
that is why we notice that specific objects are recognised differently (e.g. one object 
with different meanings) across places and times. On the other hand, subjectivism 
holds that neither the reality nor its meaning exist outside the mind; rather we impose 
meanings to reality when we discover it. This epistemological position is consistent 
with anti-realism ontology, whereby reality cannot exist outside the mind. 
Acquiring knowledge and explaining how it can be acquired has been a 
controversial issue. On one hand, rationalism sets reasoning and logic to obtain 
knowledge. Thus, the power of logic is the only ground to decide on the truth of 
theoretical argumentations. The conclusion in the rationalism approach is reached by 
drawing upon a set of facts or statements that is tested against a systematic set of 
rules. In rationalism epistemological view, even a direct experience with the world 
cannot claim knowledge if not reasoned. On the other hand, empiricism considers 
direct experience with the world enough to build a truth of reality upon, so that logic 
and reasoning is not needed as long as the direct experience with the world is 
accomplished (Ryan et al., 2002). 
My epistemological position lies on what is called modern empiricism (also 
called logical empiricism). Branching from traditional empiricism, modern 
empiricism has developed to embrace justification and reasoning, so that our 
experience with the world using a scientific method of observation represents a 
justification for our beliefs about what we have experienced or what we have known. 
However, although modern empiricism embraces reasoning and justification, it still 
emphasises experience with the world; thus, reasoning without experience is 
meaningless (Ryan et al., 2002). My modern-empiricist position (similarly my 
objectivist position) is embedded in a positivism perspective as I explain further 
(Crotty, 1998). 
The development of empiricism (i.e. modern empiricism) has led to the most 
significant philosophical movements of thinking, that is, positivism, which has been 
thought to have a strong influence on economics and accounting fields (Ryan et al., 
 Chapter 3: Research Design 51 
2002). Positivism was originally coined by Auguste Comte in 1848; the term 
“positive” and its derivatives in the philosophical sense essentially indicates 
“something that is posited” or “given”; as opposed to something that has been 
reasoned (Crotty, 1998: 20). 
Positivism suggests that methodological procedures that are applied in natural 
sciences can be applied to social sciences research, and that the results of social 
sciences investigations can be formulated or expressed in terms of laws or 
generalisations (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2000). 
Positivism is an approach of objective investigation in which the researcher has 
no influence on the findings and the results (Gratton & Jones, 2004). Thus, 
measurement in positivism has to be objective and not subject to any influence from 
the researcher side; this means that others can reach the same conclusions based on 
given evidence. To achieve this objectivity, statistical analysis and other techniques 
from applied science are the most employed techniques for measurement in 
positivism. 
Positivism highlights that statistical techniques can be used (1) to provide an 
objective control over the variables, (2) to precisely measure variables, hence (3) to 
reach at a causal relationship, and by so doing we can test the developed hypotheses 
against the obtained results. If the research is designed and planned carefully a solid 
conclusion will be achieved (Gratton & Jones, 2004). 
On the other hand, pragmatism’s perspective claim on knowledge emphasises the 
research problem rather than methods used. Pragmatism is concerned with the 
application of the resultant solutions of an investigation; “what works”. Therefore, 
the researcher can use any method to reach at a solution for the problem in hand. 
Pragmatism means being free from any commitment to any philosophy, not being 
confined to specific techniques or methods, not seeing the world as an absolute unity, 
and that the truth is the solution for the problem at the given time (Creswell, 2013). 
I adopt a positivist approach to reaching conclusions for this research; I derive 
and develop hypotheses from the theories used for this research, and then statistical 
techniques are employed for the following stages of the research: 
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 Data collection: e.g. obtain correlation values for the meta-analysis, 
determine the sample size for both experimental studies, and randomise 
conditions to participants, etc. 
 Measurement: e.g. control the variables in both experimental studies to 
measure the influence of each independent variable, weighting studies 
included in the meta-analysis based on sample size and effects size. 
 Analysis and results: e.g. reaching an overall correlation value and 
moderating analysis for the meta-analysis study; while for the experiment, 
I use ANOVA and Chi square to measure the difference between the 
groups and hence gauge the influence of each independent variable. 
Finally, to reach conclusions for the three studies, the results obtained in each of 
the three studies are tested against the hypotheses developed for each	 study, and 
hence, the conclusion for the overall research is also reached. 
3.4 QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH, DEDUCTIVE REASONING, AND 
JUSTIFICATION 
Two main strategies are employed in social sciences research; the quantitative 
research and the qualitative research. Quantitative research is concerned with data 
that is numeric which is analysed to reach a conclusion. Quantitative research mostly 
utilises experiment, survey, and archival data (Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-
Guerrero, 2010). 
 Quantitative research is deductive in nature; the word “deduction” means the use 
of reasoning to draw a valid particular conclusion from a prior valid general 
assumption (Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero, 2010; Cohen et al., 2000). 
Conducting deductive research starts with the operationalisation of the theoretical 
concepts and the development of the theoretical hypotheses. Then data are gathered 
to test the proposed theoretical hypotheses; it is important to note that the observation 
in deductive research is made after the formulation of the hypotheses and that the 
results are generalised to a previously specified population (Johns & Lee-Ross, 
1998). 
On the other hand, qualitative research is concerned with qualities characteristic 
of the phenomenon in its natural setting, and that is why qualitative research mostly 
utilises case studies and ethnographic studies. Qualitative research is inductive in 
 Chapter 3: Research Design 53 
nature; the word “induction” means reasoning a generalisation from a prior valid 
specification. Unlike deduction, observations in the inductive research are described 
and analysed for the aim of developing a theoretical framework. This means that data 
are gathered and analysed to extract hypotheses (Johns & Lee-Ross, 1998; Frankfort-
Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero, 2010). 
The three studies of this research are deductive in nature; theoretical concepts are 
derived from the used theories (e.g. agency theory, behavioural decision making 
theory, and social norms theory), then hypotheses are developed. The development 
of hypotheses includes operationalisation of the theoretical concepts, so that later 
when data collection finishes, variables are measured as previously specified in 
accordance with our operationalisation. Finally, the gathered data is analysed so that 
obtained results are used to test hypotheses. 
Each of the three studies of this research aims to address some empirical 
limitations identified in prior research into decision making in general, as well as into 
board decision making. I address these limitations in this research using a 
quantitative approach rather than a qualitative approach because these limitations are 
quantitative in nature. This research addresses three quantitative limitations from 
prior research: 
 First: for study one, prior research lacks an overall statistical evidence for the 
association between board independence and financial performance; whereby this 
evidence is needed given the inconsistent results provided in prior research. Meta-
analysis, study one, has never been utilised to investigate board independence-
performance relationship in the Australian context. This meta-analysis synthesises all 
correlation values (either reported in a journal article or obtained as raw data from 
authors) for the Australian boards’ independence and their respective performance to 
provide one overall value that identifies “To what extent” is board independence of 
Australian companies correlated with performance. Study one is comprised of two 
investigations aiming at answering the first and the second research questions of this 
thesis: (1) for RQ1, this investigation involves a sample of 64,255 company years, 
which is about eight times bigger than the biggest investigated sample in prior 
empirical research of Australian board composition-performance relationship. (2) For 
RQ2, this investigation involves a sample of 52,628 company years, which is about 
six times bigger than the biggest investigated sample in prior empirical research of 
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Australian board leadership structure-performance relationship. Furthermore, my 
sample for the two investigations includes 29 published studies; I believe that my 
sample may settle many of the sampling variability issues (Cumming, 2012). 
Second, prior research lacks an empirical evidence of “To what extent do”: 
 Anchoring effect arise when more than one reference point (anchors) are 
provided in the decision situation? Prior research has only investigated 
anchoring effect by employing one reference point in the decision 
situation. 
 Social norms are evident among directors? 
 Anchoring effect and boards’ social norms influence directors’ estimate 
of executives’ remunerations. 
 Anchoring effect and boards’ social norms arise at the group level? 
Anchoring effects have never been investigated at groups’ level. 
Moreover, anchoring effects and social norms have never been 
investigated in a hypothetical but realistic boards’ context. 
Using an experimental design, study two provides generalisation to the 
mechanisms that theoretically increase agency costs. As with this experimental 
design, the internal validity controls to increase the strength of causality claim 
around the mechanism that biases decision making in common board practice. 
Third, given the external validity issues arising in study two, as students might 
not be representative of directors and boards, study three generalises the results to the 
population of interest (i.e. directors). 
These “To what extent” questions are naturally promoted and formed given the 
quantitative nature of the inquiry in hand as promoted by the limitations from prior 
research. Because I employ quantitative approach for this research, answers to each 
research question provide an estimate for the used effect size and a confidence 
interval around that estimate (Cumming, 2012). 
3.5 MULTI-METHOD STUDY AS AN APPROACH AND THE SEQUENCE 
OF THE STUDIES 
In this section, I provide justification for the sequence of the three studies and the 
contribution of this sequence in answering the overall research question. The first 
two studies in this three-study design research stand as a recognition to the two 
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possible theoretical explanations to agency costs. These two theoretical explanations 
are drawn from two strands of decision making theory: (1) the standard perspective; 
also called the prescriptive perspective (study one), and (2) the behavioural 
perspective; also called the positive perspective (study two). Then, given some 
limitations to study two (statistical generalisation), it is complemented by study 
three. 
I find that drawing upon two theoretical perspectives requires that I accordingly 
divide this research into two studies because each theoretical perspective either 
promotes a specific strategy and methods or advances a different level of analysis. 
For each study, I develop hypotheses to be tested against the corresponding 
theoretical perspective. Bringing these two theoretical perspectives to researching 
board decision making is an endeavour to better answer the research questions of 
each study and hence best answer the overall research question. However, given 
some limitations to study two, it is complemented by study three. 
This research starts with meta-analysis that aims at providing overall empirical 
evidence about the association between boards’ outside-insider composition and 
financial performance. The obtained overall evidence from the meta-analysis is 
tested against prescriptions from both agency theory and stewardship theory; 
whereby the outcomes of decisions (i.e. financial performance) are explained by 
boards’ outside-insider composition. 
I consider this meta-analysis the first foundation in answering the overall 
research question outlined in Chapter two for the following reasons: (1) although 
meta-analysing correlation values does not provide a cause-effect explanation 
between board independence and performance, it is considered the ground to provide 
that cause-effect explanation. Because there would not be a cause-effect relationship 
between two variables if there was not a correlation between them in the first place. 
(2) This meta-analysis is considered the best method for building upon prior research 
and advancing it: first, I think that it might be better to conduct the research based on 
solid stands from prior empirical research so that a link between prior research and 
further investigations is provided; especially that prior empirical research has 
provided little consistency in results. Second, in addition to the empirical phase that 
is explained in the previous point, the evidence from this meta-analysis is used to test 
the prescribed theoretical perspectives in explaining agency costs. (3) Overall, the 
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obtained results from the meta-analysis should refine the variables of the study; it 
should clearly indicate whether subsequent investigations into boards and agency 
costs should include board independence variables or not. 
Traditionally when a research employs more than one study, and when 
experiment is one of these studies, the research starts with an experiment that aims at 
refining variables and detecting any cause-effect relationship, and then the 
experiment is followed by another study (e.g. survey or any quantitative research) to 
gauge the extent to which an inference can be made about a pre-specified 
population12. Yet, for this research, the meta-analysis is followed by the experiment 
rather than the opposite; mainly because this research aimed at linking prior research 
to the new advances in researching boards. However, after a theoretical 
generalisation is provided in study two, study three is used to provide an inference 
(statistical generalisation) about directors and boards; just like in traditional 
sequences of research. 
However, with the convenience and ease of use provided by the software I utilise 
to run the meta-analysis (the software is called CMA), it was clear at the very early 
stage of the meta-analysis that there is no association (e.g. zero correlation) between 
financial performance and each of board composition and board leadership structure. 
Hence, variables were refined so that board variables (board composition and board 
leadership structure) are not included in the subsequent investigations of this 
research. 
The obtained evidence of no correlation between board independence and 
performance from the meta-analysis study does not necessarily imply non-
association between board variables and agency costs; rather it raises two possible 
implications: first, unlike what agency theory suggests, board independence may not 
be the right proxy for board monitoring. Second, a higher proportion of independent 
directors on boards and an independent chair may not be the right proxies for board 
independence from management. However, investigating these two implications 
requires an extensive and intensive research with different instruments that cannot be 
                                                 
 
12 Yet some may argue that both cause-effect relationship and inference about population may be 
achieved from an experiment study. This might be true in some cases, but not always. Caution is 
recommended as there is a difference between sampling and statistical inference on the one hand and 
experimental design on the other (see Thompson, 2012). 
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conducted in a small project like a thesis. Yet I take the investigation one step further 
to the operational aspects of board decision making. 
In the second study, I employ an experimental design that allows controlling over 
variables to reach a cause-effect explanation to agency costs. In study two, I draw 
upon theoretical grounds from behavioural theory, and assume that agency costs may 
originate at any stage of board decision making irrespective of board independence. 
This means that I exclude variables of board independence (board composition and 
board leadership structure) from the analysis; this exclusion is consistent with the 
results from the meta-analysis results. Study two develops an understanding of the 
causal mechanism in common board practice that may cause biased decision making 
and increase agency costs. Experimental design is the only strategy that allows for 
control over the variables and hence measures the influence of each variable. 
Given the difficulty of gaining access to boards and directors, especially for the 
group setting, I recruit students from QUT to be the subjects of this study. And to get 
these participants to a board-like decision situation, I design an experiment whose 
study instrument is a hypothetical board decision situation about setting an upper 
limit for a salary negotiation with a prospective CEO. Experimental design is the 
only strategy that allows for utilising such hypothetical board-like setting design. 
Each participant will be asked to individually estimate an upper limit for the salary 
negotiation with that prospective CEO, then in a group setting, and then individually 
again.  
However, because the subjects of the experiment are students rather than 
directors, the results of the experiment cannot be statistically generalised to directors. 
Thus, study three, an on-line administered experimental design is addressed to a 
sample of directors of Australian companies to overcome the external validity issues 
in study two. Study three provides an inference about the population of Australian 
companies’ directors. Study two; the laboratory experiment, and study three; the on-
line experiment complement each other so that theoretical generalisation is achieved 
from study two, while statistical generalisation is achieved from study three. 
3.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has laid the foundations to grasp how each study in this research 
helps understand one aspect of boards’ decisions, and how the three studies together 
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help to understand the prescriptive and behavioural aspects of board decision 
making. Choice of method for each study is explained and justified through the 
methodological and philosophical stances that are embedded in the chosen methods. 
This chapter does not provide detailed discussion of the techniques used (e.g. 
sampling, data collection and analysis) for each study; detailed discussion about the 
three studies is provided in each relevant study chapter; meta-analysis is presented 
and discussed in Chapter four, while Chapter five presents and discusses the 
laboratory experiment, and the on-line administered experiment is discussed in 
Chapter six. 
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Chapter 4: Board Composition, Board Leadership 
Structure, and Firm Performance: An 
Australian Meta-Analysis 
4.1 OVERVIEW 
Having established the overall theoretical framework of the thesis in Chapter two 
and the overarching research strategy in Chapter three, this chapter documents the 
first research stage. Specifically, the chapter provides an empirical synthesis of the 
research into board structure-performance links in the Australian listed company 
environment. 
By employing a meta-analysis approach to investigating board structure-
performance links, this study aims at reconciling the vastly different array of board 
structure-performance relationships reported in the literature. Overall, the results 
indicated that the structure of Australian boards does not correlate with firm financial 
performance. Specifically, there is no robust association (i.e. correlation) between 
independence characteristics (i.e. board composition and board leadership structure) 
of Australian boards and firm financial performance. These findings form the base 
from which an investigation into decision processes is launched; the subject of 
Chapter five. 
4.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Perhaps the most investigated set of relationships in corporate governance 
research is that between board structure and firm performance. Corporate governance 
reforms, particularly in Anglo-Saxon economies (but also globally), have long 
emphasised the importance of board independence. This takes many forms, but 
generally includes prescriptions that boards should be comprised of a majority of 
independent directors and that the chair of the board should be an independent 
director (for instance, in Australia; recommendations 2.4 and 2.5 of the CGPR (2014: 
17-18)13). Independence is thought important to the board’s ability to discharge its 
duties and responsibilities. Although tied to directors’ fiduciary relationship with the 
                                                 
 
13 As a reminder CGPR (2014) stands for “Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations” 
by the ASX Corporate Governance Council, 3rd Edition, 2014. 
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organisation (Bainbridge, 2002, 2003), it is also an inherent acknowledgment of 
agency theory.  
A prescription for a specific board structure is not, however, strongly supported 
by research findings, either in Australia or internationally. Instead, findings from 
empirical research into the links between board structure and firm performance are 
inconsistent. Empirical research in the Australian context, for instance, has provided 
a range of correlations between board composition and firm performance;  at one end 
of this range, Bonn (2004) reports a statistically significant positive correlation (r 
(82) = .285, p < .05) between ROE and the proportion of outside directors. While at 
the other end, Hutchinson (2002) reports a statistically significant negative 
correlation (r (229) = -.219, p < .01) between investment opportunities set (IOS)14 
and the ratio of non-executive directors15. Moreover, other studies report correlation 
between board composition and firm performance with correlation values 
approaching zero (Capezio et al., 2011; Smith, 2009; Christensen et al., 2010). 
Similar inconsistency in results is also evident for the association between board 
leadership structure and firm performance in the Australian context.  
The aim of this chapter is to use meta-analysis strategy in an attempt to reconcile 
the different array of results (i.e. correlation values) reported in the literature. This 
approach has been used successfully in other national contexts. For instance, in the 
US three key meta-analyses for board-performance relationship concluded that the 
true population relationship between board independence and financial performance 
was near zero (i.e. Dalton et al., 1998), at most very small and positive (i.e. Rhoades 
et al., 2000) or curvilinear relationship in which performance is enhanced by the 
greater relative increase of inside or outside directors (i.e. Wagner et al., 1998). 
While international findings are instructional, differences between national 
systems of corporate governance (Psaros, 2009) highlight the importance of 
                                                 
 
14 IOS is computed by Hutchinson (2002) as a composite factor of: market to book value of assets, 
market to book value of equity, and gross book value of property, plant and equipment to market 
value of assets. Hutchinson (2002: 22) employs IOS to proxy the proportion of firm value represented 
by growth options. 
15 Bonn (2004) measured board independence as the proportion of outside directors, and measured 
performance as ROE, while Hutchinson (2002) measured board independence as the ratio of non-
executive directors, and measured performance as IOS. However, the proportion of outside directors 
and the ratio of non-executive directors were operationalised to proxy board independence. Similarly, 
ROE and IOS were operationalised to proxy financial performance.  
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understanding the nature of any systematic relationship in the Australian corporate 
governance system16.Moreover, The ASX (the Australian Securities Exchange) is 
considerably small when compared to the US and the UK Securities exchange 
environments; e.g. the ASX includes fewer listed companies and lower levels of total 
institutional investment (Hsu & Koh, 2005).  
In addition, although Australian boards resemble the prescribed governance 
practice, the Australian market represents an interesting case for studying the links 
between boards’ structure and performance; for instance, agency costs in Australian 
firms have been found to be larger than those evident in the US firms (Fleming et al., 
2005; Henry, 2004, 2010). Yet, no clear solid evidence has been provided to support 
board structure-performance links in an Australian context. 
Given the absence of evidence on board structure-performance links in corporate 
Australia, many researchers extrapolate their research conclusions in light of 
different contexts such as the contingency approach (Capezio et al., 2011), calling for 
a governance approach that balances the inside/ outside presence on boards (Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003a), the characteristics of the institutional investors (Bonn et al., 2004; 
Henry, 2008), or recommendations for extending boards research to fields of 
organisational behaviour and social psychology (Bonn, 2004; Christensen et al., 
2010). 
In an Australian context, I am not aware of any study that attempts to harness 
the statistical power available in the myriad of Australian studies conducted to date. 
For instance, the largest sample size I have located investigating the relationships 
between board independence and performance in corporate Australia is 8,594 
company observation years (Schultz et al., 2013). In contrast, a meta-analysis would 
provide evidence drawn from 64,255 company observation years. This provides 
additional power compared with previous research, and so should yield more stable 
and robust results (Harrison, Torres, & Kukalis, 1988). Whereas, in an international 
arena, a meta-analysis synthesis would update the global understanding of how board 
structure may influence firm financial performance. Previous meta-analyses from the 
                                                 
 
16 For more about the differences between the Australian corporate governance system and that of the 
US, please refer to Section “1.2 Motivation”. 
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US are now 15-20 years old (Dalton et al., 1998; Wagner et al., 1998; Rhoades et al., 
2000, 2001). 
4.3 THEORETICAL GROUNDS OF THE RESEARCH AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
Research into boards of directors has been dominated by studies that investigate 
the relationships between board composition and firm performance. Largely inspired 
by upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), this approach treats the board 
as a “black box” (Daily et al., 2003: 379) whereby important attributes of the 
directors and boards are inferred from readily accessible demographic and reportable 
data. While often part of a larger research design, most archival studies of boards in 
Australia investigate the association between board composition and/or board 
leadership structure (CEO/ chairperson roles held jointly or separately), and different 
measures of firm financial performance (Henry, 2008; Arthur, 2001; Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003a; Hutchinson & Gul, 2002, 2004, 2006). While these data are often 
collected as a control, the motivation for the research is largely driven by two 
theoretical perspectives, each of which suggests the superiority of a specific 
configuration for board composition and board leadership structure. The first is 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983) while the second is 
stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1991, 1994). 
Agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983), is based on separating ownership from 
control in the modern corporation (Berle & Means, 1932), and the so-called agency 
costs associated with self-interested actions of executive managers (e.g. shirking) 
whose interests deviate from those of the owners. Agency theory posits that these 
costs can be controlled by apportioning different decision rights to different bodies in 
the corporation (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Management, the corporation’s hands, 
initiates and implements decisions while the board of directors provides a check and 
balance through ratifying and monitoring. 
According to agency theory, outside directors, with their virtue of independence 
from the management, are best placed to monitor executive managers and control 
any conflicts arising in the agency relationship. Therefore, increased board 
independence is associated with decreased agency costs and hence improved 
financial performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Similarly, agency theory posits that 
joint leadership structure (CEO and chair roles fulfilled by the same person) would 
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promote CEO entrenchment and hence jeopardise board monitoring effectiveness. 
Therefore, an independent board chair is associated with decreased agency costs and 
hence improved financial performance (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Rechner & Dalton, 
1991).  
Stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1991, 1994) stands in 
contrast to agency theory and instead posits that managers are trustworthy and not 
prone to expropriate corporate resource for two key reasons. First, stewardship 
theory presents a different motivation for managers whereby the higher order 
motivations of self-actualisation overtake lower order motivations for narrow 
definitions of self-interest evident in agency theory17. Thus, while agency theory 
would be positioned as a Theory X view of governance (managers need to be closely 
monitored as they will always pursue self-interest with guile), stewardship would be 
positioned as Theory Y view (the higher order motivations of managers would mean 
that there will be little, if any, conflict between corporate performance and the 
interests for senior managers (Donaldson & Davis, 1991)).   
Second, stewardship theory proponents also argue that inside directors possess 
superior information (in terms of quantity and quality) about the firm, and hence they 
are in the best position to maximise shareholders’ returns (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 
1990)18. In contrast, outside directors are not in a position to monitor management 
effectively because they lack knowledge and time, and resources (Donaldson & 
Davis, 1994). Thus, stewardship theory provides a rationale for the argument that 
board independence is either overstated or perhaps even unimportant. In this view of 
the world, boards dominated by inside directors are associated with an enhanced 
decision making, which in turn leads to an improved financial performance. 
Stewardship theory also posits the same rationale for board leadership structure; 
whereby organisational structure needs not to hinder the CEO from planning and 
implementing for higher performance. Thus, the CEO’s role must not be ambiguous 
or challenged; rather, the CEO must retain complete authority and power over the 
corporation through “the fusion of incumbency of the roles of chair and CEO” 
                                                 
 
17 These higher order motivations were earlier recognised in organisational psychology and 
organisational sociology (see McClelland, 1961; Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959). 
18 The links between board characteristics and performance are not made explicitly in stewardship 
theory, yet insider directors are thought to enhance corporate decision making, which is regarded as a 
key point in promoting financial outcomes (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). 
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(Donaldson & Davis, 1991: 52). Therefore, joint leadership structure (CEO duality) 
is associated with an enhanced decision making, which in turn leads to an improved 
financial performance. 
While these two theories are often presented as competing views of how boards 
should be structured, a more nuanced contingency view of stewardship theory has 
developed (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). This view recognises that sometimes 
managers act as agents and sometimes as stewards, with the role of the board as 
being to set a control system that matches management behaviour (Finkelstein & 
D’Aveni, 1994). While a contingency view is an important development, it does not 
negate the importance of understanding general relationships between financial 
performance, and board composition and board leadership structure. For instance, 
absent perfect interaction, if one style of management behaviour predominates, 
should be evident in generalised relationships. Similarly, if the followed normative 
prescription clashes with a true contingency perspective, this should also be evident 
in generalised relationships reported if there is sufficient power in the tests.  
In Australia, empirical research into the relationships between financial 
performance and each of board composition and board leadership structure has 
gained much attention from governance researchers. To highlight these generalised 
relationships across various empirical studies, I reviewed correlation values between 
financial performance and each of board composition and board leadership structure 
as reported in 29 prior Australian studies. 
I identified 28 different studies that report the correlation between financial 
performance and board composition. However, although the targeted correlation was 
reported in all of these 28 studies, the relationship between financial performance 
and board composition was not always the focus of these studies. Therefore, across 
these 28 studies, board composition was investigated as the independent variable for 
16 different studies, the control variable for seven different studies, the dependent 
variable for two studies, and finally for three different studies (Matolcsy, Tyler & 
Wells, 2012; Lim et al, 2007; Hutchinson, 2002), board composition was 
investigated as the dependent variable in the first stage of the study analysis and the 
independent variables in the following stage(s). 
Out of the above 28 studies, I identified 13 studies that report the correlation 
between financial performance and board leadership structure. In addition, I 
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identified one single study that reports the correlation between financial performance 
and board leadership structure, yet without reporting the correlation between 
financial performance and the continuous variable board composition (i.e. Davidson 
et al., 200519). Again, although the correlation between financial performance and 
board leadership structure was reported in all of these 14 studies, the relationship 
between financial performance and board leadership structure was not always the 
main investigation of these studies. Therefore, across these 14 studies, board 
leadership structure was investigated as the independent variable for 10 different 
studies, and the control variable for three different studies; yet for one study 
(Monem, 2013) board leadership structure was investigated as the independent 
variable for the first two stages of the study analysis and then as the dependent 
variable for the third stage analysis. 
Given the importance of the two theoretical perspectives (agency theory and 
stewardship theory) and the wide adoption of board composition and board 
leadership structure as control, dependent, or independent variables in board studies, 
this research seeks to identify if there is empirical support for a generalised 
association between board composition and firm performance. In synthesising the 
work of 28 studies of this relationship, the study seeks to understand: 
RQ1: Is there any association between the insider-outsider board 
composition of Australian firms and financial performance and, if 
so, what is the extent of this association? 
Similarly, in synthesising the work of 14 studies of the relationship between 
board leadership structure and firm performance, the study seeks to understand: 
RQ2: Is there any association between board leadership structure 
of Australian firms and financial performance and, if so, what is the 
extent of this association? 
                                                 
 
19 In their study, Davidson et al. (2005) use a dummy variable to measure board independence. This 
variable takes a value of one if the board is comprised of a majority of non-executive directors and 
zero otherwise. Hence, it was only included for the analysis of board leadership structure. 
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4.4 METHODS 
4.4.1 Meta-Analysis and Correlation; Justification 
In this chapter, the research questions are addressed with the aid of meta-
analysis. Meta-analysis is a procedure of achieving cumulative knowledge by 
combining the differing results across all studies on related issues (Hunter & 
Schmidt, 2004). Meta-analysis produces evidence on a controversial topic, and is 
well suited to a topic whose empirical work, though large, has resulted in different 
outcomes (Cumming, 2012). In the Australian context, a meta-analysis methodology 
would appear well suited to the range of results reported in the literature and, to the 
best of my knowledge, has not yet been employed in investigating the relationship 
between firm financial performance and each of board composition and board 
leadership structure. 
A meta-analysis is	“the extension of estimation to multiple studies”	 (Cumming, 
2013: 161) which harnesses effect sizes (ESs) and confidence intervals (CIs) instead 
of the dichotomous approach employed in null hypothesis significance testing with 
its associated significance values (p values). A meta-analysis approach uses the 
effect size reported in a range of comparable studies (e.g. means, correlations, Cohen 
ds) as a point estimate and develops confidence intervals as a scale for estimated 
uncertainty around that point estimate. These estimates are then combined based on 
the weight of evidence provided around the reported relationship in each study.  
Given the archival and often cross sectional design of boards’ research, any 
synthesis can only investigate the presence of relationships rather than causality. 
Although agency theory and stewardship theory argue for a causal relationship 
between board characteristics and financial performance, none of them has received 
strong, robust empirical support in terms of implications for board composition or 
board leadership structure. To investigate these theoretical claims, I will examine the 
Pearson product-moment correlation reported in studies as the measure for the 
strength of the relationship. A correlation coefficient provides an estimate of the co-
variation between variables and should be present if there is any underlying 
relationship between the variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Pallant, 2013). In this 
study, I employ the Pearson product–moment correlation as the most liberal measure 
of potential relationship between the variables of the interest (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). While a positive result does not establish a causal relationship, if a true 
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relationship exists it should be evident in a significant correlation. Therefore, this 
meta-analysis combines all correlation values between board composition of 
Australian firms and financial performance that are reported in previous studies, as 
well as all those correlation values between board leadership structure of Australian 
firms and financial performance that are reported in previous studies. 
4.4.2 Sample: Criteria for a Study’s Possible Inclusion in the Analysis 
Searching for articles to include in the meta-analysis proceeded at three stages20. 
First, I searched all databases made available to research students at QUT, namely: 
Business Source Elite, Wiley-Blackwell Pilot, ABI/INFORM Complete, ProQuest 
databases, SAGE premier journals, ScienceDirect journals, RePEc, Social Science 
Research Networks eLibrary, EBSCOhost data bases, Australian Public Affair 
Fulltext, Emerald, informit business databases, Taylor & Francis online journals, 
Accounting & Tax. Searches were based on terms and keywords commonly used in 
studies that investigated aspects of board independence and their influence on 
financial performance (please see Appendix one for search terms). By doing so, this 
stage of search yielded three types of studies: (1) studies investigating board 
structure-performance relationship; whereby correlation values were reported (12 
studies); (2) studies investigating board structure-performance relationship whereby 
correlation values were not reported (six studies), and (3) studies investigating 
relationships other than the board structure-performance links, yet included at least 
one board structure variable (e.g. CEO duality, proportion of independent directors, 
etc.) and one or more financial performance variable (e.g. ROA, Tobin’s Q) (nine 
studies; correlation was reported in seven of them). In total, the first stage of search 
identified 27 studies.  
In the second stage of the search I used the studies obtained in the first stage to: 
(1) identify further studies based on the reference lists of the studies identified in 
stage one, and (2) identify further studies based on the authors’	 names of studies 
identified in the first stage. Stage two of the search identified 12 studies; correlation 
values were reported in eight of these 12 studies. Thus, the total of studies identified 
in stage one and two of the search was 39 articles; out of which correlations were 
reported in 27 studies. 
                                                 
 
20 The search was conducted for the two meta-analyses; financial performance and board composition, 
as well as financial performance and board leadership structure. 
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In the third stage of the search, following Post and Byron (2014) and Quinones, 
Ford, and Teachout (1995), I contacted 12 authors via email whose studies 
investigate the variables of interests (i.e. financial performance and board structure 
variables) but did not report correlations, and requested from them the correlation 
values if they were available (please see Appendix two for the email template used in 
contacting authors). Requesting details from authors is a recommended procedure for 
any meta-analysis protocol (Chen & Peace, 2013). However, I received eight replies, 
two of which provided the requested correlation values.   
Overall, the entire search process identified 29 empirical studies for the two 
meta-analyses; out of which, 13 studies report correlations between financial 
performance and both board composition and board leadership structure, 15 studies 
report correlation between financial performance and board composition, and one 
study report correlation between financial performance and board leadership 
structure. Thus, there were 28 studies for board composition analysis and 14 studies 
for board leadership structure analysis. 
For the 28 board composition analysis studies, there were seven studies providing 
one correlation value (e.g. correlation between the ratio of independent directors and 
ROA), while each of the other 21 articles provide two correlation values or more 
(e.g. correlation between the ratio of independent directors, and ROA and Tobin’s 
Q). In total, the 28 identified articles for board composition analysis provide a total 
of 68 correlations. Sample size across the included studies ranges from 62 to 8,594 
company-years; the total sample size for the board composition/ financial 
performance meta-analysis is 64,255 company-years. Table 4.1 presents studies 
included in the board composition-performance analysis, sample size, board 
composition, performance measure, and correlation value for all included studies. 
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Table 4- 1: Studies Included in the Board Composition-Performance Analysis, 
Sample Size, Board Composition Measure, Performance Measure, and Correlation 
Values 
Study Sample 
size 
Board composition  Performance 
measure 
r 
Arthur (2001) 
 
118 % of independent directors  MBA .089 
Hutchinson & Gul (2002) 
 
268 % of non-executive directors ROE .066 
268 % of non-executive directors IOS21 -.187 
Hutchinson (2002) 
 
229 % of non-executive directors IOS -.219 
Hutchinson (2003) 182 % of non-executive directors ROE -.083 
182 % of non-executive directors ROE t+1 -.107 
Kiel & Nicholson (2003a) 348 % of non-executive directors ROA .023 
348 % of non-executive directors MBA -.179 
Hutchinson & Gul (2004) 
 
310 % of non-executive directors ROE -.029 
310 % of non-executive directors IOS -.072 
310 % of non-executive directors ROE t+1 .083 
Sharma (2004) 62 % of independent directors Change in 
total assets 
.201 
Henry (2004) 400 % of non-executive directors ROI -.082 
400 % of non-executive directors MBA -.010 
Bonn (2004) 84 % of independent directors ROE .285 
84 % of independent directors MBA -.087 
Bonn et al. (2004) 104 % of independent directors ROA .254 
104 % of independent directors MBA -.052 
Hutchinson & Gul (2006) 
 
753 % of non-executive directors ROE -.020 
753 % of non-executive directors IOS -.040 
753 % of non-executive directors ROE t+1 -.060 
Chalmers et al. (2006) 532 % of non-executive directors ROA .020 
                                                 
 
21 IOS (investment opportunity set) is a composite factor of market to book value of assets, market to 
book value of equity, and gross book value of property, plant and equipment to market value of assets. 
Hutchinson (2002: 22) employs IOS to proxy the proportion of firm value represented by growth 
options. 
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Study Sample 
size 
Board composition  Performance 
measure 
r 
532 % of non-executive directors MBE -.150 
Brown & Sarma (2007) 430 % of non-executive directors ROA -.046 
430 % of non-executive directors MBA -.210 
Lim et al. (2007) 181 % of independent directors ROA .116 
181 % of independent directors P/B ratio -.138 
Hutchinson et al. (2008) 400 % of non-executive directors ROA .105 
400 % of non-executive directors MBE -.045 
200 % of non-executive directors ROA(t+5)-t -.090 
200 % of non-executive directors MBE(t+5)-t .063 
Henry (2008) 1127 % of independent directors ROA -.023 
1127 % of independent directors MBA -.102 
Lau et al. (2009) 740 % of independent directors ROA -.044 
Wang & Oliver (2009) 243 % of executive directors 
(reversed) 
Rate of return .120 
243 % of independent directors Rate of return -.064 
Smith (2009) 105 % of non-executive directors ROA -.048 
105 % of non-executive directors MBE -.130 
105 % of non-executive directors ROEt-1 .056 
101 % of non-executive directors ROAt+1 .063 
101 % of non-executive directors MBEt+1 -.111 
92 % of non-executive directors ROAt+2 .118 
92 % of non-executive directors MBEt+2 -.067 
88 % of non-executive directors ROAt+3 .109 
87 % of non-executive directors MBEt+3 -.008 
Christensen et al. (2010) 1039 % of independent directors ROA -.015 
996 % of independent directors MBA -.051 
906 % of independent directors ROAavrg(t+1,
t+2,t+3) 
.106 
901 % of independent directors MBAavrg(t+1
,t+2,t+3) 
.002 
Heany et al. (2010) 1144 % of non-executive directors ROA .020 
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Study Sample 
size 
Board composition  Performance 
measure 
r 
1144 % of non-executive directors MBA -.010 
1144 % of non-executive directors ROA -.010 
1144 % of non-executive directors ROA .040 
1144 % of non-executive directors MBA -.080 
1144 % of non-executive directors MBA -.070 
Capezio et al. (2011) 4456 % of non-executive directors Stock return .015 
4456 % of non-executive directors Stock return -.006 
Bliss (2011) 799 % of non-executive directors ROA .194 
799 % of non-executive directors MBA -.061 
Chancharat et al. (2012) 125 % of non-executive directors ROA -.090 
Matolcsy et al. (2012a) 900 % of independent directors ROA .133 
Matolcsy et al. (2012b) 2288 % of executive directors 
(reversed) 
ROA -.047 
2288 % of executive directors 
(reversed) 
ROE -.024 
2288 % of executive directors 
(reversed) 
Book/market -.004 
2288 % of executive directors 
(reversed) 
Stock return .020 
Monem (2013) 1462 % of non-executive directors ROA .076 
Schultz et al. (2013) 8594 % of non-executive directors ROA .060 
8594 % of non-executive directors MBE .130 
Total 64255    
 
 
For the 14 board leadership structure studies, there were three articles providing 
one correlation value (e.g. correlation between CEO duality and ROA), while each of 
the other 11 articles provide two correlation values or more (e.g. correlation between 
CEO duality and both ROA and Tobin’s Q). In total, the 14 identified articles for 
board leadership structure analysis provide a total of 39 correlations. Sample size 
across the included studies ranges from 62 to 8,594 company-years; the total sample 
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size for the board leadership structure/ financial performance meta-analysis is 52,628 
company-years. Table 4.2 presents studies included in the board leadership structure-
performance analysis, number of correlations, sample size, board leadership structure 
measure, performance measure, and correlation value for all included studies. 
 
Table 4- 2: Studies Included in the Board Leadership Structure-Performance 
Analysis, Sample Size, Board Leadership Structure Measure, Performance Measure, 
and Correlation Values 
Study Sample 
size 
Board leadership measure Performance 
measure 
r 
Kiel & Nicholson 
(2003a) 
348 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROA -.067 
348 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair MBA .121 
Henry (2004) 400 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROI -.024 
400 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair MBA .101 
Sharma (2004) 62 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair Change in 
total assets 
-.087 
Davidson et al. (2005) 434 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is not the 
chair (reversed) 
ROA -.172 
434 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is not the 
chair (reversed) 
MBE -.097 
434 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is not the 
chair (reversed) 
ROA -.105 
Chalmers et al. (2006) 532 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROA .090 
532 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair MBE .170 
Henry (2008) 1127 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROA -.014 
Smith (2009) 105 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROA .063 
105 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair MBE .057 
105 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROE .032 
101 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROA -.057 
101 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair MBE .095 
92 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROA -.139 
92 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair MBE .054 
88 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROA -.117 
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Study Sample 
size 
Board leadership measure Performance 
measure 
r 
87 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair MBE .012 
Heany et al. (2010) 1144 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROA -.010 
1144 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair MBA .020 
1144 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROA -.060 
1144 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROA -.030 
1144 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair MBA .060 
1144 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair MBA .100 
Capezio et al. (2011) 4456 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair Stock return .035 
4456 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair Stock return .050 
Bliss (2011) 799 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is not the 
chair (reversed) 
ROA -.086 
799 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is not the 
chair (reversed) 
MBA .103 
Chancharat et al. 
(2012) 
125 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is not the 
chair (reversed) 
ROA -.090 
Matolcsy et al. (2012b) 2288 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROA .007 
2288 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROE -.004 
2288 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair Book/market .057 
2288 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair Stock return -.005 
Schultz et al. (2013) 8594 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROA -.030 
8594 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair MBE -.010 
Monem (2013) 1462 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair ROA -.109 
1400 Dummy V = 1 if CEO is the chair MBA -.066 
Total 52628    
 
4.4.3 Data Collection Form 
Data collection was based on a data abstraction form (DAF). The form is 
organised to collate all information required (study variables, findings, statistical data 
of the variables) so that it is readily available when needed. In addition to the time- 
saving that DAF offers whenever a piece of information is needed, DAF can also be 
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used by future researchers if an update on these current meta-analyses is needed 
and/or for replication (Peace & Chen, 2013).  
Key fields collected in the DAF were: title of the study, author(s) name(s), year 
of publication, sample, measure(s) of board composition and corresponding 
definition(s), leadership structure measure, performance measure(s) and 
corresponding definition(s), the year to which the data for different variables 
pertained, coefficient or correlation (measure of the relationship), and control or 
other variables collected in the study22. 
4.4.4 Measures and Moderators 
A key challenge for a meta-analysis is determining if studies are similar enough 
to be combined into a single analysis. In many disciplines, this challenge takes the 
form of differing research design and whether the studies were aimed at investigating 
the same relationship or not23 (Peace & Chen, 2013; Cumming, 2012). However, this 
is not a major issue in this study as all the included research was focused on 
correlation coefficients and the general relationship between the variables.  
Instead, the major challenge in analysis arose from the measurement of the 
constructs. Many studies operationalised the constructs of interest in different ways; 
a well-known challenge in the studies of boards of directors (Dalton & Aguinis, 
2013). For instance, many different operationalisations or measures of board 
independence are aimed at measuring the same phenomenon (separation from 
management), but did so in several different ways (e.g. the ratio of non-executives, 
the ratio of non-executives, the ratio of independent directors).  
Board Composition measures reflecting Board Independence: CGPR (2014: 16) 
defines an independent director as; 
A director of a listed entity should only be characterised and 
described as an independent director if he or she is free of any 
interest, position, association or relationship that might 
influence, or reasonably be perceived to influence, in a material 
                                                 
 
22 To receive a copy of the DAF in an Excel sheet format, please contact the authors at: 
abdull_mahmoud@yahoo.com. 
23 For instance, Fletcher and Kerr (2010) employed meta-analysis to investigate how people think 
about and make judgment about their partners. Fletcher and Kerr (2010) aimed to include studies that 
have investigated partners’ relationship, no matter whether a given study investigates heterosexual 
partners or homosexual partners. 
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respect his or her capacity to bring an independent judgement to 
bear on issues before the board and to act in the best interests of 
the entity and its security holders generally. 
Determining the independent status of a director in line with the above definition 
is difficult, largely due to limited information disclosed by the companies about their 
practicing directors. However, prior studies into board independence appear to have 
derived measures for operationalising board independence from a range of sources; 
this includes normative requirements (e.g. CGPR 2003, 2007, 2014), theory (e.g. 
managerial power theory (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004)), as well as conventional practice 
in the literature (see Dalton & Aguinis, 2013 for a review of potential measures). 
There is also the strong influence of whether the available information is reliable for 
measurement or not (i.e. what is disclosed in annual reports and so capable of being 
studied (Daily et al., 2003). 
For the studies included in this research, attributes of both board composition and 
firm performance were also operationalised differently. For instance, for only four of 
the 28 included studies (Bonn, 2004; Henry, 2008; Christensen et al., 2010; Matolcsy 
et al., 2012a)24, there was a direct indication that board independence is 
operationalised in line with the Australian CGPR for listed entities, specifically 
CGPR (2003). 
The sample of this study also includes the most liberal and common 
operationalisation of board independence, which involves measurements based on 
directors’ non-executive status (e.g. Capezio, et al., 2011; Hutchinson, 2002, 2003; 
Hutchinson & Gul, 2004, 2006), a position consistent with managerial power theory 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2004) and argued by some (Capezio et al., 2011) as the most 
valid criterion in determining directors’	independence. 
At the other extreme, some studies included in this meta-analysis operationalise 
board independence in accordance with criteria that are more conservative than those 
of the Australian Corporate Governance Guidelines (CGPR, 2003, 2007, 2014). For 
instance, Sharma (2004) and Lau et al. (2009) consider a director’s independence 
                                                 
 
24 The authors of these studies indicate that they relied on the CGPR (2003)’s definition of 
independent director to determine directors’ independence. Yet for three of these four studies, more 
recent version(s) of the CGPR were available; second edition (2007). However, CGPR (2003: 19)’s 
definition of an independent director is almost identical to that of the CGPR (2007: 16) and CGPR 
(2010: 16). Yet both are a bit different from the most recent version; CGPR (2014). 
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jeopardised if that director has ever been employed in an executive capacity of the 
company, whereas the CGPR guidelines (2003, 2007, and 2014) limit that to 
employment within the last three years. Similarly, Wang and Oliver (2009) consider 
a director’s long tenure on the board (i.e. in excess of 10 years on the same board) as 
a loss of independence; the prescribed guidelines (CGPR, 2007) did not highlight the 
length of directors’ tenure as a threat to directors’ independence. 
Although the above highlights the challenge of operationalising board 
independence, the studies included in this meta-analysis essentially employed one of 
two operationalisations of board independence, namely: (1) the ratio of independent 
directors, or (2) the ratio of non-executive directors. Only three studies did not follow 
one of those two operationalisation of board composition: first, where a study 
reported the ratio of executive directors, this operationalisation was transformed to a 
ratio of non-executive directors and the correlation sign reported was reversed (i.e. 
five correlations: four from Matolcsy et al., 2012b, and one correlation from Wang & 
Oliver, 2009). Second, one study reports correlation between the ratio of affiliated 
directors and performance; that is, Wang & Oliver (2009). I excluded this specific 
operationalisation of board composition from the analysis as it is represented by one 
correlation involving a small sample size of 243 company-years, yet there were two 
other correlations from the same study (i.e. ratio of independent directors and ratio of 
executive directors). Thus, the exclusion of this correlation should not result in any 
bias in results. 
Finally, there were two operationalisations of board independence used 
differently by researchers: (1) the ratio of outside directors; some researchers 
operationalise it to indicate the ratio of independent directors in accordance with the 
CGPR guidelines, while other researchers use it to indicate the ratio of non-executive 
directors. For each study that employed the ratio of outside directors measure, I 
thoroughly read the measurement procedures in each study and based on this I 
reclassified the measure as either to indicate the ratio of non-executive directors (i.e. 
Kiel & Nicholson, 2003a; Chalmers et al., 2006) or the ratio of independent directors 
(i.e. Bonn, 2004; Bonn et al., 2004; Lau et al., 2009; Arthur, 2001. (2) board 
independence: Some researchers use the term to indicate the ratio of non-executive 
directors, while other researchers use it to indicate the ratio of independent directors. 
I reviewed each study and reclassified the measure as either to indicate the ratio of 
non-executive directors (i.e. Hutchinson et al., 2008; Bliss, 2011; Smith, 2009; 
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Chalmers et al., 2006) or the ratio of independent directors (Henry, 2008; Kent & 
Stewart, 2008). 
After considering the classification issues in the 68 samples for board 
composition, a moderating meta-analysis was designed to test for any differences 
based on the two operationalisations of board composition (the ratio of non-executive 
directors/ the ratio of independent directors). Accordingly, the moderating meta-
analysis based on operationalisation of board independence provides two subgroups 
for the analysis: the first group includes 17 correlations from 10 different studies; 
whereby board composition is represented by the ratio of independent directors. The 
second set includes 51 samples25 from 18 different studies; whereby board 
composition is represented by the ratio of non-executive directors. 
Board Leadership Structure reflecting CEO Duality: It is important to note that 
out of the 39 correlations for board leadership structure meta-analysis there were 33 
correlations from 11 different studies that measured board leadership structure as 
CEO duality, whereby CEO duality is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if 
the roles of CEO and Chair are fulfilled by the same person; zero otherwise. Thus, in 
line with the majority of studies included in this meta-analysis, CEO duality is 
operationalised as the case where one person is fulfilling the roles of CEO and the 
board Chair. However, there were six correlations from three different studies 
(Davidson et al., 2005; Bliss, 2011; Chancharat et al., 2012) measuring board 
leadership structure in the opposite way, whereby CEO duality is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of one if the roles of CEO and Chair are fulfilled by two different 
persons; zero otherwise. For these six correlations, the correlation sign reported was 
reversed to unify the operationalisation of CEO duality. Hence, there was 
consistency in measurement and no need for a moderating analysis for different 
board leadership structure measures. So that board leadership structure or CEO 
duality in this study indicates one person fulfilling the roles of CEO and the board 
Chair.  
Financial Performance measures: The studies included in the two meta-analyses 
used accounting-based measures and/ or market-based measures. Potentially each 
                                                 
 
25 As mentioned above, five samples out of the 51 samples originally report correlation between 
financial performance and the ratio of executive directors; however the correlation values for these 
samples were reversed to indicate the correlation between financial performance and the ratio of non-
executive directors. 
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measure represents a theoretically different aspect of financial performance; market-
based performance measures reflect the future expected financial results, while 
accounting-based performance measures reflect the historical results (Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003a). 
Accounting-based measures tend to be more stable than market-based measures 
(Conyon & Florou, 2002 cited in Lau et al., 2009) with some academics positing that 
accounting-based measures are a better measure for examining the relationship 
between performance and corporate governance characteristics as they are less 
affected by leverage, extraordinary items (e.g. sale of fixed assets) and other 
discretionary items (e.g. fixed assets depreciation method) (Core, Guay, & Rusticus, 
2006 cited in Christensen et al., 2010). Nevertheless, accounting measures are 
criticised as they are subject to manipulation (Dalton et al., 1998) and are historical 
in nature – so they may lag the actual actions and decisions that are brought about by 
boards (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003a). On the other hand, market performance measures 
are thought to better reflect future performance and so some consider them a better 
measure of the contemporaneous influence of any board composition characteristic 
(Christensen et al., 2010). However, most corporate governance investigations 
(including the studies included in the meta-analyses of this study) employ both types 
of measures. 
Given the recognition to the differences between the two types of performance 
measures in prior board-performance research, a moderating meta-analysis was 
based on the operationalisations of financial performance (accounting-based 
performance measure/ market-based performance measures). 
Moderating the board independence-performance analysis was based on two 
subgroups: the first subgroup includes 32 correlations for board composition and 
market performance measures (notably MBA was employed for 13 correlations, 
while MBE was employed for eight correlations). The second subgroup includes 36 
correlations for board composition and accounting performance measures (notably 
ROA was employed for 24 correlations, while ROE was employed for 10 
correlations). Similarly, for the board leadership structure moderating analysis based 
on financial performance measures, there are also two subgroups: the first subgroup 
includes 18 correlations for board leadership structure and market performance 
measures (notably MBA was employed for seven correlations, while MBE was 
employed for the other seven correlations), while the second subgroup includes 21 
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correlations for board leadership structure and accounting performance measures 
(notably ROA was employed for 17 correlations, while ROE was employed for two 
correlations). 
The Study Design of the samples: Many of the included samples report 
correlation values for board composition and board leadership structure, and 
financial performance by employing two designs for the time the data set represents. 
All correlations included in both meta-analyses have been screened to identify 
the different types of designs employed. Out of the 68 correlations for board 
composition meta-analysis, I identified 38 correlations computed by using a cross-
sectional design of data. Cross-sectional design can be either at one point of time 
(e.g. correlation between the ratio of independent directors for the year 2002 and 
ROA for the same year), or pooled over a period of time (e.g. correlation between the 
ratio of independent directors for the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, and ROA for the 
same three years). Out of these 38 cross-sectional correlations, I identified 20 
correlations computed by using pooled over a period of time cross-sectional data, 
while 18 correlations were computed using one point of time cross-sectional data. 
Similarly, for the rest of the correlations, the 30 non-cross-sectional design 
correlations, different designs were also identified (e.g. when computing correlation, 
board composition measure was lagged one year, two years, three years, or four 
years against the performance measure)26. 
Out of the 39 board leadership structure samples, I identified 21 cross-sectional 
correlations (11 correlations have pooled over a period of time design, and 10 
correlations have a one point of time cross-sectional design). Again, different designs 
were identified across the 18 non-cross-sectional design samples. Then for the 18 
non-cross-sectional design correlations, there were different lags across the different 
data sets. Differences in the design of the different data sets for each correlation need 
to be accounted for when considering the investigation in hand (Peace & Chen, 
2013). Accordingly, a moderating analysis was based on the design of the data set for 
each correlation; whereby, correlations are grouped into either correlation for which 
cross-sectional data sets were used or correlations for which non-cross-sectional data 
sets were used. The moderating analysis is run for each of the two meta-analyses. 
                                                 
 
26 Correlation was also computed for board composition measure at time t and the average of 
performance measure at time t+1, t+2, and t+3 (e.g. Kiel & Nicholson, 2003a; Christensen et al., 2010). 
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4.4.5 Meta-Analytic Procedures 
Meta-analysis approach: Two main approaches to meta-analysis are employed in 
psychology and management (Pierce, 2008): (1) Hedges and Olkin (1985) and (2) 
Hunter and Schmidt (1990, 2004)27. Each of these two approaches applies a set of 
statistical and methodological procedures to obtain an estimate of the true effect size 
and a confidence interval around that estimate (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004; Hedges & 
Olkin, 1985); however, there are three recognised differences between the two 
approaches. 
Weighting of studies when calculating meta-analytic results: Hunter and Schmidt 
(1990, 2004) weight the observed effect size of each study by its sample size, while 
Hedges and Olkin (1985) weight the observed effect size of each study by its inverse 
variance. Thus, Hedges and Olkin’s (1985) approach weights each study (its 
contribution to the meta-analysis) based on both the sample size of the study and the 
standard deviation of that study. As the standard deviation of a given study increases, 
the weight of that study in the meta-analysis decreases; and as the sample size 
increases, the weight of that study in the meta-analysis increases. In contrast, Hunter 
and Schmidt (1990, 2004) weight studies based on their sample size before 
accounting for variance and correcting for statistical artifacts (e.g. sampling 
variability, measurement error). Thus, Hunter and Schmidt (1990, 2004) calculate the 
mean effect size (e.g. the meta-analysed correlations) based on the sample size of 
each study. Then the standard deviation of that mean effect size of the included 
studies is computed to correct the mean effect size. In summary, Hedges and Olkin’s 
(1985) approach accounts for the within study variance (i.e. the standard deviation of 
each included studies), while Hunter and Schmidt’s (1990, 2004) approach accounts 
for the across studies variance (i.e. the standard deviation of the mean effect size of 
the included studies). 
Detecting moderators: The Hedges and Olkin (1985) approach accounts for cross 
study variability at a second stage of the meta-analysis. They posit that the cross 
studies variability (i.e. standard deviation of the mean effect size) needs to be 
assessed and then a moderating analysis must be conducted to determine if this cross 
study variability can be explained by moderating variables. This procedure was 
                                                 
 
27 Other approaches are also recognised (e.g. Rosenthal , 1991), yet the above two approaches are the 
most widely employed in social sciences. 
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criticised by Hunter and Schmidt (2004) who argue that if the mean effect size is not 
corrected for statistical artifacts at first, the across studies variability may be 
erroneously attributed to moderators. 
Fixed effect model and random effects model: The third difference between 
Hunter and Schmidt’s (2004) approach and Hedges and Olkin’s (1985) approach is 
theoretically and technically statistical difference that reflects the first two 
differences. Consistent with the statistical fixed effect model, Hedges and Olkin’s 
(1985) approach assumes that all studies included in a meta-analysis are thought to 
be homogeneous (i.e. variation across the different studies is thought to be only 
explained by sampling variability) (Cumming, 2012). Theoretically, this will occur 
when the different studies are all drawn from the same population, meaning the 
meta-analysis is estimating the same mean effect size of an underlying population 
and the standard deviation from that single population mean. 
On the other hand, Hunter and Schmidt’s (2004) approach, which is compatible 
with the random effects model, assumes that different studies on the same topic 
might be heterogeneous. In other words, different studies on the same topic may 
estimate different underlying population effect size(s). Thus, Hunter and Schmidt’s 
(2004) approach accounts for two sources of variability: (1) sampling variability, and 
(2) variability in the population effect size. Heterogeneity is central to the random 
effects model; it indicates the variation across the different studies’ estimated effect 
size as explained by the variation in the underlying population effect size. 
Heterogeneity is measured by Q-value; which is a standardised measure 
indicating the variability between the means of correlations (or an effect size) and the 
width of confidence interval on that mean. For heterogeneous studies, the Q-value is 
notably larger than the degree of freedom (df), and the p-value calculated for that Q-
value is statistically significant (e.g. p < .05). Another sign of heterogeneity is Tau 
squared (τ2); which indicates the variance of the different population ESs, so that if τ2 
is greater than zero, the studies are heterogeneous. 
Although the random effects model is recommended when the included studies 
are heterogeneous, it would also produce results that are the same, or very similar to 
those yielded by the fixed effect model if the studies were homogeneous. Therefore, 
it is recommended that meta-analysis researchers always use the random effects 
model (Cumming, 2012; Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). However, the nature of this study 
suggests that fixed effect model (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) might be more appropriate 
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because the samples for all included studies are drawn from the ASX 500 or a subset 
of the ASX 500. 
All in all, this study employs procedures from both approaches (Hedges & Olkin, 
1985; Hunter & Schmidt, 1990; 2004) and both models (fixed effect and random 
effects) in a systematic investigation. This is facilitated by employing CMA software 
(Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2006). CMA produces results computed 
using the fixed effect model, random effects model, or both models. Both models 
were used for each meta-analysis and at every level (e.g. overall meta-analysis or 
moderating meta-analyses); the results were similar, yet not identical indicating that 
the methodological choice did not affect the results. 
Independence of samples: A key decision to be made before conducting this 
meta-analysis is whether to include as independent samples, or not, the different 
correlations from an individual study (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990, 2004). This is 
particularly crucial for this research because there are 68 correlations for board 
composition-performance provided by 28 studies, and there are 39 correlations for 
board leadership structure-performance provided by 14 studies. 
The different correlations obtained from an individual study were produced by 
employing different operationalisation of financial performance in that study; so that 
correlations were computed for governance attribute (e.g. ratio of independent 
directors) and each of the different financial measures employed for that study (e.g. 
ROA and Tobin’s Q). Similarly different correlations were produced by computing 
correlations between governance attributes at one point of time (e.g. ratio of 
independent directors for the year of 1998) and one financial measure at more than 
one point of time (e.g. ROA for the year of 1998 and then for the year of 1999). 
Finally, a mixture of the two cases was also identified in some studies (Hutchinson & 
Gul, 2004, 2006; Hutchinson et al., 2008; Christensen et al., 2010; Heaney et al., 
2010). However, at the individual studies level, each individual study operationalises 
board composition using the same measure (i.e. either the ratio of independent 
directors or the ratio of non-executive directors)28; the same applies to board 
leadership structure. 
                                                 
 
28 Wang and Oliver’s study is one exception, as they employ two operationalisations for board 
composition. However, given their small sample size (n= 243) compared to the total sample size for 
the meta-analysis (n= 64,255), this should not cause a considerable bias in results. 
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After screening the 68 correlations for board composition-performance across the 
28 studies, I found that there are 18 studies, each of which reporting correlations for 
board composition and more than one financial measure (e.g. ROA and Tobin’s Q). 
Moreover, there were eight studies, each of which reporting correlations for board 
composition and one performance measure, yet at more than one point of time (e.g. 
ROA for the year of 1998 and then for the year of 1999). Similarly, after screening 
the 39 correlations for board leadership structure/ performance across the 14 studies, 
I found that there are 10 studies, each of which reporting correlations for board 
leadership structure and more than one financial measure. Moreover, there were four 
studies, each of which reporting correlations for board leadership structure and one 
performance measure, yet by employing two different time designs. 
Since Hunter and Schmidt’s (1990, 2004) approach to meta-analysis weigh each 
individual effect size (e.g. correlation) by the sample size, they emphasise that 
samples included in a meta-analysis must be independent; otherwise the calculation 
of sampling error variance will be inaccurate. This raises the concern whether the 
different correlations from one individual study, as per the different measures of 
performance in individual studies (e.g. ROA and Tobin’s Q) or the different designs 
of data set, are independent or not? 
In previous international meta-analyses studies of boards, Hunter and Schmidt’s 
(1990, 2004) concept of sample independence was approached differently. On the 
one hand, Quinones et al. (1995); Dalton et al. (1998) and Wagner et al. (1998) used 
all available samples (i.e. included duplicated estimates of the effect size of interest). 
Dalton et al. (1998) and Wagner et al. (1998) stipulate that the different correlation 
values from one individual study must be aggregated only if the reported correlation 
is estimated using the same exact operationalisations of board independence and 
financial performance. Thus, because this was not the case for the studies they 
included in their meta-analyses, they treated every sample (i.e. correlation) as a 
separate independent correlation that captures a different aspect of the relationship. 
For instance, from 54 studies of board composition and performance, Dalton et al. 
(1998) include 159 correlations in their meta-analysis. 
On the other hand, Rhoades et al. (2000) only used data that were clearly 
exclusive (i.e. no overlapping source). Rhoades et al. (2000) treat different financial 
measures used in one study (e.g. ROE and Tobin Q) as a measurement of the same 
variable (financial performance). Thus, Rhoades et al. (2000) unified the different 
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correlations provided by one study in one correlation; to do so, they employed a 
composite measure for the different correlations within each individual study 
whenever the inter-correlation between the different financial measures was reported 
in a given study. While for those studies not reporting such an inter-correlation, 
Rhoades et al. (2000) compute the average correlation for the different estimates of 
correlation. 
In this study I follow Dalton et al. (1998) and Wagner et al. (1998) as the data 
reported in the different correlations involve different measures and different 
operationalisations, meaning the duplication challenge identified by Hunter and 
Schmidt (1990, 2004) is not directly an issue. For instance, the overlapping data 
primarily relate to different operationalisations of performance (i.e. the overlap 
occurs because of reporting correlations for both accounting and market 
performance), and have different implications and so reflect different aspects of 
performance. Similarly, multiple correlations in some studies relate to different 
analyses (e.g. different time periods) again suggesting a variation from duplication.  
While it might be argued that the preceding justifications are measurement 
errors, the moderating analyses (which take advantage of these different measures to 
run separate different analyses (Fletcher & Kerr, 2010; Wilson & McKenzie, 1998) 
should account for and highlight any influence of measurement error in the overall 
meta-analyses. Consistent with the meta-analysis conducted by Dalton et al. (1998) 
and Wagner et al. (1998), and based on the preceding justifications, the meta-analysis 
of this study treats the various correlation values in a given individual study as 
independent samples (i.e. independent correlations). 
4.5 RESULTS 
The results are presented in two sections, reflecting the two research questions 
(RQ1 and RQ2). First, I outline the results for the meta-analysis for board 
composition (i.e. independence) and firm performance link before turning to examine 
the link between board leadership structure (i.e. CEO duality) and firm performance. 
4.5.1 Board Composition (i.e. Independence) and Financial Performance 
The overall meta-analysis: Given the data were all drawn from ASX 500 
companies; I assume that all included studies (i.e. correlations) are homogeneous. 
The analysis for all samples (68 correlations, n = 64,255) commenced with a fixed 
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effect model that yielded a point estimate of a positive correlation between board 
independence and financial performance, r = .022, and 95% CI [.014, .029]. 
If the fixed effect model was the appropriate model to use (i.e. the studies 
included in the meta-analysis are homogenous), the null that there is no relationship 
between board independence and firm financial performance would be rejected as the 
95% confidence interval around this correlation does not include zero. However, 
even if a fixed effect model was the appropriate model to use, and hence the null was 
rejected, the results would be practically non-significant (Cohen, 1992: 99)29. 
Nonetheless, we must ensure the validity of employing the fixed effect model for this 
analysis. 
To ensure the validity of the employed model, I tested for the heterogeneity of 
studies. For the above results, the Q-value (378) is notably larger than the df (67), p < 
.001. Additionally, Tau squared is greater than zero (τ2 = .005) (Cumming, 2012). 
These tests indicate that the studies included in the analysis were heterogeneous and 
hence a random effects model was more appropriate to employ. Using the random 
effects model for meta-analysing all correlations (68 correlations, n = 64,255), the 
results yielded a point estimate of negative correlation between board composition 
and financial performance, r = -.010, and 95% CI [-.031, .011]. Since the 95% 
confidence interval around this mean correlation contains zero we cannot reject the 
null that there is no relationship between board independence and firm financial 
performance. Using the random effects model, Figure 4.1 displays the forest plots for 
each correlation included in the analysis, as well as the forest plot for a summary of 
the overall analysis for board independence and financial performance. 
                                                 
 
29 Small, medium, and large ESs are respectively r = .10, r = .30, and r = .50. 
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Figure 4- 1: Forest plots for each correlation included in board independence-firm 
performance meta-analysis, as well as the summary forest plot for all correlations 
overall analysis/ random effects model 
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Since the random effects meta-analysis model relies on weighting each individual 
study by its size, three studies with large sample sizes were potentially over-
represented in this result, namely Schultz et al. (2013) who report for 8,594 
company-years two different correlations on board composition-performance links, 
Capezio et al. (2011) who report for 4,456 company-years two different correlations, 
and Matolcsy et al. (2012b) who report for 2,288 company-years four different 
correlation. To address this overrepresentation concern, the analysis was re-run using 
the “one study removed”	option provided by the software. In order to run this “one 
study removed” analysis, the different correlations provided by any given individual 
study were combined (i.e. similar to Rhoades et al.’s (2000) approach of treating 
different correlations from a given individual study). By doing so, first, we could 
check how a removal of one study would change the results. Second, we were able to 
compare the results as per the two approaches to the concept of samples 
independence (Dalton et al. (1998) and Wagner et al. (1998) approach vs. Rhoades et 
al. (2000) approach). 
The removal of any given study did not affect the results in any meaningful way; 
the summary point estimate of correlation between board composition and financial 
performance given the removal of any study of the 28 included studies ranged from r 
= -.005 to r = -.015, with each result’s	confidence interval containing zero. Overall, 
the inability to reject the null hypothesis is robust against removing any study from 
the analysis. Figure 4.2 displays the summary results for board independence and 
financial performance when employing the “one study removed” option. Then we 
can see from Table 4.3 that both approaches (Dalton et al. (1998) and Wagner et al. 
(1998) approach vs. Rhoades et al. (2000) approach) to independence of samples 
provided an identical point estimate of correlation, as well as very similar 95% CI. 
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Figure 4- 2: Summary results for board independence and financial performance 
when employing the “one study removed” option 
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Table 4- 3: Summary Results for Board Independence and Firm Performance when 
employing the Two Approaches to Independence of Samples (Dalton et al. (1998) 
and Wagner et al. (1998) approach vs. Rhoades et al. (2000) approach) 
 Correlation 
point r 
95% CI p-value 
Approaches to independence of samples  Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
 
Summary results when following Dalton et al. 
(1998) and Wagner et al. (1998) approach  
-.010 -.031 .011 .350 
Summary results when following Rhoades et al. 
(2000) approach  
-.010 -.036 .017 .480 
 
Finally, the studies were ordered from the oldest to the most recent in order to 
conduct a “cumulative analysis”. This approach displays the summary forest plot for 
the correlational relationship between board independence and financial performance 
at any point of time as if an earlier meta-analysis was conducted. The oldest study 
included in this meta-analysis is Arthur (2001) and there were two studies included 
that were published in 2013. The cumulative analysis highlights that, over the first 
half of this study period (2001-2007) the correlation point estimate of board 
independence-firm performance fluctuated from r = .089 to r = -.080. Nevertheless, 
from 2008 until 2011 the correlation point estimate ranged from r = -.043 to r = -
.028, whereby the 95% CI did not include zero during these four years. Whereas 
from 2008 to the last included study in 2013, the correlation between board 
independence and performance had started to decline in a steady pattern from around 
r = -.043 in 2008 to r = -.010 in 2013, which has zero included in its 95% CI. This 
stabilised decline in the size of the correlation may be justified by the cumulative 
sample size for that period; whereby, 6/7 of the total sample size was cumulated 
during the second half of the study period (2008-2013). 
As this is the first Australian board independence-performance meta-analysis, the 
“cumulative analysis” helps us envisage how an earlier meta-analysis would 
influence corporate governance practice or research. For instance, a meta-analysis on 
the correlation between board independence and performance before 2014 might 
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have had an influence on the ASX corporate governance council as they released the 
third version of the CGPR (2014). Another example applies to corporate governance 
research, as an earlier meta-analysis on board independence-performance might have 
provided new insights for future research. For example, as we can see in Figure 4.3, 
although the cumulative sample size of the analysis had not changed much of the 
correlation strength or direction, CI around the correlation estimate had become 
narrower. Figure 4.3 displays the forest plots for board independence and financial 
performance when employing “cumulative analysis” option. 
 
 
Figure 4- 3: Summary results for board independence and financial performance 
when employing the “cumulative analysis” option 
 
These results from the cumulative meta-analysis indicated how researchers since 
2008 have started to utilise larger sample size in their empirical investigations; yet 
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this does not rule out the current need for a large scale investigation that involves the 
ASX top 500 using a 10-15 years data set (e.g. 2003-2013), and by employing 
different cut-off points (e.g. release of first CGPR in 2003, GFC). 
Moderating analysis for board composition and financial performance: Given the 
different measures used for the constructs synthesised in this analysis, differences in 
measurement were a potential concern for validity (Dalton & Aguinis, 2013). To 
address this concern, three moderating analyses were conducted to establish if the 
measurement choices influenced the study’s conclusions: (1) financial performance 
measures, (2) study design, and (3) operationalisation of board independence. Then, 
(4) a fourth moderation analysis was conducted using different combinations of the 
three moderators. 
Moderator analysis 1; the measure employed for financial performance: Since 
different performance measures reflect different orientations in financial results (i.e. 
accounting measures are backwards-looking while market measures are forward-
looking), type of financial measure was used as the basis for this moderating 
analysis. Following Dalton et al. (1998), Wagner et al. (1998) and Rhoades et al. 
(2000), the 68 correlations between board independence and financial performance 
were split into two groups: (1) correlations between board independence and 
accounting-based financial measures (36 correlations) and (2) correlations between 
board independence and market-based financial measures (32 correlations). 
Under a fixed effect model, the Q-value for correlations between board 
composition and accounting-based financial measures (103) is notably large when 
compared to its correspondent degree of freedom (35); similarly the Q-value for 
correlations between board composition and market-based financial measures (258) 
is notably large when compared to its correspondent degree of freedom (31). 
Moreover, the p-value calculated for the two Q-values are statistically significant (p 
< .001). These results indicate heterogeneity across the studies within each sub-
group. Furthermore, Tau squared statistics are greater than zero for both sub-groups 
(τ2 = .003 for accounting-based performance measures sub-group, and τ2 = .007 for 
market-based performance measures sub-group); indicating that heterogeneity within 
each sub-group is high. Hence, analysis switched to a random effects model. 
The studies employing accounting-based performance measures (36 correlations, 
n = 29,690) provided a point estimate of a positive correlation between board 
independence and accounting-based performance, r = .031, and 95% CI [.002, .061]. 
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Since the 95% CI does not include zero, we can reject the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between accounting-based performance measures and board 
independence; nevertheless, this statistically significant correlation is practically non-
significant (Cohen, 1992). Similarly, the results were statistically significant and 
practically non-significant for the correlation between board independence and 
market based financial measures; however, the correlation takes the other direction 
of correlation. The results for the included correlations (32 correlations, n = 34,565) 
provided a point estimate of a negative correlation between board composition and 
market-based performance, r = -.055, and 95% CI [-.086, -.025]. Figure 4.4 exhibits 
the summary results and forest plots for the correlation between board independence 
and each of the performance measure group. 
 
	
Figure 4- 4: Forest plots for the correlation between board independence and each of 
the performance measure group, as well as the summary result for the overall 
analysis 
 
Following Wagner et al. (1998) and Rhoades et al. (2000), a further moderating 
analysis was conducted based on the correlation between board composition and the 
exact performance measure used (e.g. ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q). This moderating 
analysis is expected to provide more reliable results as I expect that measurement 
errors should be less for this moderating analysis (Dalton & Aguinis, 2013). Out of 
the 36 correlations between board independence and accounting-based performance 
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measures, there were 24 correlations for ROA and 10 correlations for ROE30. 
Whereas, for the 32 correlations between board composition and market-based 
performance measures, there were 13 correlations for market to book value of assets 
(MBA) and eight correlations for market to book value of equity (MBE)31. Thus, I 
run this specific moderating analysis using only these 55 correlations; the excluded 
13 correlations should not cause any concern in regard to biasing the results because 
the point of conducting moderating analysis is to provide a control over the different 
constructs (i.e. operationalisation of variables). 
After checking for homogeneity across the studies within each sub-group, I chose 
to run the analysis using the random effects model because the studies within each 
sub-group were heterogeneous32. The results indicate that the synthesised 
correlations between MBA and board independence (13 correlations, n = 8,739) 
yielded a point estimate of a negative correlation between board independence and 
MBA, r = -.067, and 95% CI [-.108, -.025], while correlations between ROA and 
board independence (24 correlations, n = 23,993) yielded a point estimate of a 
positive correlation between board independence and ROA, r = .044, and 95% CI 
[.013, .075]. However, the results for correlations between board independence and 
each of MBE (eight correlations, n = 10,111) and ROE (10 correlations, n = 5,235) 
were approaching an estimate point of zero correlation (r = -.015 and r = .001 
respectively); whereby, CI around each of the summary estimate points includes zero 
(i.e. statistically non-significant results). 
There were two notable points about the results for the moderating analysis based 
on the exact performance measures. First, where the book value of assets was the 
denominator (i.e. ROA and MBA), rather than the book value of equity (i.e. ROE 
and MBE), the results indicate that the true population correlation is non-zero, yet the 
magnitude of that correlation is small. Thus, capital structure and leverage 
implications may need to be considered in future board independence-performance 
research. Second, although the non-zero correlation for each of the two sub-groups 
MBA and ROA was statistically significant, each correlation has a different 
                                                 
 
30 Two correlations employing accounting-based measures were excluded as they stand alone and 
cannot be grouped. 
31 Eleven correlations employing market-based measures were excluded as they are spread among 
different measures. 
32 Future research with exact operationalisation of measures and matched study period designs may be 
recommended. 
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direction. Board independence and ROA were positively correlated, while board 
independence and MBA were negatively correlated. Figure 4.5 exhibits the summary 
results and forest plots for correlation between board independence and MBA, MBE, 
ROA and ROE. 
 
	
Figure 4- 5: Forest plots for correlation between board independence and MBA, 
MBE, ROA and ROE, as well as the summary result for the overall analysis 
 
Moderator Analysis 2; The design of the studies’ investigation period: Secondly, 
I ran a moderating analysis by grouping the correlations from the included studies 
into two groups of correlations; (1) correlations with a cross-sectional design; a 
cross-sectional design is the one that has cross-sectional data set for both board 
composition and performance (38 correlations), and (2) correlations with a non-
cross-sectional design; a non-cross-sectional design is the one that has data set that 
lag board composition data one year or more against performance data (30 
correlations). This grouping seeks to find the extent to which the design of the 
different samples may moderate the correlation between board composition and 
performance. 
Given the detected heterogeneity (measured by Q-value and Tau squared) across 
the studies included within each sub-group (i.e. cross-sectional design sub-group/ 
non-cross-sectional design sub-group) the random effects model was used to run the 
analysis. The results for this moderating analysis were very similar to those obtained 
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for the overall meta-analysis for board independence- performance. For cross-
sectional design correlations (38 correlations, n = 48,685), the results yielded a 
negative correlation between board independence and financial performance, r = -
.011, and 95% CI [-.037, .016]; while for the non-cross-sectional design correlations 
(30 correlations, n = 15,570), the results also yielded a negative correlation between 
board independence and financial performance, r = -.009, and 95% CI [-.043, .025]. 
The 95% CI for each group of correlation includes zero, and thus we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between financial performance and board 
independence. Hence, we cannot conclude that the design of the data set of samples 
included in the meta-analysis has a moderating effect on the association between 
board composition and performance. Figure 4.6 exhibits the summary results and 
forest plots for the correlation between board independence and performance as per 
the design of the studies. 
 
	
Figure 4- 6: Forest plots for the correlation between board independence and 
performance as per the design of the studies, as well as the summary result for the 
overall analysis 
 
Finally for this moderator, I ran the analysis using a very specific design of the 
data set, so that I grouped the correlations based on the exact design of the data set. 
Four groups were identified: (1) cross-sectional correlation design where data 
involved one specific year for the investigated variables (18 correlations, n = 9,640), 
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(2) cross-sectional correlation design where data involved more than one year for the 
investigated variables (i.e. pooled over a number of years) (20 correlations, n = 
39,045), (3) non-cross-sectional correlation design where data involved one specific 
year for one variable and another different year for the other variable (12 
correlations, n = 9,648), (4) non-cross-sectional correlation design where data 
involved a group of years for one variable and a different group of years for the other 
variable (18 correlations, n = 5,922). 
Again, similar to those results obtained for the cross-sectional design/ non cross-
sectional design moderator, the results yielded a negative correlation between board 
independence and performance that is statistically and practically non-significant. 
The 95% CI includes zero for each of the four groups indicating no moderating effect 
on the association between board composition and performance. 
Moderator Analysis 3; Board independence operationalisation of the studies 
included: Third, following Dalton et al. (1998), Wagner et al. (1998) and Rhoades et 
al. (2000), I sought to investigate differences based on the board composition 
operationalisation. Two groups were identified; the first includes all correlations 
between the ratio of non-executive directors and performance (51 correlations), while 
the second includes all correlations between the ratio of independent directors and 
performance (17 correlations). 
Given the detected heterogeneity (measured by Q-value and Tau squared) across 
the studies included within each sub-group (i.e. ratio of independent directors sub-
group/ ratio of non-executive directors sub-group) the random effects model was 
used to run the analysis. The results for the correlation between the ratio of non-
executive directors and financial performance (51 correlations, n = 55,358) indicated 
a negative correlation, r = -.018, and 95% CI [-.042, .006], while the correlation 
between the ratio of independent directors and financial performance (17 
correlations, n = 8,897) indicated a positive correlation, r = .017, and 95% CI [-.028, 
.006]. Given the small correlation estimate and that the 95% CI includes zero for 
each group, we cannot conclude that the operationalisation of board independence 
has a moderating effect on the association between board independence and 
performance. Figure 4.7 exhibits the summary results and forest plots for the 
correlation between board independence and performance as per the 
operationalisation of board independence. 
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Figure 4- 7: Forest plots for the correlation between board independence and 
performance as per the operationalisation of board independence, as well as the 
summary result for the overall analysis 
 
Moderator Analysis 4; Combination of the different moderators: Finally, 
following Wagner et al. (1998) I ran the analysis using all possible combinations of 
moderators. Eight moderating analyses based on all possible combinations of the 
three moderators (e.g. board independence operationalisation, financial performance 
measure, and the design of the data set used for the correlation) were conducted. 
Then, 12 moderating analyses based on all possible combinations of two moderators 
(e.g. board independence operationalisation and financial performance measure, 
board independence operationalisation and the design of the data set used for the 
correlation, and financial performance measure and the design of the data set used 
for the correlation) were conducted. All the results from the 20 moderating analyses 
were around those results obtained for the overall meta-analysis. (Please see 
Appendix three and Appendix four for the results obtained from the combinations of 
the different moderators.) 
4.5.2 Board Leadership Structure and Financial Performance 
The overall meta-analysis: as a reminder from section 4.4.4 above, any following 
reported correlation between board leadership structure and firm performance is 
actually a correlation between CEO duality (i.e. one person fulfilling the roles of 
CEO and the board Chair) and financial performance. 
The meta-analysis for the CEO duality-firm performance relationship proceeded 
as for the board independence-firm performance meta-analysis. Given the data were 
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all drawn from ASX 500 companies, I assumed that all included studies (i.e. 
correlations) are homogeneous; hence the analysis commenced with fixed effect 
model that yielded a point estimate of a positive correlation between CEO duality 
and financial performance (39 correlations, n = 52,628), r = .006, and 95% CI [-.002, 
.015]. 
However, since the Q-value (149) was considerably larger than the df (38), and p-
value calculated for that Q-value is statistically significant (p < .001), the studies 
exhibited heterogeneity and so a random effects model is to be preferred. This 
decision was corroborated by the Tau squared value that is greater than zero (τ2 = 
.002). The random effects model yielded a point estimate of a positive correlation 
between CEO duality and financial performance (39 correlations, n = 52,628), r = 
.018, and 95% CI [-.002, .039]. Thus, the null hypothesis of no relationship between 
CEO duality and firm financial performance could not be rejected. Figure 4.8 
displays the forest plots for each study included in the analysis, as well as the 
summary of the overall analysis. 
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Figure 4- 8: Forest plots for each study included in the CEO duality- performance 
meta-analysis, as well as the summary result for the overall analysis/ random effects 
model 
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To ensure no single study was too influential in the result, a “one study removed” 
analysis was conducted. This analysis revealed that the removal of only one study 
(Monem, 2013) provides statistically significant results with a point estimate of 
positive correlation, r = .028, and 95% CI [.004, .053]. Nevertheless, the practical 
significance of this correlation is still small. Other than Monem (2013), the analysis 
indicated no substantial differences to the overall result with the correlation point 
estimates ranging between r = .024 and r = .010. Figure 4.9 displays summary results 
for CEO duality and financial performance when employing the “one study 
removed” option, as well as the summary of the overall analysis. 
 
	
Figure 4- 9: Summary results for CEO duality and financial performance when 
employing the “one study removed” option 
 
To run the “one study removed” analysis, I needed to combine the different 
correlations provided by one given study, thus, it is possible to compare the overall 
results as per the two approaches to the concept of samples independence (Dalton et 
al. (1998) approach vs. Rhoades et al. (2000) approach). We can see from Table 4.4 
that both approaches (Dalton et al. (1998) and Wagner et al. (1998) approach vs. 
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Rhoades et al. (2000) approach) to independence of samples provided the similar 
estimate point of correlation and 95% CI. 
 
Table 4- 4: Summary Results for CEO Duality and Firm Performance when 
employing the Two Approaches to Independence of Samples (Dalton et al. (1998) 
and Wagner et al. (1998) approach vs. Rhoades et al. (2000) approach) 
 Correlation 
point 
95% CI p-value 
Approaches to independence of samples  Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
 
Summary results when following Dalton et al. 
(1998) and Wagner et al. (1998) approach  
.018 -.002 .039 .076 
Summary results when following Rhoades et al. 
(2000) approach  
.019 -.008 .046 .170 
 
Finally for the overall analysis, a “cumulative analysis” was employed to display 
the summary result (the synthesised correlation between CEO duality and financial 
performance) at any point of time if an earlier meta-analysis was conducted. And just 
like the case for the “one study removed”, I combined the different correlations from 
one study. The oldest study included in this meta-analysis is Kiel and Nicholson 
(2003a) and there were two studies published in 2013. Before we go through the 
results from the cumulative analysis, it is important to note that 18 correlations out of 
the 39 correlations have statistically significant results, with a correlation ranging 
from r = .170 to r = -.172. However, the cumulative analysis shows that at any point 
of time after 200633, the results were mostly statistically significant (i.e. 2006, and 
also from 2010 till 2012 inclusive). Nevertheless, these statistically significant 
correlations were never practically significant; the strongest statistically significant 
cumulative correlation was in 2006, r = .077, with a CI [.023, .131]. However, the 
cumulative sample size in 2006 was quite small (i.e. 3,924) when compared to the 
                                                 
 
33 I chose 2006 because in 2006 I would have five studies included in the analysis, making it more 
reasonable to claim cumulative results.  
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cumulative sample size in 2013 (i.e. 52,628). Figure 4.10 displays summary results 
for CEO duality and financial performance when employing the “cumulative 
analysis” option. 
 
 
Figure 4- 10: Summary results for CEO duality and financial performance when 
employing the “cumulative analysis” option 
 
Moderating analyses for CEO duality and financial performance: As with board 
independence-firm performance analysis, moderator analyses for association 
between CEO duality and performance were also conducted to see if there were any 
discernible differences in the pattern of results relating to two moderators: (1) 
financial performance measures, (2) study design. Then, (3) a third moderating 
analysis was conducted using combinations of different measures of financial 
performance measures and the different study designs. 
Moderator Analysis 1; financial performance measures of the studies included: 
Following Dalton et al. (1998), Wagner et al. (1998) and Rhoades et al. (2000), the 
39 correlations between CEO duality and financial performance were split into two 
groups: (1) correlations between CEO duality and accounting-based financial 
measures (21 correlations), and (2) correlations between CEO duality and market-
based financial measures (18 correlations). Given the detected heterogeneity 
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(measured by Q-value and Tau squared) across the studies included within each sub-
group the random effects model was used to run the analysis. 
The results indicate a negative correlation between CEO duality and accounting-
based financial measures (21 correlations, n = 22,816), r = -.002, and 95% CI [-.030, 
.026]. Since the 95% CI includes zero, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between accounting-based performance measures and CEO duality. On 
the other hand, there is a positive correlation between CEO duality and market-based 
financial measures (18 correlations, n = 29,812), r = .038, and 95% CI [.010, .066]. 
Importantly the CI does not include zero, and thus we can reject the null hypothesis 
of no correlation between market-based performance measures and CEO duality. 
However, the strength of correlation is small. Figure 4.11 exhibits the summary 
results and forest plots for the correlation between CEO duality and each of the 
performance measure group. 
 
 
Figure 4- 11: Forest plots for the correlation between CEO duality and each of the 
performance measure group, as well as the summary result for the overall analysis 
  
Following Wagner et al. (1998) and Rhoades et al. (2000), a further moderating 
analysis was conducted based on the correlation between CEO duality and the exact 
performance measure used (e.g. ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q). This moderating 
analysis is expected to provide more reliable results as I expect that measurement 
errors should be less for this moderating analysis (Dalton & Aguinis, 2013). Out of 
the 18 correlations between CEO duality and market-based performance measures, 
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there were seven correlations for MBA and seven correlations for MBE34; whereas 
for the 21 correlations between CEO duality and accounting-based performance 
measures, there were 17 correlations for ROA and two correlations for ROE35. Thus, 
I run this specific moderating analysis using only these 33 correlations; the excluded 
six correlations should not cause any concern in regard to biasing the results because 
the point of conducting moderating analysis is to provide a control over the different 
constructs (i.e. operationalisation of variables). The analysis indicated practically 
non-significant results for the four groups of correlations, yet the results were 
statistically significant for the correlations between board leadership structure and 
MBE (seven correlations, n = 9,945), r = .068, and a 95% CI [.001, .134]. Figure 
4.12 presents the forest plots for correlation between CEO duality and each of MBA, 
MBE, ROA and ROE, as well as the summary result for the overall analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4- 12: Forest plots for correlation between CEO duality and each of MBA, 
MBE, ROA and ROE, as well as the summary result for the overall analysis 
 
 Moderator Analysis 2; the design of the studies’ investigation period: Moderator 
analyses were conducted to see whether the design of data set made any discernible 
differences in the pattern of results obtained for the overall analysis. Correlations 
                                                 
 
34 Four correlations employing market-based measures were excluded as they are spread among 
different measures. 
35 Two correlations employing accounting-based measures were excluded as they stand alone and 
cannot be grouped. 
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were grouped into either: (1) correlations with cross-sectional design for data set (21 
correlations), or (2) correlations with non-cross-sectional design for data set (18 
correlations). Given the detected heterogeneity across the studies included within 
each sub-group the random effects model was used to run the moderating analysis. 
For correlations with a cross-sectional design, the results yielded a positive 
correlation between CEO duality and performance (21 correlations, n = 40,938), r = 
.015, and a 95% CI [-.010, .040]; while for correlations with a non-cross-sectional 
design, the results also yielded a positive correlation between CEO duality and 
performance (18 correlations, n = 11,690), r = .024, and a 95% CI [-.010, .058]. For 
both sub-groups, the 95% CI includes zero, and the strength of correlation is small. 
These results support the null hypothesis of no association between CEO duality and 
performance. Moreover, these results indicated that the design of the studies’ 
investigation period do not moderate the relationship between CEO duality and 
performance. Figure 4.13 exhibits the summary results and forest plots for the 
correlation between CEO duality and performance as per the design of the studies. 
 
Figure 4- 13: The summary results and forest plots for the correlation between CEO 
duality and performance as per the design of the studies 
 
I also grouped correlations based on the very specific design of the data set. Four 
groups were identified: (1) cross-sectional correlation design where data involved 
one specific year for the investigated variables (10 correlations, n = 7,826), (2) cross-
sectional correlation design where data involved more than one year for the 
investigated variables (i.e. pooled over a number of years) (11 correlations, n = 
33,112), (3) non-cross-sectional correlation design where data involved one specific 
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year for one variable and another different year for the other variable (eight 
correlations, n = 8,629), (4) non-cross-sectional correlation design where data 
involved a group of years for one variable and different group of years for the other 
variable (10 correlations, n = 3,061). 
Again, the results for each of the four groups yielded practically and statistically 
non-significant results so that the correlation between CEO duality and performance 
was small ranging from r = -.001 to r =.050, with 95% CI including zero for each 
group. These results confirmed that the design of the studies’ investigation period 
does not moderate the relationship between CEO duality and performance. 
Moderator Analysis 3; combination of the two moderators: I finally run four 
moderating analyses based on all possible combinations of the two moderators (i.e. 
financial performance measure, and the design of the data set used for the 
correlation). For the sub-group non-cross-sectional design and market-based 
financial measures (eight correlations, n = 7,772) the fixed-effect model was used 
given the homogeneity of studies included in this sub-group. The results for this sub-
group yielded a positive correlation between CEO duality and non-cross-sectional 
market-based performance, r = .065, and a 95% CI [.043, .087].  For this sub-group, 
the 95% CI does not include zero; however, the practical significance is very small. 
For the rest of sub-groups, the random effects model was used given the detected 
homogeneity, yet the moderating analysis for all subgroups provided a statistically 
non-significant and practically non-significant results. Table 4.5 presents the results 
of the moderating analysis with the combination of the two employed moderators. 
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Table 4- 5: Moderating Meta-analyses Results for CEO Duality and Financial 
Performance; Combination of Two Moderators 
 
4.5.3 Publication Bias and Funnel Plot 
A valid meta-analysis relies on including all studies conducted on the relationship 
of interest (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). However, valid meta-analysis is one of the 
most frequent criticisms levelled against meta-analysis studies; defined as existing 
when studies available for the meta-analysis are a biased sample of all conducted 
studies (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004: 493). One of the most recognised sources of 
availability bias36is “publication bias” (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004: 493) which is 
defined to be existent if published studies, compared to unpublished studies, mostly 
have statistical significance (Rosenthal, 1979) and larger practical significance 
(Rosenthal & Rubin, 1982). For instance, if academic publication favours results that 
reject the null, a key concern in any meta-analysis is publication bias whereby there 
is an over representation of data sets that report a statistically significant result 
                                                 
 
36 Other sources of availability bias includes exclusion of studies published in other languages (see 
Egger, et al., 1997), or deliberate withholding of results (see Eyding et al., 2010). 
 Number 
of (r)s 
included 
(n) (r) 95% CI Sig Effect 
size 
Analysis    Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
  
Accounting measure * Cross-
sectional design 
12 18,986 .010 -.024 .043 No Very 
small 
Accounting measure * Non-
cross-sectional design 
9 3,830 -.026 -.074 .022 No Very 
small 
Market measure * Cross-
sectional design 
10 22,040 .016 -.017 .050 No Very 
small 
Market measure * Non-cross-
sectional design 
8 7,772 .065 .043 .087 Yes Very 
small 
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leading to the unintentional omission of non-significant results (Rosenthal, 1979; 
Cumming, 2012); the same applies to practical significance if academic publication 
favours results with larger effect size (Rosenthal & Rubin, 1982). 
The first concern in regard to availability bias in general is that my search might 
not have identified relevant studies. A second concern is that some of the relevant 
identified studies did not report correlation results, whereas the authors of these 
studies might have computed correlations for analysis purposes but the correlations 
are not available anymore as they were not reported in the published version of these 
studies. Finally, in regard to publication bias, there is a possibility that some relevant 
studies with the targeted correlation might not be published because of the non-
significant results (i.e. the “file drawer” effect (Rosenthal, 1979: 638). Therefore, 
there is a clear imperative need to assess the analyses for publication bias.  
The funnel plot (please check Figure 4.14 or 4.15 to follow with the text) is one 
common approach to assessing publication bias (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). A funnel 
plot provides a scatter plot of each study’s effect size against the standard error of 
that effect size. The vertical axis of the scatter plot represents the standard error, 
while the horizontal axis represents the effect size or a standardised effect size (i.e. in 
this research, the transformed fisher Z of the correlation coefficient)37. 
An uncommon practice for presenting scatter plots, the vertical axis starts with 
the lowest feasible standard error (i.e. zero) at the top of the axis and ends at the 
highest detected standard error (Cumming, 2012). Each circle on the funnel plot 
represents one of the studies synthesised in the meta-analysis. The line running 
parallel to the vertical axis in the middle of the graph represents the meta-analytic 
correlation, so that the distance between this line and any circle represents the 
difference between an individual study’s correlation and the meta-analytic 
correlation. Finally, two lines representing the estimated likely spread of effect size 
at different points of standard error are drawn from the top end of the meta-analysis 
line slanting down in a funnel shape (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004; Cumming, 2012). 
A funnel plot where the circles (i.e. studies) spread symmetrically to the left and 
right of the vertical line and above the forest plot of the meta-analysis indicate no 
publication bias. In contrast, common patterns of publication bias show asymmetric 
spread patterns on the funnel plot. Thus, if the density of the studies is much larger 
                                                 
 
37 The software used, the CMA software, only facilitates funnel plot for the effect size Fisher Z. 
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on one side compared with the other, there is a strong likelihood of publication bias. 
Figure 4.14 presents the funnel plot for board independence and performance 
analysis, while Figure 4.15 presents the funnel plot for board leadership structure and 
performance analysis. Since the dot points or circles, for both Figure 4.14 and Figure 
4.15, are spread largely symmetrically on both sides of the funnel, there is no 
indication to publication bias in both analyses. 
Given the correlations used in the meta-analysis were often not the primary focus 
of the studies included in this synthesis (i.e. it was often a control variable), it is 
logical that there would be less of a publication bias influence on the data reported 
around this relationship.  In fact, only 12 correlations of the 68 correlations included 
in the meta-analysis for the board independence-performance relationship were 
statistically significant; while only 12 correlations of the 43 correlations included in 
the meta-analysis for the board leadership structure-performance studies used in the 
meta-analysis were statistically significant. Thus, it is unlikely the results of the two 
meta-analyses suffer from publication bias. 
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Figure 4- 14: Funnel plot for board independence and performance meta-analysis 
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Figure 4- 15: Funnel plot for CEO duality and performance meta-analysis 
 
4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
4.6.1 Summary of Results (RQ1 and RQ2) 
Using a meta-analysis strategy, this study investigated the association (i.e. 
correlation) between financial performance and each of board composition and board 
leadership structure. The investigation was conducted to provide empirical evidence 
for the extent to which the outcomes of board decision making (e.g. financial 
performance) are associated with the different configurations of board structure as 
recommended by two rival theories: agency theory and stewardship theory. Agency 
theory posits that board independence from the CEO and the executive management 
is associated with better financial performance; while stewardship theory implies that 
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better financial performance is associated with boards that are dominated by the CEO 
and the executive management. 
 The investigation of the links between board structure and performance was 
conducted at four stages: (1) investigating the association between board 
independence and financial performance, and (2) investigating the association 
between CEO duality and financial performance. (3) investigating the moderating 
influence of financial performance measure, the design of the studies included and 
the operationalisation of board composition on the association between board 
independence and performance, and (4) investigating the moderating influence of the 
design of the studies included, and financial performance measure on the association 
between CEO duality and financial performance. 
The results of this study provided empirical evidence that there is no association 
between board composition and financial performance (RQ1). The overall meta-
analysis (i.e. all available correlations were meta-analysed) for board independence 
and financial performance indicated that the correlation between board independence 
and financial performance (68 correlations, n = 64,255 company years) is practically 
and statistically non-significant, r = -.010, and a 95% CI [-.031, .011]. That is, there 
is no robust association (i.e. correlation) between board independence and financial 
performance. 
The results from the moderators’ meta-analyses for board independence and 
financial performance have indicated that neither the operationalisation of board 
composition (ratio of independent directors/ ratio of non-executive directors) nor the 
design of the studies included (correlations with cross-sectional design data set/ 
correlations with non-cross-sectional design data set) influence the practically and 
statistically non-significant results. However, moderating (i.e. controlling) for the 
type of financial measure (i.e. accounting-based measures/ market-based measures) 
influenced the results so that these results were statistically significant, yet 
practically non-significant. The direction of this statistically significant correlation 
was interesting, so that on the one hand, board independence and accounting-based 
measures correlated positively (r = .031); specifically, this positive correlation was 
driven by the statistically significant correlation between board independence and 
ROA (r = .044). On the other hand, board independence and market-based measures 
correlated negatively (r = -.055); specifically, this negative correlation was driven by 
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the statistically significant correlation between board independence and MBA (r = -
.067). 
In summation, the results indicated there is no association between the board 
independence of Australian firms and financial performance. Table 4.6 presents the 
different meta-analyses results (the overall meta-analysis as well as the moderating 
meta-analyses) for board independence and financial performance; 
 
Table 4- 6: Meta-analyses Results for Board Independence and Financial 
Performance; the Overall Meta-analysis as well as the Moderating Meta-analyses 
                                                 
 
38 Given the results from homogeneity tests, the random effects model is the one that was statistically 
appropriate to employ. 
 Number 
of (r)s 
included 
(n) (r) 95% CI Sig Effect 
size 
Analysis    Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
  
Overall analysis (fixed 
effects model)38 
68 64,255 .022 .014 .029 Yes Small 
Overall analysis (random 
effects model)  
68 64,255 -.010 -.031 .011 No Small 
Moderating meta-analysis: Financial performance measure 
Accounting measures 36 29,690 .031 .002 .061 Yes Small 
ROA 24 23,993 .044 .013 .075 Yes Small 
ROE 10  5,235 .001 -.051 .053 No Small 
Market measures 32 34,565 -.055 -.086 -.025 Yes Small 
MBA 13 8,739 -.067 -.108 -.025 Yes Small 
MBE 8  10,111 -.015 -.077 .047 No Small 
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The results of this research have also provided empirical evidence that there is no 
association between board leadership structure and financial performance (RQ2). The 
overall meta-analysis (i.e. all available correlations were meta-analysed) for CEO 
duality and financial performance indicated that the correlation between CEO duality 
and financial performance (39 correlations, n = 52,628 company years) is practically 
and statistically non-significant, r = .018, and a 95% CI [-.002, .039]. That is, there is 
no robust association (i.e. correlation) between CEO duality and financial 
performance. 
Moderating meta-analyses for CEO duality and financial performance indicated 
that the design of the studies included (correlations with cross-sectional design data 
set/ correlations with non-cross-sectional design data set) did not influence the 
practically and statistically non-significant results obtained for the overall meta-
analysis. However, the moderating meta-analysis based on the type of financial 
measure employed (i.e. accounting-based measures/ market-based measures) 
indicated that only the correlation between CEO duality and market-based measures 
were statistically significant, yet practically non-significant (r = .038); specifically, 
the positive correlation between CEO duality and market-based measures was driven 
by the statistically significant correlation between CEO duality and MBE (r = .068). 
Interestingly, this positive small correlation is consistent with the negative 
correlation between the ratio of non-executive (and the ratio of independent 
directors) and market-based measures. Table 4.7 presents the different meta-analyses 
Moderating meta-analysis: Design of the study included 
Cross sectional design 38 48,685 -.011 -.037 .016 No Small 
Non cross sectional design 30 15,570 -.009 -.043 .025 No Small 
Moderating meta-analysis: Operationalisations of board composition  
Ratio of independent 
directors 
17 8,897 .017 -.028 .061 No Small 
Ratio of non-executive 
directors 
51 55,358 -.018 -.042 .006 No Small 
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(the overall meta-analysis as well as the moderating meta-analyses) results for CEO 
duality and financial performance. 
 
Table 4- 7: Meta-analyses Results for CEO Duality and Financial Performance; the 
Overall Meta-analysis as well as the Moderating Meta-analysis 
                                                 
 
39 Given the results from homogeneity tests, the random effects model is the one that was statistically 
appropriate to employ. 
 Number 
of (r)s 
included 
(n) (r) 95% CI Sig Effect 
size 
Analysis    Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
  
Overall analysis (fixed 
effects model)39 
39 52,628 .006 -.002 .015 No Small 
Overall analysis (random 
effects model)  
39 52,628 .018 -.002 .039 No Small 
Moderating meta-analysis: Financial performance measure 
Accounting measures 21 22,816 -.002 -.003 .026 No Small 
ROA 17 19,961 .002 -.036 .039 No Small 
ROE 2 2,393 .005 -.107 .116 No Small 
Market measures 18 29,812 .038 .010 .066 Yes Small 
MBA 7 6,379 .028 -.026 .081 No Small 
MBE 7 9,945 .068 .001 .134 Yes Small 
Moderating meta-analysis: Design of the study included 
Cross sectional design 21 40,938 .015 -.010 .040 No Small 
Non cross sectional design 18 11,690 .024 -.010 .058 No Small 
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In conclusion, the results from this study indicated that board composition and 
board leadership structure in corporate Australia do not correlate with financial 
performance, neither in the same pattern of correlation that is suggested by agency 
theory nor in that pattern of correlation that is suggested by stewardship theory. 
Actually, the results indicated that board composition and board leadership structure 
in corporate Australia do not correlate to financial performance in any pattern. 
4.6.2 Implications of Findings for Research 
The results from Chapter four demonstrated that there is no association (i.e. 
correlation) between independence characteristics of Australian boards (board 
composition and board leadership structure) and firm performance. First, if we 
assumed that the sample of correlations included in the meta-analysis is 
representative of the population of correlations between board independence 
characteristics and firm performance; then in line with international meta-analyses 
evidence (Dalton et al., 1998; Rhoades et al., 2000, 2001), we would be inclined to 
argue that the actual population of correlations between board independence 
characteristics and performance is nearly zero. 
Such no-relationship argument raises the level of questioning the validity of 
different theoretical frameworks for board structure (agency theory and stewardship 
theory). Such questioning highlights the need for developing a theoretical framework 
for board structure and performance. Yet, the most recognised recent advance in such 
theoretical development has been the contingency approach to boards (Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998), which, however, does not provide a clear framework to how 
board structure might influence performance given the context of firms’ needs. 
Second, the data employed for the meta-analyses in Chapter four exhibited 
floor effect; that is, there was not enough variation in board composition within and 
across the samples of the studies included in the meta-analyses. The same also 
applies to the samples for board leadership structure. This floor effect is a sign that 
the Australian boards have actually resembled the prescribed governance practice of 
having a majority of non-executive directors and separating the roles of the board 
chair and the CEO: (1) for the 51 samples reporting correlation between the ratio of 
non-executive directors and performance, there were 44 samples for each of which 
the mean for the ratio of non-executive directors was never below 50%. Moreover, 
for 39 samples of these 51 samples, the mean for the ratio of non-executive was 
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always more than 64%. (2) For the 17 samples reporting correlation between the 
ratio of independent directors and performance, there were 14 samples for each of 
which the mean for the ratio of independent directors was more than 50%. (3) For the 
39 samples reporting correlation between board leadership structure and 
performance, there were 33 samples for each of which the average of CEO duality 
was never more than 23%. Prior research has also provided evidence that Australian 
boards are generally independent (see Stapledon & Lawrence, 1996; Kang et al., 
2007; Liu, 2012; Dimovski et al., 2013; Adams & Ferreira, 2009). 
As with the floor effect, there is a possible alternative to the findings that the 
correlation between board independence and performance is zero, that is, there is a 
relationship between board independence and performance. This possible 
relationship might be linear, curvilinear or any other form of relationship. Yet, 
because of the floor effect the data in hand did not detect such possible relationship 
as the sample of correlations included in the meta-analysis is not representative of the 
population of correlations between board independence and performance. 
Out of the different possible relationships, the results from the moderating 
meta-analysis based on performance measures lend some support to the possibility 
that there is a linear relationship between board independence characteristics and 
performance. However, the potential linear relationship is contingent on the type of 
performance measure (accounting based performance measures, and market based 
performance measures). Performance measure moderating meta-analyses indicated 
that market based performance measures, which reflect the future expected financial 
results, are negatively correlated with each of the ratio of outside directors (n = 
34,565; r = -.055; p < .001) and the separation of roles between the CEO and the 
chair (n = 29,812; r = -.038; p < .01). On the other hand, accounting based 
performance measures, which reflect the historical financial results, are positively 
correlated with the ratio of outside directors (n = 29,690; r = .031; p < .05). 
Market measures are forward-looking, and hence they might be a better 
measure of the contemporaneous influence of any board composition characteristic 
(Christensen et al., 2010). On the other hand, accounting measures are backward-
looking, and hence they may lag the actual actions and decisions that are brought 
about by boards (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003a). Thus, and in the light of the results from 
the performance measures moderating meta-analyses, two arguments might be 
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extrapolated. Both arguments are conceivable for this research because the studies 
included employed different time horizons for the correlation between board 
independence characteristics and performance (e.g. lagging board independence 
characteristics against performance, or using cross-sectional design for both board 
independence characteristics and performance). 
First, it might be argued that firms with better accounting performance (e.g. 
ROA) might raise the ratio of outside directors without consideration to the actual 
current need of the firm (inside director or outside director); such as the firm’s 
increased need for skills and firm’s specific knowledge provided by inside directors. 
By assuming the hypothesis of market efficiency (Fama, 1970), the market then 
might devalue such unneeded increase in the ratio of outside director, and therefore 
market performance measures (e.g. MBA) decline. Such argument suggests that 
accounting performance results precede the change in the ratio of outside directors, 
yet a change in the ratio of outside directors precedes market performance results. 
However, for the first argument to hold, moderating meta-analyses based on 
both (1) the time horizon for the correlations and (2) the performance measures must 
provide similar results to those results obtained from the moderating meta-analysis 
based on only performance measure; which actually was the case. The results from 
moderating both the performance measures and the design of the studies (e.g. time 
horizon for the correlations) actually supported this argument; there was a positive 
correlation between accounting performance measures and the ratio of outside 
directors for all correlations with cross-sectional design (n = 23,667; r = .032; p < 
.05). There also was a negative correlation between market performance measures 
and the ratio of outside directors for all correlations with cross-sectional design (n = 
25,018; r = -.059; p < .05). 
Second, a counter argument would suggest the opposite, that is, an increase in 
the ratio of outside directors might lead to increased monitoring by outside directors 
and therefore enhance accounting performance measures. Nevertheless, the market 
might react negatively to such an increase in the ratio of outside directors as the 
market might, assuming inefficient markets, perceive such an increase as a sign of 
higher firm’s business risk, for instance. However, for this argument to hold, the 
correlations included in the performance measures moderating meta-analysis must 
have a design (e.g. time horizon for the correlations) that lags board independence 
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characteristics against performance. The results from moderating both the 
performance measures and the design of the studies did not provide any support to 
this argument. 
Statistical significance only provided support for the first argument; that is, 
accounting performance results precede the change in the ratio of outside directors, 
yet a change in the ratio of outside directors precedes market performance results. 
Whether moderating meta-analyses provide support to the first argument rationale or 
the second argument rationale, the possibility that there is an undetected linear 
relationship between board independence characteristics and performance is not 
supported by the practical significance (the correlation values were very small 
(Cohen, 1992); r < .10). Thus, we may argue that the most plausible conclusion is 
that there is no correlation between board independence characteristics and 
performance. Moreover, given (1) the nature of the sample for this meta-analysis, 
that is, all studies included in the meta-analysis drawn from the ASX largest 500, and 
(2) the relative large sample size for both the meta-analysis for board composition (n 
= 64,255 company years) and the meta-analysis for board leadership structure (n= 
52,628 company years), it is conceivable to argue that the sample of correlations 
included in both meta-analyses fairly represent the population of correlations 
between board independence and performance. Thus, the alternative that there is a 
linear relationship (whether positive or negative) between independence and 
performance has become very unlikely to hold.  
The floor effect, however, highlights three important implications for research 
into boards and corporate governance: (1) further investigations into the association 
between board independence of Australian firms and other variables (e.g. 
performance) might be unfruitful or might be misleading, at least given the current 
level of board independence of Australian firms. However, if future research into 
independence- performance links is conducted, two key matters must be considered: 
employing purposive samples within which enough variation in board independence 
variables is present; and investigating the association between board independence 
and non-financial performance measures (competitiveness, sustainability, etc.). (2) 
The documented results from the performance measure moderating analysis have 
implications for research into the interactions between the different aspects of board 
independence. There was a positive correlation between market performance 
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measures and each of CEO duality and the ratio of inside directors, as well as a 
positive correlation between accounting performance measures and the ratio of 
outside directors. Thus, along with controlling for performance measures, board 
independence might need to be measured by a combination of both aspects of 
independence (board composition and board leadership structure) rather than in 
individuality. Moreover, other attributes of board independence might also need to be 
included when measuring board independence (the composition (i.e. independence) 
of board committees, and the independence of each committee’s chair). (3) Research 
into corporate governance may need not to control for board independence because 
most Australian boards are, generally, independent. 
In summary, the findings of this study (whether the most probable explanation 
– the zero correlation relationship between board independence and performance, or 
the less probable explanation – small contingent linear relationship between board 
independence and performance) raise the level of questioning the validity, or at least 
the adequacy, of one single theory (e.g. agency theory) in explaining how board 
structure impacts performance. Such questioning highlights the need for developing a 
clearer robust theoretical framework for board structure and performance. Eisenhardt 
(1989: 71) indicates that “Agency theory presents a partial view of the world that, 
although it is valid, also ignores a good bit of the complexity of organizations. 
Additional perspectives can help to capture the greater complexity”. 
4.6.3 Implications of Findings for Practice 
The empirical findings of this research also have implications for practice. 
First, Australian firms may need to structure their boards to add value (Nicholson & 
Kiel, 2007; Henry, 2008) rather than just “ticking the boxes” of the prescribed best 
practice (Henry, 2008: 912). The appointment of new directors must take place based 
on the board’s understanding of the existing conditions and the needs of the firms; 
Australian firms need to consider the market reaction to the appointment of new 
directors, yet it is important to understand the actual need for an inside or outside 
director (Turnbull, 2001). For instance, Australian firms may appoint directors based 
on their needs but it must be highlighted in financial statement notes that the 
appointment of new directors (whether an insider or an outsider) was justified, so 
that the market reaction is not negative; this is facilitated by the basis of “if not, why 
not” (ASX CGPR, 2014: 3).  
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Second, if the theoretical framework of agency theory for board structure was 
invalid or inadequate, then a significant challenge would be faced by the 
conventional corporate governance reforms emphasising the importance of board 
independence. For instance, principle two of the most recent version of CGPR (2014) 
by the ASX Corporate Governance Council indicates that, as grounded in agency 
theory, boards must be structured to add value. It recommends that boards composed 
of a majority of independent directors and chaired by an independent director may 
discharge their duties effectively. Overall, the results of this study do not provide any 
empirical support to these recommendations, rather the results lend support to the 
calls that the ASX Corporate Governance Council may need to consider other roles 
of boards in adding value to firms, or at least considering the different manifestations 
of boards’ controlling role (other than board independence). 
4.6.4 Methodological Implications 
First, the moderating analysis employed in this study has emphasised the 
importance of measurement and operationalisation of corporate governance variables 
(Dalton & Aguinis, 2013). Two points are highlighted: (1) the results from the 
performance measure moderating analysis (accounting measures, and market 
measures) indicated that there is a statistically significant correlation (yet with a 
small effect size) between board composition and each of accounting measures and 
market measures. Furthermore, when controlling for more than one moderator (any 
combination of the three moderators), the correlation between board composition and 
financial performance was statistically significant only when performance measure 
was controlled for and the data set of the studies included has a cross-sectional 
design (see Table 4.6 and appendices three and four). (2) although moderating for the 
different operationalisations of board composition did not seem to change the 
practically and statistically non-significant results obtained from the overall analysis, 
it is important to note that out of the 68 meta-analysed correlations (n = 64,255) there 
were 51 correlations (n = 55,358) measuring board composition as the ratio of non-
executive directors. Thus, it would be fairly assumed that the correlation between 
board composition and performance (r = -.01) was driven by one specific 
operationalisation of board composition, which is the ratio of non-executive 
directors; the correlation between the ratio of non-executive directors and 
performance was r = -.018. 
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Second, moderating analyses based on performance measures detected 
statistically significant, yet practically non-significant, correlation between board 
composition and performance. However, it is important to note that although the 
correlation detected in each of these moderating analyses is small (r < .010; Cohen, 
1992), this correlation may need to be read in boards’ context rather than an abstract 
statistical sense. 
Third, homogeneity concerns should be considered when investigating the 
board independence-performance links. Although all samples included in the meta-
analyses of this study were drawn from the Top 500 of the ASX, there were 
heterogeneity issues across the samples; this was detected through two statistical 
tests (Q-value test and Tau squared test). However, this issue was addressed in this 
study by employing the random effects statistical model for the analyses rather than 
the fixed effects model. Homogeneity concerns for similar investigations may hold 
for other differences between various subjects within a given sample (different 
industries, board size, etc.). 
Finally, this study has emphasised the importance of employing meta-analysis 
to provide evidence for a controversial corporate governance topic. Meta-analysis 
might be useful for different issues and variables in corporate governance research; 
like the association between performance and females on boards, composition of 
board sub-committees and performance, etc. 
4.6.5 Limitations of the Study 
First, the analyses of this study were conducted by meta-analysing 29 
Australian studies – therefore, any bias in results for any of these 29 studies may 
reflect on the results of the meta-analyses of this study. 
Second, the meta-analyses of this research would have included more studies 
(bigger sample size), and hence maybe different findings, if more correlations had 
been included in this research (i.e. there were many Australian studies investigating 
the variables of interest (e.g. ratio of executive directors and ROA), yet these were 
not included in this study given the difficulty of deriving/ or obtaining the correlation 
values). 
Third, statistically, correlation only measures the association between two 
given variables (e.g. board independence and ROA) without considering the 
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influence of other governance variables (e.g. managerial ownership, institutional 
shareholding) on that association. Some variables influencing the relationship 
between board structure and performance would have been controlled for in this 
study if advanced statistical methods had been employed (e.g. meta-regression). 
Fourth, this study provides an abstract association between firm performance, 
and each of board composition and board leadership structure. This approach to 
researching boards was described by Pettigrew (1992: 171) as an approach that 
provides “no direct evidence on the processes and mechanisms which presumably 
link the inputs to the outputs”. However, this study provides a solid ground for 
further explanatory investigations into board decision making, which is advanced in 
Chapter five and Chapter six of this thesis. 
Fifth, authors of the studies included in this meta-analysis drew their samples 
from the ASX 500, thus, the results may not be valid for unlisted companies (e.g. 
small and medium size companies, and not for profit organisations). Having all 
samples included in this study drawn from ASX 500 (i.e. large for profit firms) raises 
two concerns (1) the influence of the board size on the association between firm 
performance and each of board composition and board leadership structure. For 
instance, Kiel and Nicholson (2003a) showed that after controlling for the firm size, 
board size of Australian firms is positively correlated with firm value. Moreover, 
prior meta-analysis from the US showed a positive correlation between board size 
and firm performance (Dalton, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). (2) All governance 
mechanisms (e.g. monitoring by boards and market for corporate control) interact to 
ensure a better governance of companies and hence better performance (Rediker & 
Seth, 1995). However, unlisted organisations (e.g. not for profit organisations) do not 
have a market for corporate control, and hence board independence for such unlisted 
organisations may have a different impact on the organisational outcomes of not for 
profit organisations. 
Sixth, variables influencing firm performance were not controlled for in this 
study. Thus, the correlation between performance and board independence as 
obtained in this study (and similarly, the correlation between performance and board 
leadership structure) may be biased because financial performance is a function of 
different external and internal variables; e.g. competition, government policy 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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Finally, the investigation in this study is limited to only two individual 
manifestations (board composition and board leadership structure) of two governance 
mechanisms by boards (monitoring vs. counselling). In this study, there was no 
integration to the interaction between monitoring and advising, and other governance 
mechanisms; there was not even a consideration to the interaction between board 
composition and board leadership structure. 
4.6.6 Conclusion 
This study aimed at providing empirical evidence on the association between 
board structure and firm performance. Specifically, this study answered two 
questions in this matter. For the first research question; whether there is any 
correlation between board composition and performance of the Australian firms; the 
findings of this study indicated that the true population correlation between board 
composition and financial performance appears practically and statistically non-
significant. Similarly, for the second research question; whether there is any 
correlation between board leadership structure and performance of the Australian 
firms; the findings of this study indicated that the true population correlation between 
board leadership structure and financial performance appears practically and 
statistically non-significant. 
The key contribution from Chapter four is that it has extended the international 
evidence that there is no robust association between board independence and 
performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Wagner et al., 1998, Rhoades et al., 2000, 2001) to 
the Australian context. However, the findings of this study should be read as findings 
of an abstract association between board structure and performance because there 
was not enough control over many influential variables on the association between 
board structure and performance. 
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Chapter 5: Investigating Board Papers and Decision 
Bias: A Laboratory Experiment 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having found little evidence to suggest that board independence has any 
consistent, practical effect on corporate performance, this chapter seeks to 
understand why this might be the case. In this chapter, the research program departs 
from a traditional input-output agency approach to consider how the processes and 
routines of director decision making may be susceptible to agency costs even in the 
presence of director independence.  
The key focus in the chapter is an experiment designed to identify if the way 
boards operate may leave independent directors susceptible to manipulation, and 
hence possibly increase agency costs for corporations. Specifically, I use a double-
blinded 3x2 experimental design to test if “anchoring” (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974:1128) can influence board decision making through the effects of suggested 
board recommendation (i.e. resolution) that is included in board papers. The design 
of this experiment departs from standard tests of anchoring in that the materials 
supplied to participants contain multiple points of reference or benchmarks (as would 
a real board paper). Traditional anchoring studies focus on only one point of 
information – the manipulation. The employed experimental design also tests if a 
director would normally support a resolution (unless he/she significantly disagrees 
with it) as would be suggested by social norms hypothesis (Berkowitz & Perkins, 
1986). 
This experimental design investigates anchoring and boards’ social norms in 
three consecutive phases that replicate the board decision process. In phase one, 
individual director decision making is examined. This corresponds to the standard 
board practice of circulating board papers on which directors base an initial 
assessment prior to a meeting (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003b). In phase two, these 
individuals meet as a group to examine the effects of group decision making on the 
anchoring and norms phenomena: Testing anchoring at the groups’ level is another 
extension on the anchoring research agenda. Finally, phase three is the final 
individual level assessment of the decisions. Between-subjects ANOVA was 
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employed to analyse each phase of the experiment, then a mixed within-between 
subjects ANOVA was employed to test if scores on the dependent variable differ 
from phase one to phase two (choice shift), and from phase one and two to phase 
three (group polarisation) (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Lamm, 1976). 
This study is therefore designed to provide an understanding of a causal 
mechanism in common board practice that may cause biased decision making and 
contribute to the agency problem. The key finding of this chapter is that independent 
decision makers (such as directors) and group based decision making (such as 
boards) are influenced by the use of board resolutions or recommendations 
(numerical reference point) at the beginning of the paper irrespective of the 
information contained in the background paper. Further, there is limited support that 
this influence is subject to the norms of the group within which the decision makers 
find themselves. In contrast, there is no support for hypotheses of choice shift or 
group polarisation – group mechanisms do not appear to affect this individual level 
mechanism. These results demonstrate how a governance process mechanism may be 
used to increase agency costs if the board paper is subject to manipulation by the 
proposer. The external validity concerns of this design are noted, but addressed to 
some degree in Chapter six. 
5.2 OVERVIEW OF THE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE STUDY   
While most governance problems are still conceptualised through an agency 
theory lens, recent literature has repeatedly called for a better understanding of the 
processes involved in actual board decision making (Daily et al., 2003; Ees et al., 
2009; Hendry, 2002, 2005). These calls have specifically identified that 
understanding boards and the agency relationship may be advanced by incorporating 
behavioural theory into boards and corporate governance research (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999; Rindova, 1999; Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Huse, Minichilli, & 
Schoning, 2005; Ees, Van der Laan, & Postma, 2008). For instance, Hendry (2002) 
suggests that agency costs may arise for reasons other than the straightforward agent 
opportunism – they may arise due to honest incompetence or the misspecification of 
objectives by the principal.  
This study aims to address these concerns by examining how cognitive decision 
bias may be triggered by a common corporate governance practice and so contribute 
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to agency costs. Bounded rationality (March & Simon, 1958) posits that individuals 
and groups suffer from biases that cause them to depart from the optimal decision. 
Thus, board decisions may depart from an optimal outcome because of bounded 
rationality rather than the straightforward opportunistic actions of agents (Ees et al., 
2009; Hendry, 2002, 2005). Therefore, cognitive decision bias at the board level may 
contribute to agency costs (Ees et al., 2009). Research in cognitive psychology and 
behavioural economics has shown people often violate the principles of rational 
choice in systematic ways. These violations are particularly evident under conditions 
of uncertainty and complexity e.g. judging probabilities and estimating uncertain 
numerical values (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Loewenstien & Thaler, 1989; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1992, 1991, 1981) – just the kinds of situations that 
boards often face. 
This study examines three different causes of bias in the context of director 
decision making. First, it examines the possible effects of anchoring (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974) in the context of how information is typically received by a board 
of directors. Second, it seeks to identify if group norms of recommendation 
acceptance (Berkowitz & Perkins, 1986) might influence director decision making. 
Finally, it seeks to understand if the group-based nature of decision making may 
mitigate or intensify any individual level biases (Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998; Yaniv, 
2011; Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams & Neale, 1996; Isenberg, 1986; Sunstein, 2002). 
In so doing, the study provides three important contributions to our 
understanding of decision making by boards of directors. First, it extends our 
knowledge of anchoring bias by testing whether the anchoring effects are evident 
despite the presence of other information that could counter any initial bias. In 
standard studies of anchoring, participants are given a single anchor point (see 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Joyce & Biddle, 1981; Mussweiler & Strack, 2001) 
whereas in this study participants in the anchoring test are given several reference 
points (i.e. similar to decision situations faced by directors) which may mitigate or 
overcome potential anchoring effects. Thus, such testing provides new avenues for 
both anchoring tests and board decision processes. Second, and perhaps most 
importantly, the study examines the effect of changing from an individual to group 
based decision model on the possible effects of anchoring to directly test if the group 
based nature of boards may mitigate this fundamental decision heuristic. (More 
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explanation is provided in the Section “The anchoring effect: Why study boards of 
directors?” under the Heading “2.3.2 Heuristics and Cognitive Biases”. 
5.2.1 Anchoring Effect 
The key decision bias at the heart of this study is “anchoring” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974:1128). Anchoring (sometimes called focalism) is based on the 
phenomenon that individuals often put too much weight on the initial value they 
possess when making subjective assessment; the phenomenon of anchoring is most 
easily demonstrated when people make numerical estimates by adjusting from an 
initial point; as Tversky & Kahneman (1974: 1128) explain it: 
In many situations, people make estimates by starting from an 
initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer. The initial 
value, or starting point, may be suggested by the formulation of 
the problem, or it may be the result of partial computation. In 
either case, adjustments are typically insufficient. That is, 
different starting points yield different estimates, which are 
biased toward the initial values. 
The anchoring phenomenon contradicts a key principle of rational choice theory, 
namely invariance. The invariance principle in rational choice theory states that 
“different representations of the same choice problem should yield the same 
preference. That is, the preference between options should be independent of their 
description” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986: S253). However, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) demonstrate that people’s estimates of numerical values are biased toward the 
initial values people have. The anchoring effect is a robust and reliable decision bias 
that has been demonstrated at the individual level in both laboratory and field 
research (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Epley & 
Gilovich, 2001; Mussweiler & Strack, 2004; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). In short, 
individuals’ decisions on issues with which they are relatively unfamiliar is biased 
towards the initial information provided to them. 
Prior experimental research has demonstrated that people anchor on arbitrary 
values, and they might do so even when they were told that the anchors are 
arbitrarily selected and uninformative (Mussweiler & Strack, 2001). For example, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) set the anchor value for each subject in their 
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experiment at the number resultant from spinning the wheel of fortune; moreover, the 
wheel spinning and the anchor setting took place in the presence of each given 
subject. Wilson, Houston, Etling, and Brekke (1996) used their subjects’ social 
security numbers to set the anchors for the subjects of their experiment. However, 
studies generally present only one numerical “anchor” and so depart from a typical 
board decision situation where multiple different data points are provided. 
The aim of this study is to extend our understanding of the anchoring mechanism 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) with an abstracted test of a boardroom decision 
process. In so doing, it provides an understanding if other aspects of the governance 
decision process (e.g. providing additional reference points or using a group to make 
decisions rather than an individual) may mitigate any potential anchoring 
phenomenon. The study is motivated by the insight that management largely shape 
the information provided to boards (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003b; Kiel, Nicholson, 
Tunny, & Beck, 2012) and hence manipulation of the form and content of 
information may lead to biased board decision making irrespective of board 
independence. 
This study is important to our understanding of agency theory as it clearly tests 
the underlying mechanism of information asymmetry so central to agency costs. The 
examples used in the experiment contain the same objective information – the only 
change was the recommendation from the paper’s fictitious anchor (section 5.3.1). 
Thus, it seeks to examine if a transparent manager (i.e. providing all the information 
is in the paper) can manipulate a decision through the provision of the initial 
recommendation. Normative prescription emphasises the need to clarify the purpose 
of information for a board early in any communication. Best practice advice 
advocates that a board paper should commence with the recommended decision the 
paper proposer believes should be made. Thus, presentation of a specific 
recommendation as the first piece of information a director reads would appear ripe 
for an anchoring effect. The specificity of the information, particularly if it contains a 
specific numeric recommendation, would likely influence the initial preferences of 
the directors, leading me to hypothesise that: 
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H5.1: Participants provided with a recommended numeric figure at 
the beginning of a board resolution paper will anchor on that 
recommended figure irrespective of the presence of other 
benchmark data provided in that resolution paper. 
5.2.2 Social Norms Theory and Group Decision Making40 
The desire to abstract the board decision process raises important distinctions 
with traditional laboratory and field studies of anchoring (Northcraft & Neale, 1987; 
Wansink et al., 1998; Joyce & Biddle, 1981). Specifically, boards operate in a group 
environment which may mitigate the effects of anchoring. To begin to understand 
this phenomenon, this study also draws upon social norms theory (Berkowitz & 
Perkins, 1986). Social norms theory posits that environmental and inter-personal 
influences play a significant role in people’s judgment and behaviour. Specifically, 
individuals may alter their decisions and behaviour based on their view of what is 
normal among their peers even when they have a misperception of others’ 
behaviours or beliefs. 
Since its first application to alcohol abuse by youth (Berkowitz & Perkins, 1986), 
there has been a growing interest in the application of social norms theory to other 
issues such as violence prevention (Berkowitz et al., 2003) as well as health and 
social justice issues (Berkowitz, 2002). Social norms theory would suggest that 
individual directors will be swayed in their decisions by their beliefs about how their 
peer directors will behave and make decisions, irrespective of the actual behaviours 
and decisions of the peer directors. For instance, if a director believes that a good 
director will always approach a recommendation from management skeptically, then 
he/ she will likely approach that recommendation with skepticism and hence a given 
director’s decision will be quite different compared with the decision of a director 
who believes that management are inherently trustworthy. In examining the impact 
of social norms, the experiment attempts to operationalise the key mechanism at the 
heart of the disagreement between agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983) and stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1991, 
1994), leading me to hypothesise that: 
                                                 
 
40 The second and third hypotheses are developed as a consequence of pilot-testing as described 
below. 
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H5.2: Participants cued to agree with the recommended resolution 
were more likely to accept the recommendation in a board 
paper.  
Hypothesis two provides one mechanism by which the effects of anchoring may 
be mitigated or intensified and is based on the social norms of the individuals 
involved in the decision. This effect is a substantive test of the difference in 
behaviour expected under agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) compared with 
stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1991, 1994). If a director 
believes that the proposer’s recommendation is a good steward of the organisation, 
he/ she would be predisposed to adopt it. In contrast, if a director did not see the 
proposer of the recommendation as trustworthy, there should be no effect in 
including a recommendation in the paper. 
Further into the investigation, Muth and Donaldson (1998) contend that there is a 
likely contingency relationship whereby the approach of the board (trust/distrust) 
needs to match the motivation of management (trustworthy/self-interested). By 
manipulating both the social norm and the presentation of the information, this 
experimental design tests the effect of any such contingency. Anchoring effects (and 
the manipulation of a recommendation by the proposer to increase agency costs) will 
be exacerbated when there is a norm of agreeing with the recommendation (when the 
board believes that the proposer is a steward), leading me to hypothesise: 
H5.3: Anchoring effects are higher when there is a social norm of 
accepting the recommendation in a board paper compared 
with anchoring effects in the absence of the norm. 
5.2.3 Board Decision Making: Choice Shift and Group Polarisation 
Modelling a board decision process requires the experiment to incorporate an 
element of group based decision making. Whereas anchoring has largely been 
investigated at the individual decision making level (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974; Joyce & Biddle, 1981; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997), board decision making is 
a group based activity (Bainbridge, 2002), whereby boards’ decisions result from 
team interdependence (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) and generally aim for group 
consensus (Bainbridge, 2002). Thus, if an anchoring effect occurs at the individual 
director level it may or may not translate to a group level decision. 
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Standard economists argue that the departure of individuals from the rational 
choice model (such as anchoring) will average out such that the average behaviour of 
large groups is consistent with the rational choice model (Bainbridge, 2002). Thus, 
group decision making has been argued to be one mechanism in overcoming biases 
that accompany individuals’ application of heuristics. Prior research has shown that 
groups’ decisions, under certain circumstances, can be superior to those of 
individuals (Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998; Hiltz, Johnson, & Turoff, 1986; Neale et al., 
1986; Sniezek & Henry, 1989). Because group decision making aggregates inputs of 
individuals, their interests, and their skills, groups are likely to make less biased 
decisions than individuals do (Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998; Bainbridge, 2002). For 
instance, Sniezek and Henry (1989) demonstrated that groups are found to be more 
accurate than individuals in making decisions under uncertainty. 
On the other hand, cognitive psychologists suggest that if a decision bias is 
evident among individuals, it may, in some cases, be amplified among groups (Paese 
et al., 1993; Yaniv, 2011). Moreover, there are also decision biases that may 
accompany group decision making due to consensus issues, e.g. groupthink (Janis, 
1972), group polarisation (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Lamm, 1976), 
and unshared information (Stasser & Titus, 1985). Understanding the effect of 
moving to a group-based decision is therefore important as it may exacerbate or 
mitigate any individual level bias. 
The anchoring effect may be exacerbated at the group level due to choice shift or 
after the group level due to group polarisation (Stoner, 1961; Moscovici & Zavalloni, 
1969; Myers & Lamm, 1976). Both concepts could explain any difference between 
decisions made by individuals before a group’s deliberation and those decisions 
made after a group’s deliberation as both suggest that “members of a deliberating 
group predictably move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by 
the members’ pre-deliberation tendencies” (Sunstein, 2002: 176). 
Although these two concepts are often collapsed in the literature, they should not 
be considered equivalent. Choice shift indicates the post-deliberation decision made 
by the group, while group polarisation indicates the post-deliberation decisions made 
individually by the group’s members (Zuber et al., 1992; Sunstein, 2002). Choice 
shift denotes “the difference between the arithmetic mean of the individual first 
preferences before discussion (pre-discussion preferences) and the group decision”; 
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while group polarisation denotes “the difference between the pre-discussion 
preferences and the individual first preferences after group discussion (post-
discussion preferences)” (Zuber et al., 1992: 50). This research specifically tests for 
both choice shift and group polarisation. 
Prior experimental research investigating whether group discussions intensify or 
attenuate decision biases has yielded diverse and inconsistent results. Some of this 
inconsistency is due to the diversity of experimental designs across the studies 
(Maharaj, 2009; Sunstein, 2002; Yaniv, 2011; Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998). For 
instance, Neale et al., (1986) investigated the framing effect among individuals and 
groups, whereby each participant responded to a decision scenario (i.e. framed either 
in gains or in losses) at both the individual level and the group level. They found that 
groups were less susceptible to the framing effect compared with individuals. In 
contrast, Paese et al. (1993) employed four scenarios and compared decisions made 
by groups composed of individuals who had responded to the same scenario, with 
those groups composed of individuals who had responded to different scenarios. 
Paese et al. (1993) found that framing effect was evident at the individual level. 
However, the results were different at the group level. Framing effect was amplified 
for groups responding to the scenario that its members responded to as individuals, 
while there was a reduced framing effect for groups whose members had responded 
to different scenarios as individuals. Yaniv (2011) corroborated Paese et al.’s (1993) 
results reporting an amplified framing effect among groups whose members 
previously responded to the same frame; while there was no framing effect for 
groups whose members previously responded to different frames. 
This study follows the same logic as the preceding series of experiments. Yet, it 
differs in that it focuses on anchoring effect rather than framing, and that the decision 
context investigated is board decision making. Thus, this study seeks to understand if 
individuals are susceptible to anchoring effect when faced with information supplied 
in a typical board paper. It then investigates if group decision making mechanisms 
amplify/ or attenuate this effect. Because this experiment focuses on the context of 
the board of directors41, each participant responds to the same scenario at both the 
individual and the group levels. 
                                                 
 
41 Directors on the same board are typically exposed to the same frame of the decision situation.   
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Given the results reported for framing effects, I would expect group decision 
making to exacerbate the effects of anchoring as multiple individuals would likely 
reinforce each other’s perspective on adopting a recommendation. Thus, moving 
from an individual to group decision forum would likely influence (e.g. intensify) 
anchoring effects and boards’ social norms. Given the well-known choice shift and 
group polarisation phenomena (Stoner, 1961; Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers 
& Lamm, 1976), I therefore hypothesise that: 
H5.4: Anchoring effects are higher in a post-discussion decision 
context compared with the pre-discussion decision context, 
specifically; 
H5.4a: Anchoring effects are higher in a group decision context 
compared with the individual level context. 
H5.4b: Anchoring effects are higher for individuals’ post-discussion 
decision context compared with the individuals’ pre-
discussion decision context. 
5.3 METHODS 
5.3.1 Experimental Design and Justification 
The nature of the hypotheses (i.e. differences in the mean as an effect size) 
naturally prompts a quantitative answer that gives an estimate for the effect size and 
a confidence interval around that estimate (Cumming, 2012). A key challenge for the 
studies of boards is the limited research on the causal mechanisms underlying 
potential agency costs in board research. An experimental design allows for the 
direct study of causal mechanisms and is the gold standard design for causal 
inference (Myers & Hansen, 1997; Yin, 2009). Further, an experimental design 
allows for strong internal validity as it is possible to maintain tight control over 
possible confounding variables, which is an important consideration in complex 
decision making. 
Following a series of three pilot studies (see section 5.3.2 on the piloting phase 
and design development) the hypotheses were tested using a double blinded 3x2 
between-subjects experimental design. Each participant was provided with a scenario 
and asked to make a decision as if he/she was a director on a board faced with 
appointing a new CEO. The decision involved nominating a dollar amount as an 
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upper limit for the salary negotiations with a candidate CEO. There were a series of 
three pilot studies conducted to fine tune the experimental design and estimate the 
necessary sample size required to provide sufficient power in the design. The six 
scenarios which manipulate anchoring and social norms are illustrated in Table 5.1. 
(Please see Appendix five for the six scenarios of the exercise.) 
 
Table 5- 1: Factorial 3x2 Experimental Design  
 Decision resolution: anchoring condition 
Social norms condition  
High anchor Low anchor 
No anchor 
(control) 
Norms present Scenario A Scenario C Scenario E 
Norms absent (control) Scenario B Scenario D Scenario F 
 
To manipulate the individual/group condition, each task in each scenario was 
repeated three times. First, participants completed the task and made their decisions 
as individuals. Immediately following their individual decision, participants were 
randomly assigned to groups of three (within the same condition) and asked to 
provide a single consensus decision for their group. Finally, participants were asked 
to make the decision again as individuals.	
Given the complex nature of board decision making and the dearth of robust 
causal evidence on agency costs at the board level, I decided to emphasise internal 
validity in the design of the study. While this emphasis may raise questions of 
external validity, the emphasis on strong causal inference on a possible mechanism 
underlying agency costs was deemed worth the trade-off. However, the challenge of 
external validity leads to Chapter six. 
Three further considerations support the choice of internal validity over 
generalisability in this study. First, the causal mechanism in corporate governance 
around monitoring of management proposes that independence of the decision maker 
is important. Theoretically, it would seem reasonable to expect that participants in 
this experiment would be independent of the decision and so the theoretical 
mechanism is replicated by participants. Second, agency theory assumes information 
asymmetry between the board and management – indeed, this is proposed as a key 
source of agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Since the participants in this 
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study know a little about the topic of the decision, they were in the theoretical 
position posed by agency theory, thus strengthening the theoretical claim to the 
decision context. Finally, study three (Chapter six) involves participants drawn from 
the population of interest (i.e. directors) as a check for external validity. 
It is important to note the presence of three different control groups. Scenario F 
was a true control where both of the conditions were absent; there was no decision 
resolution (i.e. no anchor), and the social norms condition was absent. Scenarios E 
and F did not contain a resolution so they were controls for the anchor conditions 
(although there is a possible confound in E where a norm was provided). Similarly, 
Scenarios B, D, and F are controls for the social norm condition (although there were 
potential confounds due to anchoring with the provision of the resolution). 
I chose to use a control group rather than a calibration group42 (e.g. Jacowitz & 
Kahneman 1995; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997), for two reasons. First, integrating 
results from the calibration group to the experimental design involves running the 
exercise at two different times, introducing possible threats to randomisation. 
Second, using a calibration group output as input to the experiment may cause biases 
toward the responses of the subjects in the calibration group, raising potential issues 
with respect to the independence of observations (Brown & Melamed, 1993). I thus 
chose to conduct the experiment on both treatment and control groups at the same 
time with a complete randomisation of subjects to the different conditions following 
extensive piloting. 
5.3.2 Pilot Testing and Design Development 
Prior to the experiment, three pilot tests were conducted between December 2013 
and May 2014. The pilot tests concentrated on the anchoring phenomenon and 
assessed if an effect appeared to be present. By debriefing participants I could assess 
any difficulties in understanding the instrument; this included refining wording of the 
instrument and the anchors used.  
Pilot 1: In the first pilot, the draft individual level task was administered to 18 
participants of whom 14 were debriefed. During the first pilot, the task involved 
                                                 
 
42 Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995), and Strack and Mussweiler (1997) started their experiment by 
conducting a “no anchor” condition on their calibration groups, then they used the 85th percentile and 
15th percentile from the calibration group results to set the high anchor value and the low anchor value, 
respectively, for their experimental groups. 
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approving an upper limit for a CEO salary negotiation under three conditions: (1) no 
up-front board resolution or recommendation at the beginning of the paper; (2) a low 
up-front recommendation; or (3) a high up-front recommendation (see section 5.3.4 
for a discussion of the instrument). Generally the participants reported the task was 
easy to understand and complete.  
However, during the debriefings several participants asked for the meaning of a 
board resolution (i.e. the recommendation at the beginning of the paper). This 
highlighted a possible difference between a board setting and the general public 
setting, whereby directors will likely understand the meaning of a resolution in a 
board paper and, perhaps more importantly, may be predisposed to approving the 
recommendation suggested by management (Huse, 2007; Kiel et al., 2012). 
Participant confusion on the meaning of a board resolution directed my attention to 
the possible importance of social norms to director decision making (e.g. Sonnenfeld, 
2002; Forbes & Milliken, 1999). I decided to re-pilot the task and include another 
manipulation to clarify the role of a board resolution and attempt to manipulate social 
norms in the decision process. Under social norms theory (Berkowitz & Perkins, 
1986) a director may be predisposed to agreeing with a resolution when he/she 
believes this is the norm in the board. Thus, the overall bias in decision making may 
result from the two effects, both the presentation of information and the presence of 
the social norm. 
Pilot 2: The second pilot test was administered to 30 participants. As with the 
first pilot, the task involved approving an upper limit for a CEO salary negotiation 
under three conditions: (1) no up-front board resolution or recommendation at the 
beginning of the paper; (2) a low up-front recommendation; or (3) a high up-front 
recommendation. In this pilot I altered the instructions’ script for 10 participants and 
informed them what a board resolution was and that a board normally approves the 
manipulation. In all other ways the task was the same. 
Analysis of the results indicated that anchoring was present; participants 
receiving the high condition recommendation approved a statistically significantly 
higher negotiation ceiling. There was, however, no effect due to the change in 
instructions. As a consequence, I re-examined the approach to manipulating the norm 
in a third pilot.  
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Pilot 3: The third pilot was administered to 40 participants. As with both pilots 
one and two, the key change was to integrate the explanation of a board resolution 
for all instruments and adding the norm around adopting the resolution in the 
manipulation condition. Given the anchor manipulation and the norm manipulation, I 
administered a 2x2 experimental design for this pilot. Following assumption testing 
and exploration (e.g. a Levene’s test for variance between groups), a two-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the results indicated the presence of anchoring and 
social norms, but the results were not statistically significant. There was, however, an 
interaction effect indicating the importance of the norm manipulation at this early 
stage.  
Pilot conclusion: Based on the results of the three pilots, I decided to proceed to 
the main experiment with a 3x2 factorial design. Result from the first and second 
pilot test suggested two levels of manipulation (high anchor and low anchor board 
resolution) as well as a control (no resolution) as conditions. Based on the learning 
from the first pilot I also decided to manipulate social norms. Based on the difference 
in results between the second and third pilot, I chose to include the information on 
the resolution in the task assigned to participants. Thus, the pilot phase leads to the 
design outlined earlier in Table 5.1. 
5.3.3 Sample Size Determination 
Results from the third pilot test were used to estimate the experiment’s required 
sample size. Sample size was calculated using Power Analysis and Sample Size 13 
(PASS 13) (www.NCSS.com). I employed factorial ANOVA power analysis 
technique as it estimates the sample size needed to detect a significant main effect for 
each of the two independent variables, as well as a significant interaction effect 
between the two independent variables. Furthermore, the factorial ANOVA 
technique is suitable for our sample size estimation because ANOVA tests assume 
homogeneity of variance across the groups; and this was the case in the pilot data. 
Since the third pilot test involved 2x2 factorial design (whereas the estimate was for 
a 3x2 factorial design), I chose to guard against misestimation by using a one-sided t-
test assuming an equal variance43. 
                                                 
 
43 One sided because the anchoring variable in pilot test three involves two levels; high anchor and no 
anchor, whereby the results were expected to differ only in one direction. 
  
Chapter 5: Investigating Board Papers and Decision Bias: A Laboratory Experiment 139 
Factorial ANOVA Power Analysis 
Power calculations were based on Partial Eta Squared (ηp2) as an effect size 
(Cohen, 1973, 1988; Levine & Hullett, 2002). Partial Eta Squared is the most 
reported estimate of effect size for ANOVA test (Pallant, 2013; Levine & Hullett, 
2002); in its simple form it is calculated by dividing the sum of squares between 
groups (i.e. the sum of squared deviations between each group mean and the grand 
mean; denoted “SS b-g”) by the total sum of squared differences between scores and 
the grand mean; denoted “SS total”): 
ηp2 = SS b-g/ SS total 
Assuming equal variance across the conditions, calculations revealed a target of 
43 participants per condition (a total of 258 participants for the 3x2 design). For the 
anchoring condition, this design is expected to achieve 100% power when an F test is 
used at a 5% significance level; the estimated detected effect size is: ηp2 = .45. While 
for the norms condition, this design also meets the 80% power, a threshold 
traditionally accepted in experimental design, when an F test is used at a 5% 
significance level and an effect size: ηp2 = 0.22 is present. 
One-Sided t-test assuming an equal variance 
Using the scores from the third pilot, this sample size calculation was cross-
checked using a series of six t-tests based (one test for each pair of groups in the 2x2 
design). Calculations based on the difference in means indicated that a sample size of 
38 participants in each of the six cells (i.e. total sample size of 228 participants) is 
expected to achieve 80% power to reject the null hypothesis of equal means for each 
pair of the groups when the “SS total” is 49,221 and the significance level is 5%. 
5.3.4 Procedures 
Experiment schedule 
Due to the large number of participants required, the three-phase testing 
(individual-group-individual) and the nature of the experiment, testing occurred over 
multiple sessions during September 2014. Initially three different dates were 
scheduled (11:00 am- 12:00 pm, 12 September 2014; 12:00 pm- 1:00 pm, 17 
September 2014, and 10:00 am- 11:00 am, 23 September 2014). However, because 
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the last two sessions did not attract the anticipated number of participants, a fourth 
session was later scheduled (11:00 am- 12:00 pm, 8 October 2014). 
Participant remuneration 
At the conclusion of the experiment, each participant that took part was 
reimbursed $15. Compensation of five dollars was also prepared for reserve 
participants; however there were no reserve participants. In session one, the number 
of attendees meant one participant could not be assigned to a group; this person was 
thanked and paid the reserve participant compensation. Session four had a similar 
uneven number of participants but in this case the participant was paid the full $15. 
The total amount of compensation paid to participants was $3,170 and was funded by 
the Research Student Fund Scheme at QUT. 
Participants 
Participants for this research were primarily recruited from a database of 
approximately 2,000 individuals (largely QUT students) who had previously 
indicated their general willingness to participate in research. An invitation to 
participate was emailed to potential participants. The email provided students with a 
link to register to participate in the first session up to the seating capacity of the room 
(99 seats) plus reserves. Previous experiments indicated around 90% of individuals 
registering turn up on the day of the experiment; therefore 111 individuals were 
allowed to register. Some 63 participants arrived for session one. The same 
recruitment procedures were applied to all sessions, with a gradual decrease in those 
who turned up (69 participants for session two, 39 participants for each of session 
three and session four). Overall, there were 210 participants that formed 70 groups 
over four sessions. With the fourth session conducted, 92% of the calculated sample 
size was achieved and recruitment was halted due to the increasing logistical 
difficulties involved. Details of the participants are presented under results (see 
section 5.4.1). 
Assignment of participants to conditions 
Randomised assignment of participants to experimental conditions is the gold 
standard for causal, theoretical inference (Dane, 1990; Brown & Melamed, 1993). 
Randomisation of assignment removes any potential unknown bias that might arise 
from applying the treatment to different segments of the participant group (Myers & 
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Hansen, 1997; Brown & Melamed, 1993). Random assignment in this experiment 
was complicated by the individual-group-individual basis of the design as well as the 
necessity of carrying out the experiment over four sessions. For instance, if there 
were some unknown attribute of an individual that correlated with their ability to 
attend a different date of session or time of session (particularly if, for instance, only 
a subset of scenarios were carried out in each different session), then this might bias 
any assignment process if not carefully thought through.  
To overcome these complications a two stage randomisation process occurred. 
First, the treatment conditions (i.e. the six scenarios) were randomly assigned to 
group numbers across the four sessions. This meant that the group-treatment 
assignment was truly random across all the data. If the treatments were instead 
assigned to individuals (or individuals to scenarios) it would require multiple seating 
changes during the experiment with possible confusion and contamination of the 
experimental process. Practically, this entailed using the randomisation function in 
Microsoft Office Excel 2007 to one of 33 groups in each session (i.e. a total of 132 
groups across the four sessions).  
The second stage involved randomly assigning participants for each session to a 
specifically numbered seat (and so to a group) in each session. Practically, the 
randomisation function in Excel was used to generate a random list of the 99 seat 
numbers for each session. As participants arrived, they were asked to move to the 
appropriate seat. For instance, if the first random number on the list was 53, the first 
participant entering the room or the first participant in the queue was assigned to seat 
number 53. 
After assigning participants to seats, and prior to commencing the experiment, 
the assistant running the experiment was required to check for unoccupied seats. Any 
spare seats at the lowest numbers were filled in reverse order from the back of the 
room. That is, the participant sitting at the seat with the highest number was moved 
to the unoccupied seat with the lowest number. For example, if the first unoccupied 
seat in the room was seat 13, the participant sitting on the last occupied seat (say seat 
number 98) was reassigned to seat 13, and so on until all participants were seated in a 
continuous order to ensure the group based sections of the experiment all ran with 
three participants. 
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Task 
The key task for participants was to make a decision abstracted from a real 
scenario facing a board of directors. In line with the approach taken in anchoring 
research (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Strack & 
Mussweiler, 1997), I developed a written task that required participants to estimate a 
numerical value. Each participant was supplied with a scenario whereby they were 
informed their board was moving to appoint a new CEO and had identified an ideal 
candidate on which they all agreed. The task involved nominating an upper limit for 
the salary package negotiations. In the scenario the participants were provided with 
two benchmark data: (1) the salary of the previous CEO and (2) the salary the 
candidate had been receiving at his/ her last job44. This is a significant difference to 
most anchoring tasks as it provided more than one possible reference point for 
participants.  
This task was selected as it involved a realistic decision that would face a board 
in which a director would need to decide on a real estimate based on possibly 
conflicting reference points45. Boards regularly use benchmarking data with multiple 
data points or ranges when making similar decisions (Kiel et al., 2012).  
The task was divided into three stages. In the first stage participants were asked 
to read the scenario and provide an upper limit on the amount they would allow a 
Chair to negotiate with the potential candidate. In the second stage, participants were 
randomly assigned to groups of three and asked to agree a consensus value for the 
upper limit set for the Chair for negotiation. In the final stage, the participants were 
asked to individually nominate the value they would approve as an individual having 
had the discussion with two other participants. They were also asked to respond to a 
series of demographic questions.	
Logistics materials 
A full set of material for each session included: 
• Yellow sheets numbered from one to 99 in the format “Seat one”, etc. 
                                                 
 
44 Note that these two reference points are contained in the decision background of all the six 
scenarios, yet a recommended reference point (decision resolution) was present for some scenarios; 
please see Table 5.1 and Appendix five. 
45 Note that CEO remuneration is a crucial decision to be made by the board as it is an important 
element to aligning the interest of principals and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1988). 
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• Red sheets numbered from one to 33 in the format “Group one”, etc.  
• One box labelled “Unused envelopes, absence and incomplete groups”46 
• One box labelled “Phase one: Individual test one” containing:  
• 99 white envelopes numbered and ordered from one to 99 with the relevant 
task papers for phase one; 
• 99 consent sheet (please see Appendix six); and 
• 99 pens. 
• One box labelled “Phase two: Group phase” containing: 
• 33 blue envelopes numbered and ordered from one to 33 with the relevant 
task papers for phase two; 
• One box labelled “Phase three: Individual test two” containing: 
• 99 brown envelopes numbered and ordered from one to 99 with the relevant 
task papers for phase three; 
• One box labelled “Compensation” which containing: 
• 99 white envelopes each with $15 compensation for experiment participants; 
• 12 yellow envelopes with five dollars compensation for potential reserve 
participants 
• One payment sheet where participants verified they received compensation. 
• One box labelled “Pen returns” for the return of the pens used in the experiment. 
• A list of registered participant names; and  
• One envelope containing instructions and scripts for the assistant running the 
experiment. 
Upon completion of material preparation and prior to sealing the envelopes, 10% 
of the envelopes were reviewed for accuracy and that all materials were in order. 
 
                                                 
 
46 All envelopes were distributed to work stations (handed or accommodated to the work station 
before the session) at all phases just like all participants have turned up. Then as each phase starts, 
envelopes set for participants who did not turn up were collected and put in the empty box. 
 144 Chapter 5: Investigating Board Papers and Decision Bias: A Laboratory Experiment 
Room layout 
Each room was booked for two hours. This allowed one hour to arrange the 
materials and seating and one hour to conduct the experiment. Each participant was 
accommodated at a work station (seat and desk). Each seat in the room was labelled 
with both a seat number and group number. The seats were numbered in consecutive 
order from one to 99 and the group number was written under the seat number so that 
each three consecutively ordered seats had the same group number (e.g. seats 1-3 
were labelled as “group one”; seats 4-6 were labelled as “group two”, and so on up to 
seats 97-99 which were labelled as “group 33”). A white envelope containing section 
one of the experiment as well as a consent sheet and a pen was placed on each desk. 
Since the scenarios had been pre-assigned to the groups, these were placed in a 
prepared order whereby each envelope was numbered for the corresponding seat (1-
99) to ensure that the correct randomly assigned section of the experiment was 
provided to the correct participant. 
The materials for section two of the experiment were contained in 33 blue 
envelopes. These envelopes were kept aside by the assistant until required in the 
experiment; they were distributed by the blinded assistant to the 33 groups in the 
second phase of the experiment. Again, the reassignment of scenario to group 
required that each blue envelope was numbered from one to 33 and each contained 
the randomly assigned scenario for that group. 
Finally, 99 brown envelopes numbered from one to 99 and containing the 
exercise for the third phase (i.e. the second individual exercise), were placed under 
the number of the corresponding seats. This again ensured the correct scenario for 
phase 3 was applied to the correct participant. 
Conducting the experiment 
Since the experiment was a double-blinded one, I did not participate in the main 
activities when participants were present. However, I was available at the four 
sessions helping in the room set-up, collecting envelopes, handing compensation 
envelopes to participants, and ready for any issues that may arise. 
Two assistants managed the run of the four sessions of this experiment; five 
scripts of what they were to say during the different stages of the experiment were 
prepared, the procedures for running the experiments were discussed with them. The 
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main assistant rehearsed the experiment run once prior to the first session of the 
experiment. 
Five minutes before the start of the experiment, the room door was opened, and 
participants were queued in a line so that they could be randomly assigned to seats in 
accordance with the list of seating. The first assistant was assigning participants to 
seats based on the list; while the second assistant was helping participants find their 
seats and cordially asking them to not open envelopes until they were told to do so. 
Then participants were greeted and welcomed, and an introductory statement about 
the experiment and its three phases was given to participants. After this, participants 
were given five minutes to read the one page consent sheet. 
After the five minutes had passed, the assistant asked participants to write their 
name on the white envelope that was in front of each participant and commence the 
exercise in the white envelope. Participants were given 10 minutes to solve the 
exercise for phase one, and then the completed white envelopes were collected. 
For the second phase of the experiment, blue envelopes were handed to each 
group, and the three participants of each group were asked to write their names on 
the blue envelope handed to them. After each participant had finished writing his/ her 
name on the envelope, each group was asked to have one group member open the 
blue envelope, take the exercise out, and solve it as a group. Participants were given 
10 minutes to answer, and told to put their completed materials back in the blue 
envelope when completed. After 10 minutes, the blue envelopes were collected.  
Just as in phase one, participants in phase three were asked to solve the 
exercise individually again; participants were asked to find the brown envelope under 
their seats, write their names on the envelope and complete the exercise a third time. 
Participants were given 10 minutes to complete the exercise, after which the 
envelopes were collected. Participants were thanked and asked to queue so that they 
could receive their compensations. Each participant was handed an envelope 
containing $15 and small piece of paper informing participants how to obtain a copy 
of the experiment’s results. Each participant wrote his/ her name and signed next to it 
on the compensation receipt sheet. 
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5.4 RESULTS 
5.4.1 The Participants 
Data were collected from 210 QUT students. Given I randomly assigned 
scenarios to participants with replacement (see section 5.3.4 for details), there was a 
considerable difference in the number of participants in each condition. In total there 
were 42 participants in conditions A and E, 36 participants in condition C, and 30 
participants in conditions B, D and F. 
Having unequal cell sizes for one-way between-groups design does not cause 
major issues in calculating variances and sum of squares, thus it does not bias the 
results (Spector, 1993; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). However, as cell sizes become 
more discrepant, the assumption of homogeneity of variance may become at risk, 
especially if the cell with the smaller size has larger variance. For factorial design, 
however, the discrepant difference in sample size across cells gives rise to two 
issues: first, it becomes difficult to identify whether the marginal mean is the mean of 
cells’ means or the mean of all scores across the cells. Second, the total sum of 
squares for all effects (i.e. the total of various “SS b-g”) becomes greater than the 
total sum of squares (i.e. “SS total”; the total sum of squared differences between 
scores and the grand mean). These two issues cause the factorial design to become 
“non-orthogonal”; that is, the independent variables become dependent and 
correlated, and hence the hypotheses about main effects and interaction effect are no 
longer independent (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007: 217). 
There are several strategies to deal with unequal cells sizes. The simplest strategy 
is to randomly delete cases from the cells with larger n till the cells are equal; this 
strategy is best when the cells were originally designed to include the same number 
of subjects for each. As this was the case for this experiment, I decided to randomly 
delete responses from those cells with larger sample sizes until cells were equal in 
size. This provided a balanced design with 180 participants in total (i.e. 30 
participants in each condition). 
There were 100 male participants (56%) and 80 female participants (44%). Some 
136 participants (73%) were aged 18 years to 25 years old, while 36 participants 
(20%) were aged 26 years to 33. Some five participants (3%) indicated that they had 
served on a board of directors. Table 5.2 presents the age and gender of participants. 
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Table 5- 2: Age and Gender of Participants; Frequency and Percentages 
Age 
Gender <18 years 18- 25 26-33 34- 41 41> Total 
Male 2 (1%) 65 (36%) 27 (15%) 4 (2%) 2 (1%) 100 (56%) 
Female 2 (1%) 67 (37%) 9 (5%) 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 80 (44%) 
Total 4 (2%) 132 (73%) 36 (20%) 6 (3%) 2 (1%) 180 (100%) 
a. Percentages are approximated, thus the total might be 1% less or more than 100%. 
 
There were 58 participants whose first language is English (32%), while there 
were 122 participant who speak English as a second language (68%). Furthermore, 
there were 60 participants who are domestic students (33%), while there were 119 
participants who are international students (66%) Table 5.3 presents the frequency 
and percentages of participants based on their use of English as a language and their 
nature of enrolment to QUT. 
 
Table 5- 3: The Use of English as a Language by Participants and their Study Status  
                                   Study status 
English Domestic 
students 
International 
students 
Not 
applicable 
Total 
English is my first language  42 (23%) 16 (9%)  58 (32%) 
English is my second language  18 (10%) 103 (58%)  122 (69%) 
Total 60 (33%) 119 (66%) 1 (0.5%) 180 (100%) 
a. Percentages are approximated, thus the total might be 1% less or more than 100%. 
 
Most participants were undergraduate students, 115 participants (64%), while at 
the postgraduate level of studies, there were 34 participants enrolled to coursework 
programs (19%) and 30 research students (17%). Some 113 students from QUT 
Business School participated in this experiment, composing the majority of the 
sample (63%). Table 5.4 presents the participants’ level of education and their major 
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Table 5- 4: Participants’ Level of Education and their Major of Study 
                                  Level of education 
Major of studies Undergraduate Postgraduate Research 
students 
Total 
Business 77 (44%) 26 (15%) 10 (6%) 113 (64%) 
Science and Engineering 18 (10%) 7 (4%) 16 (9%) 41 (23%) 
Law 8 (5%) 1 (0.5%) 4 (2%) 13 (7%) 
Education 1 (0.5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.5%) 
Health faculty 5 (3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 5 (3%) 
Creative industries 4 (2%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 4 (2%) 
Total 113 (64%) 34 (19%) 30 (17%) 177(100%)
a. Percentages are approximated, thus the total might be 1% less or more than 100%.  
 
From the sample of 180 QUT students, there were only five participants who 
indicated that they had served on a board of directors (3%). In regard to the mode of 
study, about 97% of the sample were full time students; 174 participants. Table 5.5 
presents the frequency and percentages for the mode of study of the participants at 
QUT and whether they have served on a board or not. 
  
Table 5- 5: Participants’ Mode of Study and Board Experience  
 Mode of study  
Board experience Full time Part time Not current 
student 
Total 
Have served on board 5 (3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 5 (3%) 
Never served on board 169 (94%) 5 (3%) 1 (0.5%) 175 (97%) 
Total 174 (97%) 5 (3%) 1 (0.5%)     180 (100%) 
a. Percentages are approximated, thus the total might be 1% less or more than 100%.  
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5.4.2 Anchoring and Social Norms Effects among Individual Participants: 
Phase One 
Phase one aimed at understanding the effects of anchoring in board papers and 
the social norms of accepting recommendations on individual level responses. While 
a test in its own right, the result from phase one also formed the baseline for 
assessing group level effects in phase two, as well as the within individual changes 
following the group phase (phase three). This sequence of intervention allowed for a 
comparison of choice shift (phase two) and group polarisation effects (phase three). 
Moreover, comparing results across the three phases provides an indication about the 
relative effect size of choice shift compared with group polarisation. 
ANOVA tests were conducted using the software “IBM SPSS Statistics 21”. To 
ensure ANOVA’s assumption of equality of error variance was not violated, 
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances was applied. The results indicate that the 
error variance across the six treatment groups is equal, and hence the analysis 
proceeds. Table 5.6 presents basic descriptive statistics of the dependent variable 
(participants’ estimates to the upper limit for the salary negotiations) for each of the 
six treatment groups. Inspection reveals a considerable difference between the means 
of the three levels of anchoring condition (high anchor/ low anchor/ and no anchor). 
There is also a difference, but to a lesser extent, between the norm conditions of 
present/absent. 
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Table 5- 6: Descriptive Statistics for the Upper Limit for the Salary Negotiation: 
Phase One 
 Norm Present Norm Absent Anchor Condition  
Average 
 
Anchor 
Condition 
Mean a Std. 
Devia
tion a 
N Mean a Std. 
Devia
tion a 
N Mean a Std. 
Devia
tion a 
N 
High Anchor 292 14 30 283 25 30 287 21 60 
Low Anchor 256 21 30 251 18 30 254 20 60 
No Anchor 278 24 30 266 18 30 272 22 60 
Norms 
Condition 
Average 
 
275 
 
25 
 
90 
 
267 
 
24 
 
90 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
Grand 
Summary  
(All 
participants) 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 271 25 180 
a. Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
 
Estimates of the upper limit for the salary negotiations that a participant would 
approve (the dependent variable) were subjected to a 3x2 two-way analysis of 
variance having three levels of anchoring (high anchor, low anchor, no anchor) and 
two levels of norms presence (present, absent). Main effects for both variables 
(anchoring and norms) were statistically significant at the .05 significance level (and 
at the more stringent .01 level of significance); however the interaction effect 
between anchoring and norms was not statistically significant. Table 5.7 presents the 
results from the tests of between-subjects effects. 
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Table 5- 7: Summary of ANOVA: Phase One 
a. Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
b. Computed using α= .05 
c. R Squared = .39 (Adjusted R Squared = .32) 
Significance level is a priori criterion that is set at .05; however * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Analysis of variance showed a statistically significant main effect of anchoring 
on participants’ estimates to the upper limit for the salary negotiations, F (2, 174) = 
40, p < .05. Importantly, measured by partial eta squared, the main effect of 
anchoring had a large practical significance (ηp2= .32) (Cohen, 1988: 22). Post hoc 
analyses were conducted for the anchoring condition given the statistically 
significant omnibus ANOVA F test. Given the assumed equal variance between 
groups, Tukey’s Honesty Significant Different Test (Tukey’s HSD) tests were used 
to compare all pair-wise contrasts for the anchoring condition. All pairs of anchoring 
groups were found to be statistically significantly different (p < .05). Groups one 
(High anchor: M=287; SD=21) and two (Low anchor: M=254; SD=20); groups one 
(High anchor: M=287; SD=21) and three (No anchor: M=272; SD=22); and groups 
two (Low anchor: M=254; SD=20) and three (No anchor: M=272; SD=22). In 
summary, participants’ estimates of the upper limit for the salary negotiations were 
different depending on whether there was a high recommendation (i.e. high anchor), 
a low recommendation or no recommendation at all at the beginning of the board 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares a 
df Mean Square a F ηp2 Observed 
Power b 
Corrected Model 37790783c 5 7558157 17*** .34 1 
Intercept 13201500050 1 13201500050 31053*** .99 1 
Anchoring variable 34304433 2 17152217 40*** .32 1 
Norms variable 3116672 1 3116672 7** .04 .77 
Anchoring variable 
* Norms variable 
369678 2 184839 .44 .005 .12 
Error 73972167 174 425127    
Total 13313263000 180
    
Corrected total 111762950 179     
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paper. The differences in means in participants’ estimates are consistent with 
hypothesis H5.1. Table 5.8 presents the results obtained from Tukey’s HSD tests for 
the anchoring condition47. 
 
Table 5- 8: Tukey’s HSD Tests for Comparisons between the Anchoring Levels: 
Phase One 
   95% CI 
Comparisons  Mean 
difference 
Std. error Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
High anchor vs. low anchor 34*** 4 25 43 
High anchor vs. no anchor 16*** 4 7 25 
No anchor vs. low anchor 18*** 4 9 27 
Note.  Based on observed means, the error term is Mean Square (Error) = 425127394.636. 
Note.  Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
Significance level is a priori criterion that is set at .05; however * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
The main effect of norm condition on participants’ estimates was also statistically 
significant, F (1, 174) = 7, p < .05, indicating that participants’ approval for the 
upper limit for the salary negotiations was greater when the norm stimulus was 
present (M = 275, SD = 25) compared with the absence of the norm stimulus (M = 
267, SD = 24). In contrast to the main effect of anchoring, however, the practical 
significance of the difference in norm conditions was small (ηp2= .04). 
The differences in means in participants’ estimates between the two levels of 
norms variable provided a mixed conclusion for the hypothesis H5.2. First, 
consistent with hypothesis H5.2, participants’ estimates were greater when the norm 
stimulus was present and high anchor was used (M = 292, SD = 14) compared to the 
absence of the norm stimulus when high anchor was used (M = 283, SD = 25). 
Second, inconsistent with hypothesis H5.2, participants’ estimates were also greater 
when the norm stimulus was present and low anchor was used (M = 256, SD = 21) 
                                                 
 
47 Given there were only two levels for the norm condition, the omnibus test is all that is required.  
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compared to the absence of the norm stimulus when low anchor was used (M = 251, 
SD = 18). Finally48, when there was no anchor, again participants’ estimates were 
also greater when the norm stimulus was present (M = 278, SD = 24) compared to 
the absence of the norm stimulus (M = 266, SD = 18). Altogether, given the small 
effect size, it would not appear that norms variable has as much of an impact on the 
outcome of the decision as anchoring. 
Inconsistent with H5.3, the interaction effect between anchoring variable and 
norms variable was statistically and practically non-significant, F (2, 174) = .44, p > 
.05. While there was, unfortunately, low power in the interaction test (observed 
power = 12%) increasing the chance of a Type II error (i.e. accepting the null 
hypothesis when it is false (Cohen, 1992)). Since statistical power is determined by 
(1) the cut-off specified significance level, (2) sample size, and (3) the effect size of 
the population, I sought to diagnose the source of low power in the experiment. As α	
increases (i.e. becomes less stringent: 10%, 20%, or 50%), the statistical power of a 
test increases. Therefore, the analysis was re-run using a liberal significance level of 
50% resulting in an increased statistical power from 12% to 63% and still non-
significant results. Similarly, reviewing the original factorial ANOVA power 
analysis (see section 5.3.3), revealed that a statistical power of 80% (α	< .05, ηp2 = 1) 
would require 258 participants; the small decrease in sample size (i.e. 180 compared 
with 258) is unlikely to explain the large decrease in statistical power (i.e. 80% to 
12%). 
Unlike the first two determinants of the statistical power, the third one, the 
population effect size, cannot be diagnosed because it is never known. Rather, it is 
estimated based on the results obtained from the sample. Although unknown, 
population effect size has a positive relationship with the observed statistical power 
of a test (Cumming, 2012; Cohen, 1992). Therefore, the likely cause of low power 
was the small effect size of any interaction. Furthermore, the very small practical 
significance of any difference (ηp2 = .005) suggests limited practical impact of any 
interaction present and undetected. 
The results from the first phase of analysis provide strong evidence of an 
anchoring effect when a board paper contains a recommendation or proposed 
                                                 
 
48 No anchor is a control condition, thus, there is no hypothesis to test. 
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resolution at the beginning of that board paper, even when other reference data are 
provided. Some 32% of the variation in participant estimates to the upper limit for 
the salary negotiations was explained by the anchoring variable compared to only 4% 
due to the explicit manipulation of the norm of recommendation acceptance. There 
was no support for an interaction between anchoring and norms conditions. Figure 
5.1 presents the means plots for both conditions. 
 
 
Figure 5- 1: Means plots for participants’ approval to the upper limit for the salary 
negotiations: phase one 
 
Moderating analysis/ demographical variables 
In this section, I investigate the moderating influence of the demographical 
variables of the sample on the relationships between the variables of the study as 
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detected above (section 5.4.2 Anchoring and social norms effects among individual 
participants: phase one). 
After reviewing the nine demographical variables of the sample, I only consider 
one demographical variable for the moderating analysis, that is, “gender”. Gender 
variable has two levels; male and female49. I consider the gender variable because it 
is the only demographical variable that has a balanced sample size among its levels. 
Although, the sample size across the two levels of the gender variable is not 
identically equal, the difference in sample size in each level is not considerable 
(Spector, 1993). 
In regard to demographical variables other than gender, each of them has a 
considerably unbalanced sample size across its levels. For instance, 74% of the 
participants fall in one level of the five levels of the age variable, while for the 
variable “served on boards or not”; 97% of the participants have never served on 
boards. Similarly, the same applies to the rest of the demographical variables: 
“English is my first/ or second language”, “mode of study”, “domestic or 
international student”, “major of study”, and “level of education”. Finally, the only 
continuous demographical variable, “GPA”, was also excluded from this moderating 
analysis because 30% of participants did not disclose their GPAs. 
I employ factorial between groups ANOVA to investigate the moderating 
influence of the “gender” variable on the relationships between the variables as 
investigated earlier in this section. The dependent variable is subjects’ estimates to 
the upper limit for the salary negotiations as reported in phase one, whereas, the 
independent variables are the anchoring variable, the norms variable, and the gender 
variable. 
The results from Levene’s test for homogeneity indicate that the error variance 
across the conditions is equal. Factorial ANOVA indicated that the gender variable 
yielded an F ratio of F (1, 168) = 0.65, p > .05, ηp2= .004, indicating that the 
differences between males’ estimates to the upper limit for the salary negotiations (M 
= 270, SD = 24) are statistically and practically non-significant when compared to 
                                                 
 
49 For the “gender” question, participants were provided with three alternatives of choice; “1: male”, 
“2: female”, and “3: prefer not to disclose/ other”. However, all participants disclosed their gender as 
either “1: male” or “2: female”. 
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females’ estimates (M = 272, SD = 26). Furthermore, the results for the main effect 
of anchoring variable, the main effect of norms variable, and the interaction effect 
between anchoring and norms were all very similar to those obtained previously 
before incorporating the moderating influence of gender. Finally, the interaction 
effect between gender, norms, and anchoring are statistically and practically non-
significant. 
5.4.3 Anchoring and Social Norms Effects among Groups: Phase Two 
Phase two shifted the focus of the experiment from the individual to the group 
level of response. Specifically, it sought to understand how groups (whose members 
were previously exposed to the decision situation as individuals) are influenced by 
anchoring and social norms effects (choice shift). For this phase of the experiment, 
the same participants from phase one provided their estimates to the upper limit for 
the salary negotiations in groups of three participants; thus, the analysis was 
conducted for 60 groups of participants. 
I employed the ANOVA test for phase two of the experiment. The null 
hypothesis from Levene’s test that the error variance across the conditions is equal 
was not rejected (indicating equivalence of variance assumption was met) and hence 
the analysis proceeded. The descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (the upper 
limit for the salary negotiations) for each of the six treatment groups are presented in 
Table 5.9. Table 5.9 highlights that there is a considerable difference in means 
between the three levels of the anchoring variable. To a lesser extent, there is also a 
difference in means between the two levels of the norms variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 5: Investigating Board Papers and Decision Bias: A Laboratory Experiment 157 
Table 5- 9: Descriptive Statistics for the Upper Limit for the Salary Negotiation: 
Phase Two  
 Norm Present Norm Absent Anchor Condition  
Average 
 
Anchor 
Condition 
Mean a Std. 
Devia
tion a 
N Mean a Std. 
Devia
tion a 
N Mean a Std. 
Devia
tion a 
N 
High Anchor 292 11 10 284 16 10 288 14 20 
Low Anchor 255 11 10 257 20 10 256 16 20 
No Anchor 278 14 10 265 16 10 272 16 20 
Norms 
Condition 
Average 
 
275 
 
19 
 
30 
 
269 
 
20 
 
30 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
Grand 
Summary  
(All 
participants) 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 272 20 60 
a. Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
 
The main effect of the anchoring condition on groups’ estimates was statistically 
significant at the .05 significance level (and at the more stringent .001 level of 
significance). However, the main effect of the norms condition, and the interaction 
effect between anchoring and norms failed to meet statistical significance. Table 5.10 
presents the results from the tests of between-subjects effects. 
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Table 5- 10: Summary of ANOVA: Phase Two  
a.   Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
b.   Computed using α= .05 
c.   R Squared = .49 (Adjusted R Squared = .45) 
Significance level is a priori criterion that is set at .05; however * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Analysis of variance showed a statistically significant main effect of anchoring 
on groups’ estimates, F (2, 54) = 23, p < .05. Importantly, the main effect of 
anchoring had a large practical significance (ηp2= .47)50. Post hoc analyses were 
conducted for the anchoring condition given the statistically significant omnibus 
ANOVA F test. Given the assumed equal variance between groups, Tukey’s Honesty 
Significant Different Test (Tukey’s HSD) tests were used to compare all pair-wise 
contrasts for the anchoring condition. All pairs of anchoring groups were found to be 
statistically significantly different (p < .05). Groups one (High anchor: M=288; 
SD=14) and two (Low anchor: M=256; SD=16); groups one (High anchor: M=288; 
SD=14) and three (No anchor: M=272; SD=16); and groups two (Low anchor: 
M=256; SD=16) and three (No anchor: M=272; SD=16). In summary, for the groups 
phase, participants’ estimates were different depending on whether there was a high 
                                                 
 
50 Note that the effect size of anchoring effect obtained for phase two (ηp2= .47) is larger than that 
obtained for phase one (ηp2=.32). 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares a 
df Mean Square a F ηp2 Observed 
Power b 
Corrected Model 11658083c 5 2331617 10*** .50 1 
Intercept 4429796817 1 4429796817 20060*** .99 1 
Anchoring variable 10466633 2 5233317 23*** .47 1 
Norms variable 582817 1 582817 2 .05 .36 
Anchoring variable 
* Norms variable 
608633 2 304317 1 .05 .28 
Error 11924100 54 220817    
Total 4453379000 60
    
Corrected total 23582183 59     
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recommendation (i.e. high anchor), a low recommendation or no recommendation at 
all at the beginning of the board paper. Again, similar to the results from phase one, 
the differences in means in participants’ estimates are consistent with hypothesis 
H5.1. Table 5.11 presents the results obtained from Tukey’s HSD tests for the 
anchoring condition in phase two. 
 
Table 5- 11: Tukey’s HSD Tests for Comparisons between the Anchoring Levels: 
Phase Two 
   95% CI 
Comparisons  Mean 
difference 
Std. error Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
High anchor vs. low anchor 32*** 5 21 44 
High anchor vs. no anchor 17** 5 5 28 
No anchor vs. low anchor 16** 5 5 27 
Note.  Based on observed means, the error term is Mean Square (Error) = 220816666.667. 
Note.  Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
Significance level is a priori criterion that is set at .05; however * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Unlike the statistically significant results obtained for the norms variable in phase 
one, the results from ANOVA test in phase two indicate that the scores on the 
dependent variable when the norms stimulus was present (M = 275, SD = 19) do not 
differ statistically and practically from those scores obtained when the norms 
stimulus is absent (M = 269, SD = 20). The test for the norms condition yielded an F 
ratio of F (1, 54) = 3, p > .05, ηp2= .05. However, the observed power for the norms 
condition test is fairly low (36%). 
Two points are noticed about the results for the norms variable; first, the practical 
significance for the norms variable obtained in phase two is similar to that obtained 
in phase one (both are small: ηp2= .05 and ηp2= .04 respectively for phase one and 
two). Second, the observed power for the norms variable is considerably low in 
phase two (i.e. 36%) when compared to that observed power obtained in phase one 
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for the same test (i.e. 77%); this may be explained by the smaller sample size for 
phase two (i.e. 60 subjects) when compared to that of phase one (i.e. 180 subjects). 
Given the above two points, two folded inferences are made about the main 
effect of norms variable in phase two; (1) although the results in phase two were 
statistically non-significant, the probability of type II errors, B, is very high. (2) Even 
if the results were statistically significant in phase two, the practical significance is 
still small. Altogether, along with the results from phase one for the norms variable, 
we may infer that the population effect size for the norms variable in phase two (i.e. 
groups) is small. These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis H5.2.  
The interaction effect between anchoring variable and norms variable was also 
statistically and practically non-significant, F (2, 54) = 1, p > .05, ηp2= .05. 
Inconsistent with the hypothesis H5.3, the results were statistically and practically 
non-significant. Moreover, just like that of phase one, the observed power of the test 
is also low (i.e. 28%), which indicates a very high probability of type II errors; B= 
72%. However, if we want to reach the conventional power for this test (80%) and 
hence a conventional B (20%), as well as significant results, the significance level 
needs to be set at p < .50. Nonetheless, by doing so the probability of type I errors 
increases 10 times the conventional p < .05. Thus, I kept the first run of the analysis 
with its non-significant results at p < .05, and inferred that the low observed power of 
the test reflects the small effect size of the population51. 
Taking the results from all tests of ANOVA, I may conclude that .47 of the 
variation in subjects’ estimates (i.e. each subject is a group of three participants) is 
explained by the anchoring variable. These results provide strong empirical evidence 
to the application of the theoretical concept of anchoring and adjustment to groups 
and boards. On the other hand, the norms variable neither statistically nor practically 
seems to explain the variation in subjects’ estimates; these results provide empirical 
evidence that is not in favour of the theoretical concept of social norms and its 
application to groups and boards. In addition, there does not seem to be any evidence 
for the interaction effect between anchoring variable and norms variable on the 
subjects’ estimates. Finally, these results indicated that the previous exposure to the 
                                                 
 
51 The justification for this inference is similar to that discussed for phase one interaction effect in 
section 5.4.2. 
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decision situation does not seem to stop decision makers from falling victims of 
anchors. Figure 5.2 presents the means plots for both independent variables. 
 
 
Figure 5- 2: Means plots for participants’ approval to the upper limit for the salary 
negotiations: phase two 
 
Similar to those results for individuals (phase one), the results for groups in 
phase two (three participants) provided strong evidence of an anchoring effect when 
a board paper contains a recommendation or proposed resolution, even when other 
reference data are provided in the board paper. Some 47% of the variation in 
participant estimates to the upper limit for the salary negotiations was explained by 
the anchoring variable. On the other hand, the explicit manipulation of the norm 
neither statistically nor practically seems to explain the variation in subjects’ 
estimates; these results provide empirical evidence that is not in favour of the 
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theoretical concept of social norms and its application to groups and boards. Finally, 
there does not seem to be any evidence for the interaction effect between anchoring 
variable and norms variable on subjects’ estimates to the upper limit for the salary 
negotiation. 
5.4.4 Anchoring and Social Norms Effects among Individual after the Group 
Phase: Phase Three 
For phase three of the experiment, again participants individually provided their 
estimates to the upper limit for the salary negotiation. As phase three comes after the 
group phase (phase two) it helps in understanding the changes in anchoring and 
social norms effects after group discussions (group polarisation). In the next section 
(section 5.4.5), the results from phase three will be compared to results from phase 
one and phase two. 
For phase three, I also conduct two-way between-groups ANOVA test. However, 
unlike the previous two phases, the null hypothesis from Levene’s test that the error 
variance of the dependent variables across the conditions is equal was rejected: F (5, 
174) = 4, p = .001. These results mean that I could not proceed with the two-way 
between-groups test for the data from phase three because parametric statistical 
techniques (e.g. ANOVA, T-test) make stringent assumptions about the 
characteristics of the populations from which the sample was drawn; homogeneity of 
variance across the conditions is one of these assumptions. On the other hand, non-
parametric alternatives assume less stringent assumptions about the characteristics of 
the population. Moreover, unlike many parametric techniques (e.g. one-way 
ANOVA, T-test), two-way between-groups ANOVA does not have non-parametric 
alternatives. Thus, I was left with no choice but to divide my two-way between-
groups ANOVA into two runs of analyses as per the two independent variables. First, 
for the anchoring variable, which has three levels, I conducted one-way between-
groups ANOVA. Second, for the norms variable, which has two levels, I conducted 
T-test. 
Given the split of analysis for phase three, there would not be a chance to test the 
interaction effect between the two independent variables. However, given the 
practically and statistically non-significant results that I obtained previously for the 
interaction effect in phase one and phase two (phase one: F (2, 174) = 0.44, p > .05, 
ηp2 =0.005; phase 2: F (2, 54) = 1, p > .05, ηp2= 0.05) it is unlikely that there was 
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any detectable effect in phase three. Second and more importantly, this spilt of 
analysis is the only viable way to run the analysis for phase three. However, when 
running a series of analyses rather than one comprehensive analysis, the chances of 
“inflated type I error” increases; thus, I used a stringent significance level by 
dividing the significance level used in this study (i.e. 5%) by the two independent 
variables. So, for the following two analyses the significance level is set at p < .025. 
One-way between-groups ANOVA: Anchoring variable; phase three 
For the one-way between-groups ANOVA, the results from Levene’s test 
indicated that the error variance of the dependent variable across the conditions is 
equal, and hence I proceeded with the test without violating the statistical assumption 
of variance homogeneity. The descriptive statistics for the three levels of the 
anchoring variable are presented in Table 5.12. 
 
Table 5- 12: Descriptive Statistics for the Upper Limit for the Salary Negotiation: 
Phase Three, Anchoring Variable 
 
Anchor Condition 
Mean a Std. Deviation a N 
High Anchor 288 15 60 
Low Anchor 255 17 60 
No Anchor 271 18 60 
Anchoring Condition Average 271 21 180 
a.  Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
 
If we examine the means of subjects’ estimates for the three conditions of the 
anchoring variable, it is noticed that there is a considerable difference in means 
across the three conditions of the anchoring variable. The mean of each condition 
and the standard deviations around these means are similar to those means and 
standard deviations obtained in phase one and phase two for the three conditions of 
the anchoring variable, and hence the differences between the means of the three 
conditions are similar to those statistically and practically significant differences in 
means obtained in phase one and phase two for the anchoring variable. 
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The results from the between-groups ANOVA test indicate that there is 
statistically significant difference in means across the three conditions of the 
anchoring variable: F (2, 177) = 60; p < .02552. Since the outputs from the ANOVA 
test do not include the value for the practical significance or the effect size (i.e. ηp2), 
I therefore manually calculated the effect size. For this test, eta squared (η2) will be 
employed as an effect size instead of partial eta squared (ηp2). Eta squared (η2) is the 
appropriate effect size to employ when the investigation involves one independent 
variable, whereas partial eta squared (ηp2) is employed when the investigation 
involves more than one independent variable53. Each of η2 and ηp2 has its own 
formula, and although η2 is computed using simpler formula, both gauge the 
variation in the dependent variable as explained by the independent variable(s). I 
chose η2 because this is a one-way ANOVA (the investigation only involves 
anchoring as the independent variable) (Cohen, 1973). Eta squared is computed by 
dividing the sum of squares between groups by the total sum of squares; hence, η2= 
33159813/ 48988294= .68, which is a large effect size (Cohen, 1973, 1988). Table 
5.13 exhibits the results from ANOVA test. 
 
Table 5 13: Summary of ANOVA: Phase Three, Anchoring Variable 
 Sum of Squares a df Mean Square a F 
Between Groups 33159813 2 16579907 60*** 
Within Groups 48988294 177 276770 
 
Total 82148107 179   
a. Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
Significance level is a priori criterion that is set at .025; however * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
The above significant results indicate that there is a statistically significant 
difference in means somewhere between the three conditions, yet it is not exactly 
identified between which pair of conditions. Therefore, I ran a post-hoc analysis to 
specify the exact groups that have the significant difference in means. At the 
                                                 
 
52 Note that significance level is priori set at p < .025 
53 Note that η2 and ηp2 give the same results if employed for a one-way ANOVA (Cohen, 1973). 
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significance level of p < .025, Tukey HSD test for post-hoc analyses indicated that 
the difference in means is statistically significant between each pair of conditions 
(i.e. the three levels) for the anchoring variable. Table 5.14 exhibits the results for the 
post-hoc analysis, and then Figure 5.3 exhibits the means plot for the three conditions 
of the anchoring variable. 
 
Table 5- 14: Tukey’s HSD Tests for Comparisons between the Anchoring Levels: 
Phase Three 
   95% CI 
Comparisons  Mean 
difference 
Std. error Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
High anchor vs. low anchor 33*** 3 26 40 
High anchor vs. no anchor 17*** 3 10 25 
No anchor vs. low anchor 16*** 3 9 23 
Note.  Based on observed means, the error term is Mean Square (Error) = 220816666.667. 
Note.  Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
Significance level is a priori criterion that is set at .025; however * p < .025, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Figure 5- 3: Means plots for the three conditions of the anchoring variable: phase 3 
 
Independent samples t-test: the norms variable; phase three 
As the results from Levene’s test indicate, the error variance of the dependent 
variable across the two conditions is equal. The descriptive statistics for the two 
levels of the norms variable is presented in Table 5.15. As we can see there seems to 
be no considerable difference in means between the two conditions of the norms 
variable, a result confirmed by the t-test. 
Table 5- 15: Descriptive Statistics for the Upper Limit for the Salary Negotiation: 
Phase Three, Norms Variable 
 
Norms Condition 
Mean a Std. Deviation a N 
Norms Present 274 21 90 
Norms Absent 268 21 90 
Norms Condition Average 271 21 180 
a. Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
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An independent samples t-test indicated that participants’ estimates when norm is 
present (M = 274, S.D = 21) do not differ statistically from participants’ estimates 
when norm is absent (M = 268, S.D = 21), t (178) = 2, p > .025. Moreover, the effect 
size was small (η2 = .02). Eta squared (η2) was manually computed using the 
following formula (Pallant, 2013: 251): 
η2= t2/ t2 + (N1+N2 – 2) 
The summary for the t-test equality of means is presented in Table 5.16. 
 
Table 5- 16: Summary of t-test for Equality of Means 
t df Mean Difference a Std. Error 
Difference a 
95% CI of the Difference 
Lower Upper a 
2 178 6 3 73 13 
a. Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
Significance level is a priori criterion that is set at .025; however * p < .025, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
The results from the one-way between-groups ANOVA is strong evidence of 
an anchoring effect when a board paper contains a recommendation or proposed 
resolution, even when other reference data are provided in the board paper. That is, 
there is .68 of the variation in subjects’ estimates to the upper limit for the salary 
negotiation that is explained by a suggested upper limit in the decision resolution. 
Whereas the norms variable neither statistically nor practically seems to explain the 
variation in subjects’ estimates; these results provide empirical evidence that is not in 
favour of the application of the theoretical concept of social norms. 
5.4.5 Integrated Analysis: Choice Shift and Group Polarisation 
In this section I provide two analyses for the three phases of the experiment. In 
the first analysis, I provide a comparative summary for the results obtained from 
each of the three phases of the experiment. This comparative summary provides a 
comparison between the interaction effect and main effect for both independent 
variables across the three phases. This comparative summary should be read as an 
introduction to the subsequent analysis. 
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In the second analysis, I employ mixed between-within subjects ANOVA to test 
for the difference between the interaction effect and the main effect for both 
independent variables across the three phases. Thus, for the second analysis, a 
categorical independent within-subjects variable is introduced. This variable is 
labelled as the “experimental phase”, which has three levels: phase one, phase two 
and phase three. This analysis is employed to test for the hypothesis of choice shift 
H5.4a and the hypothesis of group polarisation H5.4b. 
Analysis one: Comparative summary for the results obtained in three phases of the 
experiment 
For the three phases of the experiment, Table 5.17 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the dependent variable (participants’ estimates to the upper limit for the 
salary negotiations) for each of the six treatment groups. 
 
 
Table 5- 17: Descriptive Statistics for the Upper Limit for the Salary Negotiation: 
Phase One, Phase Two, and Phase Three 
 Norm Present Norm Absent Anchor Condition  
Average 
 
Anchor 
Condition 
Mean a Std. 
Devia
tion a 
N Mean a Std. 
Devia
tion a 
N Mean a Std. 
Devia
tion a 
N 
Phase One 
High Anchor 292 14 30 283 25 30 287 21 60 
Low Anchor 256 21 30 251 18 30 254 20 60 
No Anchor 278 24 30 266 18 30 272 22 60 
Norms 
Condition 
Average 
 
275 
 
25 
 
90 
 
267 
 
24 
 
90 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
Grand 
Summary  
(All 
participants) 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 271 25 180 
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Phase Two 
High Anchor 292 11 10 284 16 10 288 14 20 
Low Anchor 255 11 10 257 20 10 256 16 20 
No Anchor 278 14 10 265 16 10 272 16 20 
Norms 
Condition 
Average 
 
275 
 
19 
 
30 
 
269 
 
20 
 
30 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
Grand 
Summary  
(All 
participants) 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 272 20 60 
Phase Three 
High Anchor 292 13 30 284 16 30 288 15 60 
Low Anchor 255 12 30 255 21 30 255 17 60 
No Anchor 276 18 30 265 16 30 271 18 60 
Norms 
Condition 
Average 
274 21 90 
 
268 
 
21 
 
90 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
Grand 
Summary  
(All 
participants) 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 271 21 180 
a. Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
 
For the main effect of the anchoring variable on subjects’ estimates, the results 
from phase one, phase two, and phase three of the experiment indicated that there is a 
statistical and practical difference in subjects’ estimates that is explained by the 
anchoring variable; these differences are detected across the three levels of the 
anchoring variable (i.e. high anchor, low anchor, and no anchor). Eta Squared (η2) 
and Partial Eta Squared (ηp2) were used to measure the size of the main effect for the 
anchoring variable; for all of the three phases, the effect size was large. Specifically, 
the main effect of the anchoring variable in phase three was larger (η2=.68) than that 
of phase two (ηp2= .47) and that of phase one (ηp2 = .32). 
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The above results initially indicate differences in the main effect of the anchoring 
variable across the three phases; this initial indication is consistent with the two 
theoretical concepts of “choice shift” and “group polarisation”. Nevertheless, this 
indication can only be confirmed if statistical significance is obtained for these 
differences. To confirm this, I conducted a “mixed between-within subjects 
ANOVA”. 
For the main effect of the norms variable, the results from phase one of the 
experiment indicated a statistical significant difference in subjects’ estimates that is 
explained by the norms variable. However, the practical significance for this 
difference was small (ηp2 = .04). Similar small practical difference was also observed 
for phase two and phase three of the experiment (ηp2 = 0.05 and η2 = 0.02 
respectively). Nevertheless, the results for phase two and phase three were 
statistically non-significant. Given the statistical significance for norms variable in 
phase one yet not in phase two and three, a “mixed between-within subjects 
ANOVA” would confirm whether the results differ across the three phases. 
For phase one and phase two of the experiment, the interaction effect between the 
anchoring variable and the norms variable was statistically and practically non-
significant. Nevertheless, the observed statistical power for the test was very low for 
both phases (i.e. 12%, and 28% phase one and phase two respectively). These low 
power rates raised concerns about type II errors; accepting the null hypothesis when 
it is false (Cohen, 1992). However, to address these concerns, I diagnosed two of the 
three determinants of any given test’s statistical power; these two determinants are 
the ones that can be manipulated by the researchers: significance level and sample 
size. Unlike these two determinants of the statistical power, the third one; the 
population effect size, cannot be diagnosed because it is never known, rather, it is 
estimated based on the results obtained from the sample. Although unknown, 
population effect size has a positive relationship with the observed statistical power 
of a test (Cumming, 2012; Cohen, 1992). 
My diagnosing54 to both the significance level and the sample size had provided 
little explanation for the low rate of the statistical power observed for the test. 
Therefore, I found it conceivable to conclude that the low statistical power for the 
                                                 
 
54 To understand how these diagnostic procedures were performed, please refer to section 5.4.2. 
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interaction effect test in phase one and phase two is driven by the small effect size of 
the population. The interaction effect between the two independent variables was not 
tested in phase three because of some homogeneity issues55 that had led to splitting 
the two-way ANOVA analysis into two separate analyses as per the two independent 
variables: one-way ANOVA for the anchoring variable and two independent samples 
t-test for the norms variable. 
Mixed between-within subjects ANOVA  
Given the difference in effect size of the anchoring variable across the three 
phases (ηp2 = .32 for phase one; ηp2 = .47 for phase two; and η2 =.68 for phase 
three), this section aims to see if participants’ estimates shifted across the three 
phases of the experiment (a so-called within-subjects design). Since the data 
collected for this study involved a repeated measure (i.e. the individuals could be 
assigned an estimate in each phase), it allowed for this more powerful within-
between subjects analysis. 
However, as I am specifically interested in testing this shift across the levels of 
each independent variable (i.e. the six conditions), the within-subjects design is 
combined with the between-subjects design in this section (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). A mixed between-within subjects ANOVA (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) 
investigated the differences in scores on the dependent variable (i.e. subjects’ 
estimates) as explained by the between-subjects design (i.e. across the six 
conditions), and simultaneously investigates the differences in scores on the 
dependent variable as explained by the within-subjects design (i.e. across the three 
phases of the experiment). 
By comparing data between phases one and two, it is possible to understand if 
choice shift has occurred. Then, by comparing data between phases one and three, it 
is possible to investigate if group polarisation has taken place. Finally, comparing 
phases two and three provides evidence as to whether any group-based changes were 
more attributable to choice shift or group polarisation. 
To understand this analysis, an additional independent variable is introduced to 
identify which phase of the design the dependent variable (i.e. participants’ estimate) 
                                                 
 
55 To see a discussion and justification behind this, please refer to section 5.4.4. 
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is associated with. Thus, the three independent variables for this analysis are: 
anchoring condition, norm condition, and experimental phase.   
The mixed within-between subjects ANOVA has three main effects and four 
interaction effects. The three main effects of the independent variables are: 
1. Anchoring 
2. Norms 
3. The	experimental phase 
 Whereas the four interaction effects are: 
1. The experimental phase * Anchoring 
2. The experimental phase * Norms 
3. The experimental phase * Anchoring * Norms 
4. Anchoring * Norms 
Given the aim of understanding if the phase affected decision making, this 
analysis concentrated on the first three interaction effects (i.e. the interaction effects 
between the experimental phase and other independent variables). Three reasons 
explain why this analysis only focuses on the three first interaction effects but neither 
on the fourth interaction effect nor the main effects of the three independent 
variables. First, in this analysis, each main effect of the two between-subjects 
variables (i.e. the anchoring variable and the norms variable) represents an average 
of those main effects for each independent variables in the three phases; note that the 
preceding analyses (section 5.4.2, section 5.4.3, and section 5.4.4) have examined 
this phenomenon. Second, the main effect of the within-subjects variable (i.e. the 
experimental phase) represents the difference between the three grand means of the 
dependent variable from each phase. Finally, the fourth interaction effect (i.e. 
Anchoring variable* Norms variable) represents the average interaction effect 
between anchoring and norms for the first and second phases, which has already 
been examined in detail (section 5.4.2 and section 5.4.3.). Therefore, this analysis 
focuses on the first three interaction effects: “the experimental phase * anchoring”, 
“the experimental phase * norms”, and “the experimental phase * anchoring * 
norms”. 
Since my initial data set included 180 participants (i.e. 180 individuals) for each 
of the first phase and the third phase, but 60 groups for the second phase (each group 
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is composed of three individuals), data adjustment was required. Following Stoner 
(1961) I matched each group’s estimate from phase two with an average of those 
three estimates provided individually in phase one by the members of that given 
group; I also did the same to match phase three with phase two. Thus, the sample 
size for this mixed within-between subjects ANOVA is 60 subjects. 
For a mixed between-within subjects ANOVA, there are two statistical 
assumptions to be met: homogeneity of variance and homogeneity of inter-
correlation matrices. As per previous analyses, homogeneity of variance assumes that 
the error variance across the groups for each phase is equal and is assessed with 
Levene’s test. Homogeneity of inter-correlations is tested using Box’s test of equality 
of covariance matrices. Since Box’s test of equality is sensitive, the significance 
level is better set at a very conservative level of (p < .001) (Pallant, 2013; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Both assumptions of homoscedasticity were met. For the three phases of the 
experiment, the results from Levene’s test indicate that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across the six between-subjects conditions. Similarly, the 
results from the Box’s test indicate that the covariance matrices of the dependent 
variables are equal across the groups (p > .001). The descriptive statistics for the 
between-subjects variables are reported above in Table 5.17. 
A mixed between-within subjects ANOVA was conducted to test the effects of 
anchoring and norms on subjects’ estimates across the three phases of the experiment 
(phase one, phase two, and phase three). Results are based on the Wilks’ Lambda test 
(Pallant, 2013). First, the results indicated that the statistically and practically 
significant main effect of the anchoring variable that was detected in each of the 
three phases (ηp2 = .32 for phase one; ηp2 = .47 for phase two; and η2 =.68 for phase 
three) does not differ across the three phases of the experiment. That is, the 
interaction effect between the experimental phase and the anchoring variable was 
statistically and practically non-significant; Wilks’ Lambda = .988, F (4, 106) = .164, 
p > .05, ηp2 = .006. Second, the results also indicate that the main effect of norms 
variable56 (ηp2 = .04 for phase one; ηp2 = .05 for phase two; and η2 = .02 for phase 
                                                 
 
56 Note that the main effect of norms variable was only statistically significant for phase one, yet 
practically small for all of the three phases. 
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three) also does not differ across the three phases of the experiment. That is, the 
interaction effect between the experimental phase and the norms variable was 
statistically and practically non-significant. Wilks’ Lambda = .992, F (4, 106) = .204, 
p > .05, ηp2 = .008. Finally, the results also indicated that the interaction effect 
between the anchoring variable and the norms variable, which was statistically and 
practically non-significant for phase one and phase two57 (ηp2 = .005 for phase one; 
and ηp2 = .05 for phase two), also does not differ across the three phases of the 
experiment. That is, the interaction effect between the experimental phase and both 
the anchoring variable and the norms variable was statistically and practically non-
significant; Wilks’ Lambda = .975, F (4, 106) = .337, p > .05, ηp2 = .013. Table 5.18 
reports the summary of Wilks’ Lambda’s tests. 
 
Table 5- 18: Summary of Multi-variates Tests: Wilks' Lambda  
Effect Value F a Hypothesis df Error df ηp2 
Phases * Anchoring  .988 .164 4 106 .006
Phases * Norms  .992 .204 2 53 .008
Phases * Anchoring * Norms  .975 .337 4 106 .013
Note.  Design: Intercept + Anchoring + Norms + Anchoring * Norms variable 
Note.  Within Subjects Design: phases 
a. Exact statistic 
Significance level is a priori criterion that is set at .05; however * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
5.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.5.1 Summary of Results 
The results from the first phase of the experiment (the first individual phase) 
provided strong evidence of anchoring effect when a board paper contains a 
proposed resolution at the beginning, even when other reference data are provided in 
the board paper. Some 32% of the variation in participants’ estimates (e.g. the upper 
limit for the salary negotiations) was explained by the anchoring condition compared 
to only 4% due to the explicit manipulation of the norm of recommendation 
                                                 
 
57 Note that the interaction effect between anchoring and norms was not investigated in phase three.  
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acceptance. There was no support for an interaction between anchoring and norms 
conditions. 
For phase two of the experiment (the group based phase), some results obtained 
in phase one were also evident. Some 47% of the variation in participants’ estimates 
to the upper limit for the salary negotiations was explained by the recommended 
anchor point at the beginning of the board paper, irrespective of other reference data 
provided in the board paper. However, the norm of recommendation acceptance that 
was detected in phase one (which was practically non-significant) was not evident in 
phase two. Furthermore, the interaction effect between anchoring and norms 
conditions was also not evident among groups. Although anchoring effect seems to 
be larger for groups when compared to that for individuals (47% for phase two 
compared to 32% for phase one), the results from the mixed between-within subjects 
ANOVA indicated that there is no support for choice shift hypothesis. 
 Finally, to test the hypothesis of group polarisation, phase three examined 
individual decision making after the group testing. The results indicate that 68% of 
the variations in participants’ estimates are explained by anchoring effects. However, 
neither the norms effects nor the interaction between anchoring and norms is evident 
in phase three of the experiment. Furthermore, although anchoring effect seems to be 
larger for phase three when compared to that for phase two and phase one (68%  for 
phase three compared to 47% and 32% for phase two and phase one respectively), 
the results from the mixed between-within subjects ANOVA indicate that there is no 
support for group polarisation hypothesis. 
5.5.2 Implications of findings for research 
Traditional testing of anchoring employs one data point (i.e. one numeric value) 
for a given decision situation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Joyce & Biddle, 1981; 
Mussweiler & Strack, 2001). In such testing of anchoring, people are observed 
anchoring on that point (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Epley & Gilovich, 2001; 
Northcraft & Neale, 1987; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Joyce & Biddle, 1981; 
Mussweiler & Strack, 2001). However, board papers normally include multiple data 
points rather than one. The findings from this research indicated that people, when 
given multiple data points for a board decision situation, anchor at the first data point 
they receive. 
 176 Chapter 5: Investigating Board Papers and Decision Bias: A Laboratory Experiment 
Having decision makers anchored at the first data point when different data 
points are provided to them might be explained by the fundamental concept of 
“adjustment and anchoring” as originally explained by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974: 1128). I rephrase the statement of Tversky and Kahneman (1974: 1128) as: 
“people make estimates by starting from a first data point they receive that is 
adjusted to yield the final answer”. However, people’s adjustments from the first data 
point are typically insufficient58. 
The first implication of the findings of this experiment is that the process of 
board decision making, specifically the way information is presented, is important in 
shaping directors’ and boards’ decisions. Directors might be manipulated by the 
decision proposer (e.g. the CEO), and hence agency costs increase. If this proposer 
provides decision makers (e.g. directors) with different numeric data points in the 
decision situation (e.g. board paper) but still locates his/ her preferred data point at 
the beginning of that board paper, directors may anchor on that first data point. 
However, whether anchoring effects matter or not is dependent on the motivation of 
the agent (e.g. shirking or extracting agency costs) rather than the motivation of the 
directors (e.g. monitoring agents). 
Agency theory posits that board independence is one effective mechanism for 
controlling agency costs. In line with this argument, the group phase of this 
experiment simulated boards entirely composed of independent directors, however, 
the findings of this research indicated that independence of decision makers does not 
seem to ameliorate their anchoring bias. Standing as a challenge for agency theory, 
the findings of this research indicated that board independence does not seem to 
control agency costs in such situations where directors and boards are biased in their 
judgment (again, this is dependent on the motivation of the agent). 
 Second, the findings indicated that group based decision making does not seem 
to influence such manipulation (i.e. anchoring effects); whereby groups, just like 
individuals, were found to be susceptible to anchoring effects. These findings 
challenge the view that group based decision making are, when compared with 
individual decision making, superior in gathering, memorising, computing and 
                                                 
 
58 The original statement of Tversky and Kahneman (1974: 1128) is “People make estimates by 
starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer”. 
  
Chapter 5: Investigating Board Papers and Decision Bias: A Laboratory Experiment 177 
processing information (Radner, 1996). Such a challenge might also be posed to 
question the effectiveness of the default statutory model of corporate governance 
which contemplates “a multimember body that typically will act by consensus” 
(Bainbridge, 2002: 2). 
Third, given the reliability of anchoring as a robust decision bias that has been 
demonstrated at the individual level in laboratory and field research (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Epley & Gilovich, 2001; 
Mussweiler & Strack, 2004; Northcraft & Neale, 1987), the norm of accepting/ 
questioning the recommended decision may have been decayed in the presence of the 
anchor. Thus, to better understand norms in board decision making, future 
investigations into boards’ norms may be conducted in highly controlled contexts. 
Moreover, although the findings of this research indicated that the norm of accepting/ 
questioning a recommended decision has no virtual  influence on decision makers, it 
is still unclear whether this norm would influence decision makers if the 
recommended decision was presented at the end of the decision situation or not.	
The above three implications raise the concern about the composition of boards 
in the context of decision bias (specifically anchoring), so that if director 
independence seemed not to overcome decision bias, what would be the optimal 
composition for boards (outsiders with their virtue of independence or insiders with 
the increased information)? As highlighted above, the mechanism of using anchoring 
effect to manipulate independent decision makers (whether individuals or groups) 
works when the decision makers are naïve decision makers. Yet, neither director 
independence nor directors’ level of information seemed to overcome decision bias, 
so what would be the optimal composition for boards (outsiders with their virtue of 
independence or insiders with the increased information)? 
Finally, the findings from this study highlighted the importance of investigating 
other decision biases (e.g. framing effects, quo status bias, and inter-temporal choice) 
in board decision making. 
5.5.3 Implications of Findings for Practice 
The most recognised role of boards in the prescriptive best practices for 
corporate governance (e.g. the Australian “Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations”) is a boards’ role in controlling agency costs (Mizruchi, 1983; 
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Zahra & Pearce, 1989). In a prescriptive sense, boards chaired and dominated by 
independent director(s) are more efficient in performing their controlling role. 
However, the findings of this research indicated that the process of decision making, 
specifically, how information is presented to decision makers, is important to the 
context of board decision making; that is, agency costs may arise in the process of 
board decision making irrespective of board independence, information asymmetry, 
and group based decision making. 
First, Australian boards are mostly composed of outside directors (see section 
4.6.2), whose firm’s specific information is typically less than that of inside 
directors; nevertheless, boards’ decisions are outcomes of consensus. Thus, having 
directors with more information and expertise (i.e. inside directors) may not enhance 
the outcomes of the decision as long as outside directors compose the majority of the 
boards. 
Second, corporate governance best practices bodies might need to highlight 
that directors, as part of their controlling role, must comprehend how agency costs 
may arise in the decision process. For instance, best practice bodies may emphasise 
that management might, in some cases, manipulate the board irrespective of board 
independence, and thus directors may need to improve their skills as professional 
decision makers who are appointed to control the decision process and protect the 
interests of the company. 
Third, practicing directors may need to take into account their susceptibility to 
bias in the decision process. Specifically, directors must be aware that the 
management might manipulate them simply by structuring the decision proposal in a 
certain way, like setting the preferred alternative as a decision resolution (first piece 
of information to read). In order to ameliorate such susceptibility to bias, directors as 
professional decision makers may need to critically scrutinise management’s 
decision proposals and understand that the order of alternatives might influence their 
decisions. Moreover, directors might benefit from reading about behavioural decision 
making and understanding the different decision biases such as anchoring effect and 
framing effect. 
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5.5.4 Methodological Implications 
First, the results of this study indicated that a micro level decision process may 
inform macro level governance theories like agency theory. The results from this 
study indicated if anchoring effects can be used to manipulate boards, then agency 
costs may arise irrespective of board independence, group based decision making 
and director knowledge. 
Second, this study has highlighted the importance of using multi-theoretic 
perspective when studying social phenomenon. Researching boards in such 
perspective broadens our understanding of the way boards make their decisions and 
the extent to which each theory applies to boards. 
Third, the use of the experimental design in researching board decision making 
is a step toward opening the “black box” of boards (Daily et al., 2003: 379), as 
experiment is the most efficient method in providing a cause-effect relationship (Yin, 
2009). 
5.5.5 Limitations of the study 
First, the key limitation of this study is that the cohort of people who composed 
the sample of the study is students rather than directors. Students may not be 
representative of directors and boards, and hence the findings of this study might not 
be statistically generalised to directors and boards. However, the study aimed at an 
analytic generalisation, through which existing theoretical concepts are used as a 
“template” with which the empirical results are compared. The main analytic 
generalisation from this experiment is that non-agency mechanism (i.e. anchoring 
effects) can be used to extract agency costs. Analytic generalisation was strengthened 
by the multiple experimentations (i.e. the three phases of the experiment) (Yin, 2009: 
38). Chapter six complements this study and strengthens its external validity. 
Second, given the double-blinded design employed for this study, and given 
that answers of the participants had no influence on their interests (e.g. all 
participants were informed that they would be paid the same amount of money 
irrespective of their answers), all participants were thought to be independent and 
objective decision makers. However, boards of directors are typically composed of 
outside directors as well as inside directors – this is one of the main differences 
between real boards and our participants. As with this difference, one key limitation 
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is highlighted: (1) in typical real boards’ context where inside directors sit on the 
board (whether few or many), some of these inside directors, at least the CEO, are 
involved in framing or shaping the decision situation before presented it to the 
directors. This study did not account for such a case. 
Third, although with the three pilot-testings of the experimental instrument, it 
seems that construct validity issues have challenged the norm manipulation in the 
experimental instrument. This was extrapolated here given the demonstration of 
social norms in extensive research into social norms; alcohol abuse by youth 
(Berkowitz & Perkins, 1986), violence prevention (Berkowitz et al., 2003) and health 
and social justice issues (Berkowitz, 2002). 
Fourth, there is always the chance that there might be norms or processes in 
certain organisations that aim at, either consciously or unconsciously, addressing 
decision bias (e.g. anchoring effect). For instance, boards of cooperatives might 
eschew the use of a recommendation or resolution in board papers. Thus, the triggers 
or stimulus for anchoring may not be evident in such organisations. Alternatively, 
norms of devil’s advocacy during discussions (MacDougall & Baum, 1997) may 
uncover hidden bias.  
Fifth, unlike participants of this experiment, boards are groups on a stable and 
ongoing decision making basis. Thus, the development of different interactions 
(Bezemer et al., 2014) and dynamics (Pugliese et al., 2015) between directors of a 
given board might be different than that of the subjects of this experiment. 
Finally, only 3% of the participants of this experiment have served on boards, 
thus the findings of this research are essentially applied to naïve decision makers 
who lack experience about boards’ decisions. Nevertheless, as highlighted before, 
this experiment aimed at an analytic generalisation to the existent theories rather than 
statistical generalisation. 
5.5.6 Conclusion 
This study aimed at providing a causal claim to the mechanisms that influence 
boards’ decisions. Specifically, this study answered three questions of this thesis 
(RQ3, RQ4 and RQ5). For the RQ3, whether the anchoring effect is evident among 
independent decision makers, the findings indicate a large influence of anchors in 
hypothetical, yet realistic, boards’ decision situations. Out of the multiple data points, 
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participants of this study anchored on the first data point presented to them in those 
hypothetical board papers. Nonetheless, the findings did not indicate any support for 
the influence of social norms in board decision making (RQ4). The same findings 
were obtained in the second phase of the experiment, that is, groups are also largely 
influenced by the first data point they receive. The findings from the third phase of 
the experiment represented a replication of the first phase of the experiment and 
confirmed the answers for RQ3 and RQ4.  However, there was no difference across 
the three phases of the experiment, thus the findings from this experiment did not 
provide any support to both hypotheses of choice shift and group polarisation in 
boards’ context (RQ5). 
Implications for research and practice were presented through highlighting the 
critical importance of board decision process; specifically, agency costs may arise in 
board decision making as a result of decision bias. Furthermore, such a rise in agency 
costs might happen irrespective of board independence. The key limitations of the 
study were the issues of the statistical generalisation, and the limited consideration to 
the composition of a typical board as a group. Importantly, this study provided an 
analytic generalisation that non-agency mechanism (i.e. anchoring effects) might be 
used to extract agency costs. 
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Chapter 6: Investigating Board Papers and Decision 
Bias: An On-line Administered Experiment 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having undertaken a tightly controlled laboratory experiment to establish 
analytic or theoretical generalisability and causation in Chapter five, the following 
chapter seeks to extend these findings by improving external validity through 
replication in the cohort of interest; CEOs and directors.  
In this chapter, I extend the investigation into anchoring effect and social norms 
in board decision making by employing the same design in an on-line setting with 
real world directors and CEOs acting as participants. Although it was not feasible in 
this chapter to replicate the group based decision making component of the study in 
Chapter five, all other aspects of the research design were replicated in an on-line 
setting in the target group of interest. The findings mirrored those of the more 
stringent laboratory conditions, strengthening the claim that real world directors are 
likely to suffer from anchoring bias based on the use of the common governance 
practice of providing a recommendation or resolution at the beginning of a board 
paper. 
In this chapter I briefly reviewed prior research that investigates anchoring 
effect in professional decision making setting; I then revisited the materials. Given 
the difficulty in attracting a busy director to a laboratory setting (Leblanc & 
Schwartz, 2007), the experiment was run on-line rather than in a laboratory setting, 
and this meant that it was not possible to run a group decision stage in this study. 
However, this was not considered problematic given the precedent of theoretical 
generalisation for the anchoring effect at both individual and group levels. In 
addition, the group stage in Chapter five did not provide further insights into the 
anchoring effect identified in individuals. Following the methods the results are 
presented, before a discussion of the findings and implications. 
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6.2 HYPOTHESES REFINEMENT: DIRECTORS VS. STUDENTS 
6.2.1 Anchoring Effect 
The results presented in Chapter five corroborated findings from prior 
experimental research and extended the literature on anchoring in two important 
ways. First, it moved from the traditional use of a single anchor point in testing to a 
test that included multiple possible reference data points. Second, the test also moved 
beyond the individual level of analysis by examining anchoring in group based 
decision making.  
The majority of prior research (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Jacowitz & 
Kahneman, 1995), as well as Chapter five, has concentrated on the theoretical or the 
analytical generalisability of the anchoring effects. This means that the results 
demonstrating anchoring effects have predominantly taken place in a laboratory 
setting using university or college students as participants. A key issue for these 
results is generalisability (or external validity), particularly when dealing with quite a 
different cohort such as directors and senior managers. 
Joyce and Biddle (1981: 142) hypothesised that professional decision makers (i.e. 
auditors) have “well-developed knowledge structures” in their areas of expertise 
compared with students solving general knowledge tasks, and hence anchoring 
effects among experts might not as robust as it is among students. Yet, they found 
that anchoring is a robust phenomenon that is evident among auditors formulating 
opinions about the fairness of their clients’ financial statements. 
In line with those findings provided by Joyce and Biddle (1981), Northcraft and 
Neale (1987: 96) argue that prior laboratory research on decisional biases is 
applicable to “real world, information-rich, interactive estimation and decision 
context”. Their research into anchoring-and-adjustment in property pricing decisions 
found that anchoring effects are evident among both experts and amateurs. Similarly, 
anchoring effects have been detected among consumers’ purchase decisions 
(Wansink et al., 1998).  
There has been no study, however, of anchoring among the population of 
directors and senior managers. Given the strong effect detected in the student 
population (Chapter five), the logical next step is to consider if the behaviour of 
directors and officers differs substantially from that of students. As in Chapter five, 
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the key decision bias investigated is anchoring. However, in this study the level of 
analysis is limited to the individual director level. Constraints on access to multiple 
participants at the same time meant testing for group effects was not possible. Based 
on the logic outlined in section 5.2.1 in Chapter five, I would expect that: 
H6.1: Directors provided with a recommended numeric figure at the 
beginning of a board resolution paper will anchor on that 
recommended figure irrespective of the presence of other 
benchmark data provided in that resolution paper. 
6.2.2 Board Social Norms 
Unlike students, practicing directors are familiar with the structure of board 
papers. Drawing upon social norms theory (Berkowitz & Perkins, 1986; Berkowitz, 
2002; Berkowitz et al., 2003), directors on a given board may develop norms of 
accepting/ questioning the recommended resolution before them in a board paper. 
There is likelihood, therefore, that participants’ experience of board social norms 
may be different for directors compared with students. Therefore, the norms 
manipulation in the salary exercise may need to be changed and accommodated to 
practicing directors. However, this study is an extension of that study conducted in 
Chapter five, and hence changing the experimental condition or manipulation in the 
research instrument to account for any difference between students and directors may 
distort the confirmatory advantage of replication and comparison (Cumming, 2012). 
Thus, I decided to use the same exact experimental instrument from Chapter five at 
the first stage of the directors’ experiment, and then introduce another norms 
manipulation at a second stage. 
The instrument used in both experiments (i.e. Chapter five and stage one of 
Chapter six) attempted to manipulate social norms by directly suggesting (for a 
subset of participants) that directors normally follow the resolution provided (see 
Chapter five, section 5.2.2 for details). As a replication of Chapter five, the 
experiment documented in this chapter sought to invoke a social norm of following a 
resolution through a suggestion in the instructions to participants. Following the 
logic in Chapter five, section 5.2.2, I hypothesise that: 
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H6.2a: Directors cued to agree with the recommended resolution 
were more likely to accept the recommendation in a board 
paper. 
At the second stage of the directors’ experiment I designed a short follow-up 
investigation of the actual board social norms around following a recommended 
resolution. For the follow-up investigation, a director’s attitude toward board social 
norm was measured by three follow-up questions. These questions were: 
Q1: What was the recommended upper limit for salary negotiations 
in the board paper scenario? 
Q2: Based on the information in the scenario, do boards normally 
adopt the resolution in a board paper? 
Q3: In your experience, do boards normally adopt the resolution in 
a board paper? 
The aim of these questions was twofold. First, it allowed direct investigation of 
the norms manipulation in the instrument; that is, did the participants remember the 
instructions surrounding the norm manipulation? Second, it allowed for insight into 
the extent to which a director viewed other directors’ predisposition to agree with/ 
question the recommendations provided in the board paper (specifically the salary 
negotiations scenario Q2, and in general, Q3). The follow-up questions were 
presented to participants after they had finished the experiment salary exercise, 
whereby participants were not able to go back to the original exercise once they had 
finished it and moved to the follow-up questions. 
In addition to the experimental manipulation (stage one of the study), it is likely 
that directors share a norm that a recommendation provided in a paper will be 
approved. Drawing upon the same logic for the experimental manipulation, social 
norms theory (Berkowitz & Perkins, 1986) would predict that individual directors 
will be swayed in their decisions by their beliefs about peer directors. Thus, 
participants who believe that directors normally agree with a recommended 
resolution will be likely swayed by the anchor that is at the beginning of the board 
paper. More formally I hypothesise that: 
H6.2b: Participants who believe that directors normally agree with 
the recommended resolution provided to the board in a board 
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paper will be more likely to be influenced by value contained 
in the resolution. 
Finally, anchoring effect will be exacerbated when there is a norm of agreeing 
with the recommended resolution (interaction effect between anchoring and norms). 
However, because boards’ norm of accepting the recommended resolution was 
investigated at two stages, the interaction effect between anchoring and norms was 
also investigated accordingly. First, in line with the hypothesis H6.2a, the hypothesis 
for the interaction effect between anchoring and norms is: 
H6.3.a: Anchoring effects are higher when there is a social norm of 
accepting the recommendation in a board paper compared 
with anchoring effects in the absence of the norm. 
Similarly, in line with the hypothesis H6.2b, the hypothesis for the interaction 
effect between anchoring and norms is: 
H6.3.b: Anchoring effects are higher when directors perceive 
boards predisposed to accept that recommendation. 
6.3 METHODS 
6.3.1 Data Collection: An On-Line Experiment 
Given the difficulty in attracting a busy director to a laboratory setting 
(Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007), I decided to conduct this experimental study online. 
Online research is convenient and time saving for both the researcher and the 
participants (Dillman, 2000; Couper, 2000). For this study, the experimental 
instrument (i.e. the salary exercise) was formatted using “Qualtrics”59; a web based 
service used to format and access research instruments online60. After formatting the 
experimental instrument, an invitation to participate was emailed to directors of 110 
Australian organisations. Directors of these organisations had previously indicated a 
                                                 
 
59 http://www.qualtrics.com. 
60 Qualtrics is a web based survey service that is widely used for survey research in different 
disciplines of science; e.g. medical research, and business and marketing (Singh, Bhandarker, Rai & 
Jain, 2011; Lindfelt, Ip & Barnett, 2015; Pringle, Kowalchuk, Meyers & Seale, 2012). It has been 
used for surveying directors (Fleckner & Rowe, 2015) and for corporate governance research (Glick, 
2011). 
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general willingness to participate in directors’ surveys conducted by QUT61. These 
directors serve on boards of different forms of organisations (e.g. government, for 
profit, not for profit, large and small). The invitation email contained a link that 
directed participants (i.e. directors) to the experimental instrument. 
6.3.2 Sample Size Determination 
Using SPSS, the sample size calculations were based on tests from the first 
experiment documented in Chapter five (section 5.4.2). Given the statistically and 
practically non-significant results for both the norms’ variable, and the interaction 
effect between anchoring and norms documented in Chapter five (for which there 
were 180 subjects), sample size calculations aimed at detecting the anchoring effect. 
Calculations indicated that the estimated sample size of 10 participants in each 
cell of the 3x2 design achieves 80% power when an F test is used at a 5% 
significance level. The estimated detected effect size for anchoring using this sample 
is ηp2 = .16. Using this approach to testing sample size and power calculations, I 
recognised that tests for both the norms effect and interaction effects may be 
underpowered62. 
Altogether, because of (1) the power issues for the effects of the norms 
condition and the interaction between anchoring and norms, (2) the difficulties in 
recruiting a large number of directors to the experiment, and (3) my main interest in 
ensuring external validity of Chapter five’s results (i.e. the effect of anchoring), the 
sample size of this on-line experiment is set as the sample size needed to detect 
anchoring effects among directors: 10 participants in each cell of the 3x2 design (i.e. 
total sample size of 60 participants). 
6.4 RESULTS 
6.4.1 The Participants 
Data were collected from directors of 110 Australian organisations. In total, there 
were 80 responses from 80 directors. For each of the 80 received responses, where 
                                                 
 
61 The directors of these organisations previously participated in a similar survey conducted by 
researchers from QUT. 
62 For the norms’ variable, the calculation also indicated that this sample size design achieves 68% 
power when an F test is used at a 5% significance level; the estimated detected effect size for norms is 
ηp2 = .10. The calculation also indicated that the interaction effect between anchoring and norms 
achieves a very low power (12%), whereby the results are also practically non-significant. 
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the salary exercise was not completed by the participant, I labelled the response as 
unusable and excluded it from the analysis; four responses were excluded. Thus, the 
results reported in this study reflect a total of 76 usable replies as follows: 12 
participants (directors) in conditions A and D, 13 participants in condition B, 14 
participants in conditions C and E, and 11 participants in condition F. (To see the 
experimental design of the six conditions, please refer to Table 5.1 in Chapter five.) 
For a one-way between groups ANOVA, orthogonality issues should not be a 
concern when the difference in size among cells is small. (For more details about 
orthogonality, please refer to section 5.4.1.) Nevertheless, for two-way between 
groups ANOVA, and especially when the size of each cell is small, it is more 
accurate (i.e. decreased probability of type I error) to have an equal number of 
participants for each cell. Thus, cell sizes were balanced by randomly deleting cases 
from cells with a larger size, so that I had 11 participants in each of the six cells, 
whereby the final total sample size was 66 directors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
There were 30 male participants (45%), 27 female participants (41%), and nine 
participants who did not disclose their gender (14%). There were four participants 
(6%) aged 30 to 39 years old, and five participants (8%) aged 40 to 49 years old. 
Some 25 participants (38%) were aged 50 to 59 years old, whereas 21 participants 
(32%) were aged 60 to 69 years old. Only two participants (3%) were aged 70 to 79 
years old. Finally, the same nine participants (14%) who did not disclose their gender 
also did not disclosed their age. Table 6.1 presents frequency and percentages of the 
participants based on their age and gender. 
Table 6- 1: Age and Gender of Participants; Frequency and Percentages 
Age 
Gender 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 Not 
disclosed 
Total 
Male 1 (2%) 3 (4%) 10 (15%) 14 (21%) 2 (3%) 0 30 (45%) 
Female 3 (4%) 2 (3%) 15 (23%) 7 (11%) 0 0 27 (41%) 
Not 
disclosed 
0 0 0 0 0 9 (14%) 9 (14%) 
Total 4 (6%) 5 (7%) 25 (38%) 21 (32%) 2 (3%) 9 (14%) 66 (100%) 
a. Percentages are approximated, thus the total might be 1% less or more than 100%.  
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When comparing the age of our participating directors (participants of this 
current study) as presented in Table 6.1 to that of participating students (participants 
of Chapter five) as presented in Table 5.2, the age difference between the two 
samples is clear. That is, the students were much younger than directors. Some 95% 
of the participating students were below 34, and 73% of all participating students 
were aged 18 to 26 years. In contrast, none of the participating directors were in their 
twenties or less; interestingly, 70% of the all participating directors were aged 50 to 
70 years. In this study, females and males were almost equally represented in the 
sample, which closely resembled the distribution of gender in students (Chapter 
five).  
The nine participants (14%) who did not disclose their age and gender also did 
not disclose their education level. However, almost 80% of the participating directors 
have a university degree and 50% of the director participants reported having a 
postgraduate degree. For participants’ experience on boards, some 24 participants 
(36%) did not disclose their experience. Table 6.2 presents frequency and 
percentages of our participants based on their education and experience. 
 
Table 6- 2: Education and Experience of Participants; Frequency and Percentages 
Education 
Experience Senior 
school 
Trade/ 
TAFE 
Under-
graduate 
Post-
graduate 
Not 
Disclosed 
Total 
< 5 years 0 0 4 (6%) 5 (7%) 0 9 (14%) 
5-9 years 0 0 5 (7%) 9 (14%) 0 14 (21%) 
10- 14 years 0 0 3 (5%) 5 (7%) 0 8 (12%) 
15- 19 years 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 2 (3%) 2 (3%) 0 6 (9%) 
20 > 0 0 2 (3%) 3 (5%) 0 5 (7%) 
Not disclosed 2 (3%) 1 (2%) 3 (5%) 9 (14%) 9 (14%) 24 (36%) 
Total  3 (5%) 2 (3%) 19 (29%) 33 (50%) 9 (14%) 66 (100%)
a. Percentages are approximated, thus the total might be 1% less or more than 100%. 
 
Comparing the level of education of participating directors (presented in Table 
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6.2) to that of participating students (presented in Table 5.4), it is noticeable that, as 
expected, the directors had a higher level of education. Some 64% of the students 
from Chapter five had not gained their undergraduate degree during the time the 
experiment was conducted. 
The final two demographic characteristics reported are current occupation and 
whether a participant has served as chair of a board or not. Participants’ responses to 
the current occupation were coded as: (1) a CEO whenever the answer was 
“managing director” or “CEO”, (2) an executive director whenever the answer 
indicates so (e.g. CFO, manager), (3) a director where the answer indicates so (e.g. 
director, retired), and (4) a chair. Table 6.3 presents frequency and percentages of our 
participants based on their current occupation and having served as chair. 
 
Table 6- 3: Frequency and Percentages of Participants’ Current Occupation and 
Serving as Chair 
Having served as chair 
Current 
occupation 
Yes Currently Yes Previously No Not Disclosed Total 
 CEO 4 (6%) 4 (6%) 8 (12%) 1 (2%) 17 (26%) 
Chair 2 (3%) 0 0 0 2 (3%) 
Director 9 (14%) 0 8 (12%) 0 17 (26%) 
Executive 
director 
5 (8%) 1 (2%) 15 (23%) 0 21 (32%) 
Not Disclosed 1 (2%) 0 0 8 (12%) 9 (14%) 
Total  21 (32%) 5 (8%) 31 (47%) 9 (14%) 66 (100%) 
a. Percentages are approximated, thus the total might be 1% less or more than 100%.  
 
6.4.2 Anchoring and Social Norms among Directors: Stage One 
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances was employed to test if ANOVA’s 
assumption of equality of error variance was met. Results indicated that the error 
variance across the six treatment groups was equal, and hence the analysis 
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proceeded. Table 6.4 presents basic descriptive statistics of the dependent variable 
(directors’ estimates to the upper limit for the salary negotiations) for each of the six 
treatment groups. Inspection reveals a considerable difference between the means of 
the three levels of anchoring condition (high anchor/ low anchor/ and no anchor). 
 
Table 6- 4: Descriptive Statistics for the Upper Limit for the Salary Negotiation 
 Norm Present Norm Absent Anchor Condition  
Average 
 
Anchor 
Condition 
Mean 
a 
Std. 
Devi
ation 
a 
N Mean a Std. 
Devi
ation 
a 
N Mean 
a 
Std. 
Devia
tion a 
N 
High Anchor 282 24 11 290 19 11 286 21 22 
Low Anchor 255 18 11 254 17 11 254 17 22 
No Anchor 262 19 11 275 15 11 268 18 22 
Norms 
Condition 
Average 
 
266 
 
23 
 
33 
 
273 
 
22 
 
33 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
Grand 
Summary  
(All 
participants) 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 269 23 66 
a. Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
 
Estimates of the upper limit for the salary negotiations that a participant would 
approve were subjected to a 3x2 two-way analysis of variance. This analysis 
approach was based on having three levels of anchoring (high anchor, low anchor, no 
anchor) and two levels of norms (present, absent). The main effect of anchoring was 
statistically significant at the .05 significance level (and at the more stringent .01, and 
.001 level of significance): F (2, 60) = 15, p < .05. Importantly, the main effect of 
anchoring had a large practical significance (ηp2= .34) (Cohen, 1988: 22). However, 
neither the main effect of boards’ norm of accepting the recommended resolution, 
nor the interaction effect between anchoring and norms were statistically significant. 
Given the possible low power of the test, this was not unexpected. Review of the 
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effect size (ηp2= .03 for norms and ηp2= .02 for interactions) reveals that as reported 
in Chapter five, there was no indication that either effect was practically significant 
either. Table 6.5 presents the results from the tests of between-subjects effects. 
 
Table 6- 5: Summary of ANOVA 
a.     Numbers are approximated. 
b. Computed using α= .05 
c. R Squared = .359 (Adjusted R Squared = .306) 
Significance level is a priori criterion that is set at .05; however * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Given the statistically significant omnibus ANOVA F test, post hoc analyses 
were conducted for the anchoring condition. Given the assumed equal variance 
between groups, Tukey’s Honesty Significant Different Test (Tukey’s HSD) was  
used to compare all pair-wise contrasts for the anchoring condition. All pairs of 
anchoring groups were found to be statistically significantly different (p < .05): 
groups one (High anchor: M = 286; SD = 21) and two (Low anchor: M = 254; SD = 
17); groups one (High anchor: M = 286; SD = 21) and three (No anchor: M = 268; 
SD = 18); and groups two (Low anchor: M  = 254; SD = 17) and three (No anchor: M 
= 268; SD = 18). In summary, participants’ estimates of the upper limit for the salary 
negotiations was different depending on whether there was a high recommendation 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares a 
df Mean Square a F ηp2 Observed 
Power b 
Corrected Model 12000c 5 2400 7*** .36 .99 
Intercept 4791980 1 4791980 13438*** .99 1 
Anchoring variable 10825 2 5413 15*** .34 .99 
Norms variable 643 1 643 2 .03 .26 
Anchoring variable 
* Norms variable 
532 2 266 .75 .02 .17 
Error 21396 60 357    
Total 4825376 66 
    
Corrected total 33396 65     
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(i.e. high anchor), a low recommendation or no recommendation at all at the 
beginning of the board paper. The differences in means in participants’ estimates are 
consistent with hypothesis H6.1. This provides significant evidence to expect the 
results of Chapter five are generalisable to directors. Table 6.6 presents the results 
obtained from Tukey’s HSD tests for the anchoring condition63. 
 
Table 6- 6: Tukey’s HSD Tests for Comparisons between the Anchoring Levels  
   95% CI 
Comparisons  Mean 
difference 
Std. error Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
High anchor vs. low anchor 31*** 6 18 45 
High anchor vs. no anchor 17** 6 4 31 
No anchor vs. low anchor 14* 6 1 28 
Note.  Based on observed means, the error term is Mean Square (Error) = 357. 
Note.  Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
Significance level is a priori criterion that is set at .05; however * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
The main effect of norm condition on directors’ estimates was neither statistically 
significant nor practically significant, F (1, 60) = 2, p > .05, ηp2= .03. These results 
indicate that directors’ approval for the upper limit salary negotiations when the 
norm stimulus was present (M = 266, SD = 23) do not differ statistically from that 
approval when the norm stimulus is absent (M = 273, SD = 22). These results are 
inconsistent with the hypothesis H6.2a. These results corroborated the results 
reported for students in Chapter five, section 5.4.2.  
The results also indicate that the interaction effect between anchoring condition 
and norms condition was neither statistically nor practically significant, F (2, 60) = 
.75, p > .05, ηp2= .03. These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis H6.3a. 
Again, the results corroborated findings reported for students in Chapter five, section 
5.4.2. 
                                                 
 
63 Given there were only two levels of norm condition, the omnibus test is all that is required.  
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Unfortunately, the power of both the norms test and the interaction test is low 
(observed power= 26%, and 17% respectively) increasing the chance of a Type II 
error (i.e. accepting the null hypothesis when it is false (Cohen, 1992)). However, to 
identify the source of this low power is, the same procedures followed in Chapter 
five, section 5.4.2 were followed here for these two tests. These analytical 
procedures indicated that the low power for both tests was driven by the small effect 
size of the population. Thus, if there is any effect from the norms condition or 
interaction, it would likely be of no practical significance.  
The obtained results from this study have demonstrated that anchoring effect is 
evident in director decision making. Directors’ estimation of numerical values is 
biased toward a reference point recommended to them at the beginning of the board 
paper (i.e. proposed resolution), even when other reference data are provided in the 
board paper. Some 34% of the variation in directors’ estimates to the upper limit for 
the salary negotiations was explained by the anchoring variable. On the other hand, 
there was no support for the hypothesis of directors’ norm of recommendation 
acceptance, nor to the interaction between anchoring and norms. Figure 6.1 presents 
the means plots for both anchoring and norms conditions. 
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Figure 6- 1: Means plots for participants’ approval to the upper limit for the salary 
negotiations 
 
6.4.3 Participants’ Views to Directors’ Norm of Accepting Recommended 
Resolution: Stage Two (the Follow-Up Questions) 
The previous analysis has demonstrated that directors were only influenced by 
the anchoring condition, yet neither by the norms condition nor by the interaction 
between anchoring and norms. These results are similar to those which Chapter five 
demonstrated with students. However, in this section, I conduct another investigation 
of anchoring and directors’ norm of accepting/ questioning a recommended 
resolution. The investigation differs from all previous investigations conducted in 
Chapter five and stage one of Chapter six in that it employs another norms condition. 
Thus, it directly suggests (for a subset of participants) that directors normally follow 
the resolution provided. (See Chapter five, section 5.2.2 for details.) 
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In this current analysis, the norms manipulation as presented to participants in the 
salary exercise (directly suggesting for a subset of participants that directors 
normally follow the resolution provided) is not accounted for. This is justified by the 
statistically and practically non-significant results for the norms in all previous 
investigations (ηp2 = .04 in section 5.4.2, ηp2 = .05 in section 5.4.3, and η2 = .02 in 
section 5.4.4 of Chapter five, and ηp2 = .03 in section 6.4.2 of Chapter six). 
Moreover, the interaction effect between anchoring and norms for all previous 
analyses in Chapter five and Chapter six was also statistically and practically non-
significant, with partial eta squared being either similar or smaller than that of the 
norms.  
As a reminder, the research instrument for this stage also includes the same 
experimental instrument (the salary exercise) employed in study two, yet, the three 
follow-up questions from section 6.2.2 are integrated into the analysis. As a 
reminder, these questions are: 
Q1: What was the recommended upper limit for salary negotiations 
in the board paper scenario? 
Q2: Based on the information in the scenario, do boards normally 
adopt the resolution in a board paper? 
Q3: In your experience, do boards normally adopt the resolution in 
a board paper? 
Descriptive statistics to the three follow-up questions 
The first question required each participant to write down (i.e. type) the salary 
package recommended in that board paper. The statistics of the answers to this 
question provided an overview about how much attention participants paid to the 
recommendation provided to them in that board paper. Out of the 76 participating 
directors, 52 participants (68%) provided a right answer to the first follow-up 
question, whereas 22 participants (29%) provided a wrong answer, and only two 
participants (3%) provided no answer. Figure 6.2 presents the percentages of 
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participants who provided the right answer, wrong answer, or no answer to the first 
follow-up question64. 
 
 
Figure 6- 2: Percentages of participants who provided right answer, wrong answer, or 
no answer to the first follow-up question 
 
The second question required each participant to indicate whether a given board, 
given the information in the exercise in hand, would normally adopt the salary 
recommended in the resolution. Directors’ answers to question two reflected the 
extent to which participants viewed boards adopting a resolution as laid out in the 
exercise they solved. Finally, the third question required each participant to indicate 
whether boards, in a general sense, normally adopt the recommended resolution 
provided to them. Directors’ answers to question three reflected the extent to which 
directors viewed boards generally adopt a resolution recommended to them in a 
board paper. Table 6.7 presents frequency and percentages for questions two and 
three. 
 
                                                 
 
64 For participants who don’t have a recommended resolution (scenario E and F) on the board paper 
they responded to, the answer was considered right if the participant indicated that there was no 
recommended resolution; e.g. “Don’t know”, “Not provided” or even did not provide an answer. Out 
of 25 participants in scenarios E and F, 16 participants provided a right answer. 
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Table 6- 7: Directors’ Views to Boards’ Inclination to Adopt a Recommended 
Resolution: the Exercise of this Study (Q2), and in General (Q3); Frequency and 
Percentages 
Q2 
Q 3 Yes No Don’t know Total 
Yes 45 (59%) 6 (8%) 4 (5%) 55 (72%) 
No 5 (7%) 5 (7%) 0 (%) 10 (14%) 
Don’t know 0 0 11 (14%) 11 (14%) 
Total 50 (66%) 11 (15%) 15 (19%) 76 (100%) 
a. Percentages are approximated, thus totals might be 1% less or more.  
 
For the second follow-up question, there were 50 participants (66%) who viewed 
boards adopting the resolution as recommended in our salary exercise, compared to 
only 11 participants (15%) who did not think that boards would adopt the 
recommended resolution as presented in the salary exercise. Whereas there were 15 
participants (19%) who answered “Don’t know”. While for the third follow-up 
question, there were 55 participants (72%) who viewed boards normally adopt the 
recommended resolution in general, whereas, only 10 participants (14%) who did not 
think that boards would adopt a recommended resolution in general. It is fair to say 
that the majority of participants (45 participants, 59%) viewed boards normally 
adopting a recommended resolution in a board paper; in general, and as provided in 
the exercise in hand. 
In this stage of investigation, I run two analyses to investigate boards’ norms of 
accepting the recommended resolution. In both the first analysis and the second 
analysis, norms manipulation as employed in all previous investigation in Chapter 
five and Chapter six was not considered. Rather, I consider participants’ answers to 
the follow-up questions, so that, participants’ answers to the second question was 
employed to investigate norms in the first analysis, whereas participants’ answers to 
the third follow-up question were employed to investigate norms in the second 
analysis. 
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Analysis one; employing the second follow-up question to investigate norms  
The second follow-up question asks each participant to indicate whether a board 
(irrespective of the respondent himself or herself) would normally adopt a 
recommended resolution as presented in the exercise he/ she has just solved or not. 
Participants’ answers to this question were analysed in line with the estimates they 
provided for the salary exercise. The analysis in this sense is in a line with the main 
premise of social norms theory (Berkowitz & Perkins, 1986); that is, people’s 
decisions and behaviours are influenced by their views and perception of what is 
normal among their peers (hypothesis H6.2b). 
I classify participants into two groups: (1) participants whose answers to the 
second follow-up question are in accordance with boards’ social norms hypothesis; 
“yes”– a board would normally adopt a recommended resolution as presented in the 
exercise. (2) participants whose answers to the second follow-up question are not in 
accordance with board social norms hypothesis. That is, they provided a “No” 
answer or a “Don’t know” answer to the follow-up question. 
To this end, I also had to exclude from this analysis responses for which 
participants did not have a recommended resolution (scenario E and scenario F)65. 
Therefore, for the anchoring variable, this elimination was a departure from the 
“placebo” design which appeals a comparison between a treatment group and no 
treatment group (three levels), to the “positive” design that is based on a comparison 
between two different treatments (high anchor and low anchor) (Peace & Chen, 
2013: 34).  
In summary I had two between-groups variables, the anchoring variable with two 
levels; high anchor and low anchor, and the norms variable with two levels; the 
second follow-up question answered in accordance/ not in accordance with boards’ 
social norms hypothesis. 
To secure a bigger sample size, I started with the 76 unbalanced usable 
responses. After eliminating the responses for E and F conditions, there were 51 
responses. I then used the deletion technique to balance the sample size for the four 
                                                 
 
65 Note that an analysis was also conducted with inclusion of scenarios E and F; however, similar 
results were obtained for the practical and statistical significance for each of the two main effects tests 
and the interaction effect test. 
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cells, and ended up with 28 responses for the analysis; seven responses for each of 
the four cells.  
I ran two way between-groups ANOVA, the error variance of the dependent 
variable was equal across the groups and hence the ANOVA proceeded. Table 6.8 
presents basic descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (participants’ estimates 
to the upper limit for the salary negotiations) for each of the four groups. 
 
Table 6- 8: Descriptive Statistics for the Upper Limit for the Salary Negotiation 
 Participants in 
accordance with 
board norms 
hypothesis 
Participants not in 
accordance with board 
norms hypothesis 
Follow-up norms 
condition average 
 
Anchor 
Condition 
Mean a Std. 
Devia
tion a 
N Mean a Std. 
Devia
tion a 
N Mean a Std. 
Devia
tion a 
N 
High Anchor 300 16 7 276 19 7 288 21 14 
Low Anchor 251 16 7 261 21 7 256 19 14 
Norms 
Condition 
Average 
 
275 
 
30 
 
14 
 
269 
 
21 
 
14 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
Grand 
Summary  
(All 
participants) 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 272 26 28 
a. Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
 
The results from the between-subjects effects indicate that the main effect of 
anchoring was statistically and practically significant at the .05 significance level 
(and at the more stringent .01, .001 level of significance). Groups one (High anchor: 
M = 288; SD = 21) and two (Low anchor: M = 256; SD = 19); F (1, 24) = 21, p < .05, 
ηp2= .47. These results are consistent with the hypothesis H6.1, and thus 
corroborating the results in section 6.4.2 of this chapter, as well as those results in 
section 5.4.2 of Chapter five for the hypothesis H5.1. 
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The results for the norms variable (as indicated by the follow-up question) was 
statistically and practically non-significant; F (1, 24) = 1, p > .05, ηp2= .03. These 
results indicate that the mean of upper limit of salary negotiations for participants 
whose answers to the follow-up questions are in accordance with boards’ social 
norms (M = 275, SD = 30) do not differ statistically from that mean of upper limit 
salary negotiations for participants whose answers to the follow-up questions are not 
in accordance with boards’ social norms (M = 269, SD = 21). These results are 
inconsistent with the hypothesis H6.2b. 
The interaction effect between the anchoring variable and the norms variable was 
statistically significant; F (1, 24) = 6, p < .05. Importantly, the practical significance 
was large; ηp2= .20. However, the power for the interaction test was low (66%). 
Although the observed power (66%) for the interaction effect test is a bit below 
the conventional 80%, it is considered pretty high when compared to the observed 
power for the interaction effect test for other analyses in section 5.4.2 of Chapter five 
(12%), section 5.4.3 of Chapter five (28%), and section 6.4.2 of Chapter six (17%). 
Thus, we can fairly say that the obtained results for the interaction effect between 
anchoring and the follow-up social norms variable are consistent with the hypothesis 
H6.3b. Table 6.9 presents the results from the tests of between-subjects effects, 
followed by Figure 6.2, which presents the means plots for both conditions. 
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Table 6- 9: Summary of ANOVA 
a. Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
b. Computed using α= .05 
c. R Squared = .542 (Adjusted R Squared = .485) 
Significance level is a priori criterion that is set at .05; however * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares a 
df Mean Square a F ηp2 Observed 
Power b 
Corrected Model 9523c 3 3174 9*** .542 .99 
Intercept 2073184 1 2073184 6186*** .99 1 
Anchoring variable 7200 1 7200 21*** .47 .99 
Norms variable 283 1 283 1 .034 .14 
Anchoring variable 
* Norms variable 
2040 1 2040 6* .20 .66 
Error 8044 24 335    
Total 2090751 28 
    
Corrected total 17567 27     
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Figure 6- 3: Means plots for participants’ approval to the upper limit for the salary 
negotiations 
 
Analysis two; employing the third follow-up question to investigate norms  
In the second analysis, board social norms of accepting a recommended 
resolution was indicated by participants’ answers to the third follow-up question, 
which asked participants whether boards, in a general sense, would normally adopt a 
recommended resolution in a given board paper. Participants’ answers to this 
question were analysed in line with the estimates they provided for the salary 
exercise. The analysis here is also in a line with the main premise of social norms 
theory (Berkowitz & Perkins, 1986); that is, people’s decisions and behaviours are 
influenced by their views and perception of what is normal among their peers. 
I classify participants into two groups: (1) participants whose answers to the third 
follow-up question are in accordance with boards’ social norms hypothesis; “yes”– 
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boards normally adopt a recommended resolution in a given board paper. (2) 
participants whose answers to the third follow-up question are not in accordance with 
board social norms hypothesis. That is, they provided a “No” answer or a “Don’t 
know” answer to the question. 
Unlike the second follow-up question, the third follow-up question is a general 
question (i.e. does not relate to the salary exercise), and thus, the three anchoring 
levels are kept (scenarios E and F were not excluded from the analysis)66. In 
summary I had two between-groups variables, the anchoring variable with three 
levels; high anchor/ low anchor/ no anchor, and the norms variable with two levels; 
third follow-up question answered in accordance/ not in accordance with boards’ 
social norms hypothesis. 
To secure a bigger sample size, I started with the 76 unbalanced usable 
responses. I then used the deletion technique to balance the sample size for the four 
cells, and ended up with 30 responses for the analysis; five responses for each of the 
six cells.  
I ran two way between-groups ANOVA, the error variance of the dependent 
variable was equal across the groups and hence the ANOVA proceeded. Table 6.10 
presents basic descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (participants’ estimates 
to the upper limit for the salary negotiations) for each of the six groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
66 Note that an analysis was also conducted when excluding scenarios E and F, however, similar 
results were obtained for each of the two main effects tests and the interaction effect test. 
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Table 6- 10: Descriptive Statistics for the Upper Limit for the Salary Negotiation 
 Participants in 
accordance with board 
norms hypothesis 
Participants not in 
accordance with board 
norms hypothesis 
Follow-up norms 
condition average 
 
Anchor 
Condition 
Mean 
a 
Std. 
Devi
ation 
a 
N Mean a Std. 
Devi
ation 
a 
N Mean 
a 
Std. 
Devia
tion a 
N 
High Anchor 300 20 5 280 19 5 290 21 10 
Low Anchor 253 19 5 260 19 5 257 18 10 
No Anchor 264 15 5 270 14 5 267 14 10 
Norms 
Condition 
Average 
 
272 
 
27 
 
15 
 
270 
 
18 
 
15 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
Grand 
Summary  
(All 
participants) 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 271 22 30 
a. Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
 
The main effect of anchoring was statistically significant at the .05 significance 
level (and at the more stringent .01, and .001 level of significance): F (2, 24) = 9, p < 
.05. Importantly, the main effect of anchoring had a large practical significance (ηp2= 
.44). However, neither the main effect of boards’ norm of accepting the 
recommended resolution, nor the interaction effect between anchoring and norms 
were statistically significant. Table 6.11 presents the results from the tests of 
between-subjects effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 6: Investigating Board Papers and Decision Bias: An On-line Administered Experiment 207 
Table 6- 11: Summary of ANOVA 
a. Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
b. Computed using α= .05 
c. R Squared = .486 (Adjusted R Squared = .379) 
Significance level is a priori criterion that is set at .05; however * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Post hoc analyses were conducted for the anchoring condition given the 
statistically significant omnibus ANOVA F test. Two pairs of groups were found to 
be statistically significantly different (p < .05): groups one (High anchor: M= 290; 
SD= 21) and two (Low anchor: M= 257; SD= 18); and groups one (High anchor: M= 
290; SD= 21) and three (No anchor: M= 267; SD= 14). Nevertheless, groups two 
(Low anchor: M= 257; SD= 18) and three (No anchor: M= 267; SD= 14) were found 
to be statistically non-significant. Table 6.12 presents the results obtained from 
Tukey’s HSD tests for the anchoring condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares a 
df Mean Square a F ηp2 Observed 
Power b 
Corrected Model 7084c 5 1417 5** .49 .93 
Intercept 2205941 1 2205941 7059*** .99 1 
Anchoring variable 5872 2 2936 9*** .44 .96 
Norms variable 41 1 41 .13 .005 .06 
Anchoring variable 
* Norms variable 
1172 2 586 .18 .14 .35 
Error 7500 24 313    
Total 2220525 30 
    
Corrected total 14584 29     
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Table 6- 12: Tukey’s HSD Tests for Comparisons between the Anchoring Levels 
   95% CI 
Comparisons  Mean 
difference 
Std. error Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
High anchor vs. low anchor 34*** 8 14 53 
High anchor vs. no anchor 23* 8 3 43 
No anchor vs. low anchor 11 8 -9 30 
Note.  Based on observed means, the error term is Mean Square (Error) = 313. 
Note.  Numbers are in thousands after being approximated. 
Significance level is a priori criterion that is set at .05; however * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
The results for the norms variable (as indicated by the follow-up question) was 
statistically and practically non-significant; F (1, 24) = .13, p > .05, ηp2= .005. These 
results indicate that the mean of upper limit of salary negotiations for participants 
whose answers to the follow-up questions are in accordance with boards’ social 
norms (M = 272, SD = 27) do not differ statistically from that mean of upper limit 
salary negotiations for participants whose answers to the follow-up questions are not 
in accordance with boards’ social norms (M = 270, SD = 18). These results are 
inconsistent with the hypothesis H6.2b. The interaction effect between the anchoring 
variable and the norms variable was statistically non-significant; F (2, 24) = .18, p > 
.05, yet, the practical significance was medium (ηp2= .13). However, the observed 
power for the interaction test was very low (35%). 
6.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
6.5.1 Summary of Results 
The investigation of anchoring and social norms in director decision making took 
place at two stages: (1) the replication of the experimental design; employing the 
same experimental instrument employed for students in study two. Then (2) a 
combination of the experimental instrument (specifically to measure anchoring) and 
the follow-up questions presented to directors (to indicate social norms condition). 
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The results from all investigations of this chapter show that directors (participants 
of this study) are susceptible to anchoring effects just like students (participants of 
Chapter five). Although directors are expert decision makers, more educated and 
about 25 years older than students they also anchored on the figure provided to them 
at the beginning of the board paper. This influence of anchoring was large, and 
evident among directors irrespective of other numeric reference points provided in 
the board paper presented to directors. 
The results also indicated that social norms influence was not detected in all of 
the analyses conducted in this study; this is similar to those results obtained for 
students. Nevertheless, interaction effect between anchoring and social norms was 
detected when social norms in directors’ decision making is indicated by directors’ 
views to boards adopting the resolution recommended in the exercise they solved 
(the second follow-up questions). 
In summary, the results indicated that directors are largely influenced by 
anchoring effects; while there is little support that there is a norm among directors to 
accept the recommended resolution made to them. 
6.5.2 Implications of Findings for Research 
Directors as expert and professional decision makers are susceptible to bias in 
their decisions because of anchoring effects. Further, anchoring occurs despite 
having multiple numeric data points, a common situation facing directors reading a 
board paper and substantially different from the generalised standard anchoring 
condition in the literature (i.e. one numeric data point). This advance in the 
understanding of the anchoring effect is not unique to directors, but it is fairly typical 
for how information is presented fordecision making in the boardroom. However, 
just like participants of Chapter five (i.e. students), participants of this experiment 
(i.e. directors) are also naïve decision makers in a sense that they do not have enough 
information about the decision situation. However, compared to students 
(participants of Chapter five), the subjects of Chapter six (i.e. directors) are less 
naïve as the situation might resemble a very similar situation to one they have faced 
before. 
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6.5.3 Methodological Implications 
First, this study emphasised the importance of replication in providing 
evidence about a social phenomenon. In this study, the same results corroborated 
those results obtained in Chapter five, and hence robust evidence about the influence 
of anchors in board decisions style was provided. Critics may not consider this 
experiment as a replication because the sample in Chapter six was not drawn from 
the same population as Chapter five. However, I argue that both samples are drawn 
from the population of independent decision makers, whereby the participants of the 
study in both Chapter five and Chapter six had no interest in influencing the results 
of the study. This was reinforced by the double blinded design employed in both 
chapters. Yet, if Chapter six does not meet the requirement of a replication, it can be 
fairly labelled as an extension to Chapter five. 
Second, the results of this research highlighted the importance of researching 
the different levels of analysis in board contexts. Although boards’ decisions are 
outcomes of interdependence and consensus, directors initially set their decisions at 
an individual level; this was mostly promoted by the board papers sent to directors as 
part of the meeting agenda. 
6.5.4 Limitations 
First, this study employed a research instrument that is a hypothetical board 
decision situation; hence, anchoring effect was not investigated or observed in actual 
board decisions. Therefore, it is possible that boards operate in a way that overcomes 
anchoring bias, yet we do not know it. However, the well-known group dynamic 
such as choice shift indicates that even if a board is open it is more likely to intensify 
the anchoring effect rather than negate it. The fact that in the laboratory experiment 
(Chapter five) conducted on students there was no impact of actually making a group 
effect on the anchoring due to the presentation is suggestive that any group dynamic 
would not invalidate the general conclusion of the results. The logic of the thesis has 
been to test the generalised mechanisms in a sample that is readily accessible (i.e. 
students), and where it was found that there was no group impact, I then moved to 
see whether there were differences in decision making at the director level. The 
results from the director level of analysis (Chapter six) corroborated those results 
from the individual student level of analysis.  Given that, there is no reason to expect 
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that using groups would be different unless there were different norms among board 
members compared to student groups. 
Second, given that this study was conducted only at the individual directors level, 
thus the results from this study, as well as the results for the groups level in Chapter 
five, cannot be statistically generalised to boards as groups. Third, the sample size of 
this study did not meet the sample size needed to detect the influence of norms 
condition. However, when the norms condition was statistically significant in phase 
one of Chapter five (i.e. section 5.4.2), for which the sample size was within the 
range of the sample size needed to detect norms (i.e. 180 participants), the statistical 
power was below the conventional 80% and the practical significance was very small 
(ηp2= .04). 
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Despite decades of investigation and dialogue, the means of controlling agency 
costs in the modern corporation remains unclear. Research traditionally has focused 
on the board’s role in monitoring the CEO and the management, with studies 
concentrating on the relationship between board independence and firm performance. 
Although the findings from research into the board independence-performance links 
remain unclear and often contradictory, corporate community (e.g. institutional 
investors) and regulators (CGPR, 2003, 2007, 2014) have still been showing 
preference for independent boards (Dalton et al., 1998). 
The overall objective of this thesis has been to understand how agency costs 
might be attributed to boards and their decision making. Thus, the investigation was 
conducted using two different, though connected, themes. First, board independence-
performance relationship; second, the process of board decision making, that is, 
explaining mechanisms of agency costs in board decision making. 
This thesis has broadened the research tradition by first, consolidating the stream 
of research into the links between board independence and performance, and second, 
providing a new perspective to researching agency costs by investigating how agents 
may circumvent independent monitoring. The overall research question outlined in 
Chapter one: 
“Is director independence associated with firm performance and, if 
not, what alternative mechanisms might lead to agency costs?” 
Chapter two (Literature Review) emphasised how most governance problems 
have been conceptualised through predicting the motivations of agents and directors, 
and how the structure of boards (e.g. levels of board independence) may prompt 
different motivations. Chapter two overviewed how empirical research has provided 
contradictory and inconsistent findings about the theoretically presumed links 
between board structure and the outcomes of directors’ decisions (i.e. firm 
performance). After reviewing the relevant theories (agency theory and stewardship 
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theory) and empirical work into the relationship between board structure (e.g. 
independence) and performance, the first two research questions are: 
RQ1: Is there any association between the insider-outsider board 
composition of Australian firms and financial performance and, if 
so, what is the extent of this association? 
RQ2: Is there any association between board leadership structure 
of Australian firms and financial performance and, if so, what is the 
extent of this association? 
Chapter two also provided a rationale for investigating agency costs using a 
behavioural approach. Three theoretical concepts from the behavioural decision 
making theory were introduced for this research: anchoring effects, social norms 
theory, and choice shift and group polarisation. (1) Best practice advice advocates 
that a board paper should commence with a recommended decision the paper 
proposer believes should be made. Having the above practice advice is widely 
adopted in board common practice and given the soundness of anchoring 
phenomenon, it was appealing to argue that anchoring effect might be evident in 
board decision making, especially when a specific numeric recommendation is the 
first piece of information a director reads. Anchoring effect was specifically 
highlighted as the main investigation for the behavioural aspect of this thesis (see 
section 5.2.1 of Chapter five). (2) Chapter two also emphasised (stated more clearly 
in section 5.2.2) that a recommended decision by the management to directors may 
influence the directors’ level of accepting/ questioning to that given 
recommendation; this was discussed in light of social norms theory. (3) The chapter 
also overviewed the hypotheses of choice shift and group polarisation; given the 
group based style of boards and the potentials that anchoring effect and social norms 
theory may be amplified at the group level. While investigating the process of board 
decision making is not the novelty of this thesis, the theoretical concepts used in 
doing so (anchoring effect, social norms theory, choice shift and group polarisation) 
are. Thus, three research questions were derived as per the three theoretical concepts: 
RQ3: Does the use of an anchor in a board papers affect director 
and board decision making? 
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RQ4: Do boards’ social norms of accepting/ questioning draft 
resolutions or recommendations affect directors’ judgment? 
RQ5: Is anchoring exacerbated or ameliorated at the group level in 
board style decision making? 
Chapter three (Research Design) set out the plan to answer the research 
questions. It also justified how the multi-method multi-study design reflects on both 
the prescriptive approach as well as the descriptive approach to researching boards’ 
decisions. In the course of this thesis, three studies were conducted, each of which 
employs a different method. 
By acknowledging the advantages and disadvantages of each of the three 
methods, Chapter three demonstrated how the choice of each method was made as to 
best answer the given research question(s) and hence addresses the overarching 
research problem (Yin, 2009). Chapter three also demonstrated how the choice of 
each method was justified by a strategy that links the chosen method to the desired 
outcomes. 
In Chapter four (study one; RQ1 and RQ2) meta-analysis was employed. After 
thoroughly searching prior empirical research, correlation values between board 
independence variables (board composition and board leadership structure) and 
performance were compiled and consolidated. A correlation coefficient provides an 
estimate of the co-variation between variables and should be present if there is any 
underlying relationship between the variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Pallant, 
2013). In this study, I employed the Pearson product–moment correlation as the most 
liberal measure of potential relationship between the variables of interest 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). While a present correlation does not establish a causal 
relationship, if a true relationship exists it should be evident in a significant 
correlation. 
The results from Chapter four demonstrated that there is no robust association 
(i.e. correlation) between independence characteristics (board composition and board 
leadership structure) of Australian boards and firm performance (i.e. answers to RQ1 
and RQ2). However, given the archival and often cross sectional design of boards’ 
research, any synthesis can only investigate the presence of relationships rather than 
causality. This highlighted the need for a highly controlled experiment that describes 
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directors’ behaviour and boards’ common practices in the process of board decision 
making.	 
Chapter five employed a laboratory experiment that mainly aimed at 
investigating anchoring effect in board papers (RQ3). Chapter five also aimed at 
investigating the directors’ norm of accepting/ questioning the recommended 
resolution in the papers provided to directors by the management (RQ4). The 
experiment was conducted at both the individual and the group levels in a board style 
pattern (RQ5). 
Using a sample of QUT students, the findings from the experiment indicated that 
individual decision makers (such as directors) and group based decision making 
(such as boards), whether independent or not, are influenced by the use of 
recommended resolution (numerical reference point) at the beginning of a board 
paper. The detected influence was evident irrespective of other information (other 
numerical reference points) contained in the background to the decision. Moreover, 
there is a limited support that the influence of anchoring is subject to either the norms 
of the group within which the decision makers find themselves or the hypotheses of 
choice shift and group polarisation. Although with the internal validity strengthening 
causal claims of Chapter five, external validity challenged the generalisability of the 
findings to directors and boards. 
To address these external validity issues from Chapter five, Chapter six 
employed an on-line experiment sent out to directors of Australian organisations. For 
Chapter six, the experimental design and instrument were identical to those of 
Chapter five, yet the investigation was only conducted at the individual directors 
level (i.e. no groups). The findings from Chapter six confirmed and strengthening the 
external validity of those findings obtained in Chapter five. Nevertheless, the 
findings from Chapter six can only be generalised to individual directors because the 
investigation was not carried out at the group level. 
The major contribution of this thesis is that a non-agency mechanism (i.e. 
anchoring effect) can be used by agents to extract agency costs. Specifically, if an 
agent (e.g. the CEO) is motivated to manipulate directors, he/ she may present his/ 
her preferred numerical data point as the first piece of information directors come 
across. Such manipulation may take place irrespective of the level of board 
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independence, level of information asymmetry or group based mechanisms. Other 
contributions of this thesis can be summarised in three key points: 
 The meta-analyses from Chapter four have extended the international 
evidence of no robust association between board independence and 
performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Wagner et al., 1998, Rhoades et al., 
2000, 2001) to the Australian context. Although it might be considered a 
modest contribution, given the prior international evidence, it is important 
to note that the evidence from Chapter four has updated the 15-20 years 
old international evidence. 
 The findings from Chapter five provided an analytic generalisation (i.e. 
confirm, extend or rival) to extant theories. Importantly, the findings 
provide an explanation to agency costs in the context of decision bias (i.e. 
anchoring effects). Such an explanation extends agency theory to include, 
when it posits its efficiency logic, the competence of economic actors 
(e.g. agents and directors) along with their motivation. 
 Another analytic, and statistical, generalisation from Chapter five is that 
the findings have extended the traditional anchoring investigation (i.e. one 
data point reference) to a multiple data reference (e.g. board papers). 
Moreover, the findings have extended the anchoring phenomenon from 
the individual based decision making to group based decision making. 
7.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE (CHAPTER FOUR) 
7.2.1 Key Findings 
Study one (Chapter four) is the first Australian meta-analysis into the links 
between board independence and financial performance. Two overall meta-analyses 
were conducted: the first meta-analysis provided evidence from 28 studies (68 
correlations, n= 64,255 company-years) that the true population relationship (i.e. 
correlation) between board composition (specifically, board independence) and 
financial performance (RQ1) is nearly zero; r = -.010, and the range of correlation in 
the 95% CI is [-.031, .011]. Similarly, the second overall meta-analysis provided 
evidence from 14 studies (39 correlations, n= 52,628 company-years) that the true 
population correlation between board leadership structure (specifically, CEO duality) 
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and financial performance (RQ2) is also approaching zero; r = .018, and the range of 
correlation in the 95% CI is [-.002, .039]. 
The first overall meta-analysis was followed by three moderating meta-analyses. 
The results from these moderating analyses indicated that neither the 
operationalisation of board composition (the ratio of independent directors, and the 
ratio of non-executive directors) nor the design of the studies included (correlations 
with cross-sectional design data set, and correlations with non-cross-sectional design 
data set) influenced the practically and statistically non-significant results obtained 
for the overall analysis of board independence-performance. 
Controlling for the type of financial measure employed (i.e. accounting-based 
measures, and market-based measures), however, influenced the results so that the 
statistically non-significant results from the overall analysis of board independence-
performance were statistically significant. Nonetheless, the results remained 
practically non-significant. Moreover, the direction of this statistically significant 
correlation was interesting, so that on the one hand, ratio of outside directors and 
accounting-based measures (36 correlations, n= 29,690 company-years) correlated 
positively (r = .031). Specifically, this positive correlation was driven by the 
statistically significant correlation (r = .044) between ratio of outside directors and 
ROA (24 correlations, n= 23,993 company-years). On the other hand, ratio of outside 
directors and market-based measures (32 correlations, n = 34,565 company-years) 
correlated negatively (r = -.055). Specifically, this negative correlation was driven by 
the statistically significant correlation (r = -.067) between ratio of outside directors 
and MBA (13 correlations, n= 8,739 company-years). 
Moderating meta-analyses for the CEO duality and financial performance 
indicated that the design of the studies included (correlations with cross-sectional 
design data set, and correlations with non-cross-sectional design data set) did not 
influence the practically and statistically non-significant results obtained for the 
overall meta-analysis. However, the moderating meta-analysis based on the type of 
financial measure employed (i.e. accounting-based measures, and market-based 
measures) indicated that only the correlation between CEO duality and market-based 
measures (18 correlations, n =29,812 company-years) was statistically significant but 
practically non-significant (r = .038). Specifically, this positive correlation was 
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driven by the statistically significant correlation (r = .068) between CEO duality and 
MBE (7 correlations, n = 9,945 company-years). 
In summary, the results from both of the two overall analyses and different 
moderating meta-analyses provided answers to the first and the second research 
questions that there is no robust association (i.e. correlation) between firm 
performance and each of board composition and board leadership structure. 
However, the statistically significant results as per the moderating meta-analysis 
based on performance measures (accounting performance measures, and market 
performance measures) do not impact the findings from the overall meta-analyses as 
the results were practically non-significant (small to very small correlation (Cohen, 
1992)). 
7.2.2 Implications of Findings for Research 
Chapter four demonstrated that there is no association (i.e. correlation) between 
independence characteristics of Australian boards (board composition and board 
leadership structure) and firm performance. First, such no-association argument 
raises the level of questioning the validity of different theoretical frameworks for 
board structure (agency theory and stewardship theory). Such questioning highlights 
the need for developing a theoretical framework for board structure and performance. 
Second, the data employed for the meta-analyses in Chapter four exhibited 
floor effect; that is, there was not enough variation in board composition within and 
across the samples of the studies included in the meta-analyses. The same also 
applies to the samples for board leadership structure. This floor effect is a sign that 
the Australian boards have actually resembled the prescribed governance practice of 
having a majority of non-executive directors and separating the roles of the board 
chair and the CEO.  
The floor effect highlights three important implications for research into boards 
and corporate governance: (1) further investigations into the association between 
board independence of Australian firms and other variables (e.g. performance) might 
not be fruitful or might be misleading, at least given the current level of board 
independence of Australian firms. However, if future research into independence- 
performance links is conducted, two key matters must be considered: employing 
purposive samples within which enough variation in board independence variables is 
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present, and investigating the association between board independence and non-
financial performance measures (competitiveness, sustainability, etc.). (2) The 
documented results from the performance measure moderating analysis have 
implications for research into the interactions between the different aspects of board 
independence. There was a positive correlation between market performance 
measures and each of CEO duality and the ratio of inside directors, as well as a 
positive correlation between accounting performance measures and the ratio of 
outside directors. Thus, along with controlling for performance measures, board 
independence might need to be measured by a combination of both aspects of 
independence (board composition and board leadership structure) rather than in 
individuality. Moreover, other attributes of board independence might also need to be 
included when measuring board independence (the composition (i.e. independence) 
of board committees, and the independence of each committee’s chair). (3) Research 
into corporate governance may not need to control for board independence because 
most Australian boards are, generally, independent. 
In summary, the findings of this study raise the level of questioning the 
validity, or at least the adequacy, of one single theory (e.g. agency theory) in 
explaining how board structure impacts performance. 
7.2.3 Implications of Findings for Practice 
The empirical findings of this research also have implications for practice. 
First, Australian firms may need to structure their boards to add value (Nicholson & 
Kiel, 2007; Henry, 2008) rather than just “ticking the boxes” of the prescribed best 
practice (Henry, 2008: 912). 
Second, if the theoretical framework of agency theory for board structure was 
invalid or inadequate, then a significant challenge would be faced by the 
conventional corporate governance reforms emphasising the importance of board 
independence. Overall, the results of this study do not provide any empirical support 
to the recommendations provided by the CGPR (2014). 
7.2.4 Conclusion from Chapter four (RQ1 and RQ2) 
This study aimed at providing empirical evidence on the association between 
board structure and firm performance. Specifically, this study answered two 
questions in this matter. For the first research question, whether there is any 
  
Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion 221 
correlation between insider-outsider board composition and performance of the 
Australian firms; the findings of this study indicate that the true population 
correlation between board composition and financial performance appears practically 
and statistically non-significant. Similarly, for the second question whether there is 
any correlation between board leadership structure and performance of the Australian 
firms; the findings of this study indicate that the true population correlation between 
board leadership structure and financial performance appears practically and 
statistically non-significant. 
The key contribution from Chapter four is that it has extended the international 
evidence that there is no robust association between board independence and 
performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Wagner et al., 1998, Rhoades et al., 2000, 2001) to 
the Australian context. However, the findings of this study should be read as findings 
of an abstract association between board structure and performance because there 
was not enough control over many influential variables on the association between 
board structure and performance. 
7.3 IMPACT OF INFORMATION PRESENTATION FORMAT ON 
BOARDS’ DECISIONS (CHAPTER FIVE) 
7.3.1 Key Findings 
Chapter five examined the presentation format of the information and its 
structure on individual decision makers and group based decision making. Using a 
sample of QUT students, Chapter five employed a laboratory experiment aimed at 
investigating anchoring effects (RQ3) and social norms (RQ4) in board papers. The 
experiment was conducted at three phases to test decision making at the individual 
and the group levels in a board style pattern. Using the same experimental 
instrument, the three phases allow testing of whether group deliberations amplify/ 
ameliorate anchoring effects and social norms; that is testing choice shift and group 
polarisation in a board context (RQ5). 
The findings from Chapter five indicated that independent naïve decision makers 
(such as directors) and group based decision making (such as boards) are influenced 
by the inclusion of recommended resolutions (numerical reference point) at the 
beginning of a board paper irrespective of the information contained in the 
background of that paper. People anchor at the first numerical value provided to 
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them. However, there is limited support that the detected influence is subject to the 
norms of the group within which the decision makers finds themselves. Furthermore, 
there is no support for hypotheses of choice shift or group polarisation – group 
mechanisms do not appear to affect this individual level mechanism in the context 
studies. 
7.3.2 Implications of Findings for Research 
The first implication of the findings of this experiment is that the process of 
board decision making, specifically the way information is presented, is important in 
shaping directors’ and boards’ decisions. Whereby directors might be manipulated by 
the decision proposer (e.g. the CEO), and hence agency costs increase. If this 
proposer provides decision makers (e.g. directors) with different numeric data points 
in the decision situation (e.g. board paper) but still locates his/ her preferred data 
point at the beginning of that board paper, directors may anchor on that first data 
point. However, whether anchoring effects matter or not is dependent on the 
motivation of the agent (e.g. shirking or extracting agency costs) rather than the 
motivation of the directors (e.g. monitoring agents). 
Second, the findings indicated that group based decision making does not seem to 
influence such manipulation (i.e. anchoring effects); whereby groups, just like 
individuals, were found to be susceptible to anchoring effects. Thus, the concern 
about the composition of boards in the context of decision bias (specifically 
anchoring) is emphasised. However, the mechanism of using anchoring effect to 
manipulating independent decision makers (whether individuals or groups) works 
when the decision makers are naïve decision makers. 
Finally, the findings from this study highlighted the importance of investigating 
other decision biases (e.g. framing effects, quo status bias, and inter-temporal choice) 
in board decision making. 
7.3.3 Implications of Findings for Practice 
First, Australian boards are mostly composed of outside directors (see section 
4.6.2), whose firm’s specific information is typically less than that of inside 
directors; nevertheless, boards’ decisions are outcomes of consensus. Thus, having 
directors with more information and expertise (i.e. inside directors) may not enhance 
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the outcomes of the decision as long as outside directors compose the majority of the 
boards. 
Second, directors, as part of their controlling role, must comprehend how 
agency costs may arise in the decision process. Third, practicing directors may need 
to take into account their susceptibility to bias in the decision process. Specifically, 
directors must be aware that the management might manipulate them simply by 
structuring the decision proposal in a certain way, like setting the preferred 
alternative as a decision resolution (first piece of information to read). In order to 
ameliorate such susceptibility to bias, directors as professional decision makers may 
need to critically scrutinise management’s decision proposals. Moreover, directors 
might benefit from reading about behavioural decision making and understanding the 
different decision biases such as anchoring effect and framing effect. 
7.3.4 Conclusion from Chapter Five (RQ3, RQ4 and RQ5) 
This study aimed at providing a causal claim to the mechanisms that influence 
boards’ decisions. Specifically, this study answered three questions of this thesis 
(RQ3, RQ4 and RQ5). For the RQ3, whether the anchoring effect is evident among 
independent decision makers, the findings indicate a large influence of anchors in 
hypothetical, yet realistic, boards’ decision situations. Out of the multiple data point, 
participants of this study anchored on the first data point presented to them in those 
hypothetical board papers. Nonetheless, the findings did not indicate any support to 
the influence of social norms in board decision making (RQ4). The same findings 
were obtained in the second phase of the experiment, that is, groups are also largely 
influenced by the first data point they receive. The findings from the third phase of 
the experiment represented a replication of the first phase of the experiment and 
confirmed the answers for RQ3 and RQ4.  However, there was no difference across 
the three phases of the experiment, thus the findings from this experiment did not 
provide any support to both hypotheses of choice shift and group polarisation in 
boards’ context (RQ5). 
Implications for research and practice were presented through highlighting the 
critical importance of board decision process; specifically, agency costs may arise in 
board decision making as a result of decision bias. Furthermore, such a rise in agency 
costs might happen irrespective of board independence. The key limitations of the 
study were the issues of the statistical generalisation, and the limited consideration to 
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the composition of typical board as a group. Importantly, this study provided an 
analytic generalisation that non-agency mechanism (i.e. anchoring effects) might be 
used to extract agency costs. 
7.4 IMPACT OF INFORMATION PRESENTATION FORMAT ON 
BOARDS’ DECISIONS: EXTENSION TO REAL-WORLD DIRECTORS 
(CHAPTER SIX) 
7.4.1 Key Findings 
Chapter six mainly aimed at addressing external validity issues that arose for 
the laboratory experiment in Chapter five. Moreover, Chapter six also aimed at 
extending the results obtained for naïve decision makers (i.e. subjects of Chapter 
five, the students) to more experienced subjects (i.e. directors). Ultimately, Chapter 
six replicated the experiment conducted in Chapter five, yet on another cohort (i.e. 
directors). As with these aims addressed, answers for RQ3, RQ4 and RQ5 as 
provided in Chapter five had been reinforced in Chapter six. 
By employing an online administered experimental design addressed to 
directors, anchoring effects and the norm of recommendation acceptance were 
examined in director decision making. Stage one of the investigation, which 
represents a replication to the experiment conducted in Chapter five (i.e. the same 
exact experimental instrument), has demonstrated that 34% of the variation in 
directors’ estimates to the upper limit for the salary negotiations was explained by 
the anchoring variable. Moreover, there was no support for the hypothesis of 
directors’ norm of recommendation acceptance, nor to the interaction effect between 
anchoring and norms. In stage two of the investigation the norms manipulation was 
modified in the experimental instrument to account for the difference between 
students and directors. Similar to those findings from Chapter five and those findings 
from stage one of Chapter six, stage two of Chapter six’s investigation showed that 
anchoring effect explains 47% of the variation in directors’ estimates to the upper 
limit for the salary negotiations. However, a norms effect was also not evident in 
director decision making. Interestingly, the interaction effect between anchoring and 
norms of recommendation acceptance explains 20% of the variation in directors’ 
estimates to the upper limit for the salary negotiations. Yet the statistical power of 
the test was below the conventional 80%, and hence the interaction effect was 
discarded.  
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7.4.2 Conclusion from Chapter Six 
The findings from this study corroborated those findings obtained in Chapter 
five, and hence both studies (i.e. Chapters five and six) are integrated together so that 
both internal validity and external validity are strengthened. An overall conclusion 
from both studies would be: the presentation of information (e.g. recommended 
numerical reference point at the beginning of board resolution paper) influence 
director decision making so that directors’ decisions (e.g. estimates) are biased 
toward that recommendation. The influence of this reference point is evident 
irrespective of other reference points contained in that given board paper. Moreover, 
decision makers (students and directors) were influenced by that reference point 
irrespective of their independence. 
7.5 METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
PROGRAM 
First, the findings from this thesis (Chapters four, five and six) emphasised the 
importance of using a multi-theoretic approach in researching boards. Chapter four 
provided clear evidence that there is no association between board structure and 
performance as prescriptive theories suggest (agency theory and stewardship theory). 
The no association between board structure and performance promoted the research 
to a descriptive approach that aimed at detecting the possible explanations (i.e. 
cause-effect relationship) of agency costs (Chapters five and six). Theoretical 
concepts from the behavioural decision theory (i.e. anchoring effects, social norms, 
and choice shift and group polarisation) were investigated in boards’ context. 
Chapters five and six provided evidence for the influence of anchoring effects on 
directors’ decision making. 
Second, as with the employment of different theoretical concepts from both 
domains of decision making (prescriptive and descriptive), the findings from this 
thesis also emphasised the importance of the multi-method multi-study design in 
researching boards. For the three studies of this thesis, the limitations of each given 
precedent study stimulated the subsequent one, so that, (1) the experimental design 
employed in Chapters five and six aimed at addressing the lack of causality claim in 
Chapter four. Yet, not to underestimate the importance of the evidence provided in 
Chapter four (2) Chapters five and six provided a behavioural description to the 
process of board decision making, and hence complemented the prescriptive 
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traditional approach to board decision making (Chapter four). Hence, both the 
prescriptive and the behavioural approaches are important in predicting and 
explaining people’ actions and decisions (Simon, 1959). (3) The external validity 
issue that arose in Chapter five, whose participants were students, was addressed in 
Chapter six, whose participants were professional directors. 
Third, this research highlighted the importance of researching the different 
levels of analysis in board contexts. Although boards’ decisions are outcomes of 
interdependence and consensus, directors initially set their decisions at an individual 
level. This was mostly promoted by the board papers sent to directors as part of the 
meeting agenda. 
7.6 OVERALL CONCLUSION 
Despite the increasing calls for investigating the process of board decision 
making, corporate governance issues in research and practice are still predominated 
by the view that board structure (i.e. independence) is associated with firm 
performance. This thesis advances our understanding about board decision making. 
This thesis demonstrated that there is no association (i.e. correlation) between 
independence characteristics (insider-outsider board composition and board 
leadership structure) of Australian boards and firm performance. Hence, it extended 
the prior international evidence to the Australian boards. 
This thesis provided empirical evidence that individual decision makers (such 
as directors) and group based decision making (such as boards), whether independent 
or not, are influenced by the use of a recommended resolution (numerical reference 
point) at the beginning of a board paper. The detected influence was evident 
irrespective of other information (other numerical reference points) contained in the 
background of the decision situation. 
Such empirical evidence extends the traditional anchoring investigation (i.e. one 
data point reference) to a realistic, yet hypothetical, board decision situation for 
which multiple data reference are employed (e.g. board papers). Such an extension 
also extends the robust phenomenon of anchoring effects to the group based decision 
making (e.g. boards). 
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In summary, this thesis demonstrates that a non-agency mechanism (i.e. 
anchoring effect) may extract agency costs. Specifically, if an agent (e.g. the CEO) is 
motivated to manipulate directors, he/ she may present his/ her preferred numerical 
data point as the recommended decision resolution. Thus, agency costs may be 
extracted irrespective of board independence, information asymmetry or group based 
mechanisms. 
The contributions of this thesis are: 
 The meta-analyses have extended the international evidence of no robust 
association between board independence and performance (Dalton et al., 
1998; Wagner et al., 1998, Rhoades et al., 2000, 2001) to the Australian 
context. 
 The laboratory experiment (Chapter five) provided an analytic 
generalisation (i.e. confirm, extend or rival) to extant theories. 
Importantly, the findings provide an explanation of how agency costs may 
arise in the context of board decision bias (i.e. anchoring effects). This 
explanation extends agency theory by positing that the process of decision 
making matters in addition to economic actors’ motivation. 
 The findings of the experiments (Chapters five and six) have extended the 
traditional anchoring investigation (i.e. one data point reference) to the 
context of multiple data reference points (e.g. as would be expected in 
board papers). Moreover, the findings from Chapter five have extended 
the anchoring phenomenon from the individual based decision making 
situation to the group based decision making situation. 
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APPENDIX 1: SEARCH TERMS FOR INCLUDED STUDIES IN THE TWO 
META-ANALYSES 
Title: officer OR executive OR ceo OR director OR governance; Subject terms: 
performance OR compensation OR remuneration OR independence; All fields: 
Australia 
Title: ceo OR executives OR managers; Subject terms: performance OR 
remuneration OR compensation; All fields: Australia 
executive OR ceo OR director OR officer) AND TitleCombined:(performance OR 
remuneration OR compensation) AND TitleCombined:(australia) 
TitleCombined:(board independence OR board composition OR board attributes OR 
board characteristics OR governance attributes OR governance characteristics OR 
board performance OR nonexecutive directors OR directors performance OR 
governance structure OR board structure) AND performance OR remuneration OR 
compensation AND TitleCombined:(australia) 
TitleCombined:(board independence OR board composition OR board attributes OR 
board characteristics OR governance attributes OR governance characteristics OR 
board performance OR nonexecutive directors OR directors performance OR 
governance structure OR board structure) AND performance AND 
TitleCombined:(australia) 
TitleCombined:(board composition OR board structure OR board characteristics OR 
board attributes OR board diversity OR board monitoring OR board independence 
OR board performance OR board of directors OR board room) AND 
TitleCombined:(performance OR fraud OR earnings OR governance reforms OR 
investment OR outcomes OR wealth Or growth Or valuation) AND 
TitleCombined:(australia) 
TitleCombined:(board composition OR board structure OR board characteristics OR 
board attributes OR board diversity OR board monitoring OR board independence 
OR board performance OR board of directors OR board room) AND 
TitleCombined:(performance OR fraud OR earnings OR governance reforms OR 
investment OR outcomes OR wealth Or growth Or valuation) AND Australia 
TitleCombined:(corporate governance OR governance structure OR governance 
attributes OR governance characteristics OR governance diversity) AND 
TitleCombined:(performance OR fraud OR earnings OR governance reforms OR 
investment OR outcomes OR wealth Or growth Or valuation) AND 
TitleCombined:(australia) 
TitleCombined:(corporate governance OR governance structure OR governance 
attributes OR governance characteristics OR governance diversity) AND 
TitleCombined:(performance OR fraud OR earnings OR governance reforms OR 
investment OR outcomes OR wealth Or growth Or valuation) AND Australia 
TitleCombined:(chief executive officer OR ceo OR executive OR executives OR 
nonexecutive OR non-executive OR leadership OR duality) AND 
TitleCombined:(performance OR fraud OR earnings OR governance reforms OR 
investment OR outcomes OR wealth Or growth Or valuation) AND 
TitleCombined:(australia) 
  
Appendices 229 
TitleCombined:(chief executive officer OR ceo OR executive OR executives OR 
nonexecutive OR non-executive OR leadership OR duality) AND 
TitleCombined:(performance OR fraud OR earnings OR governance reforms OR 
investment OR outcomes OR wealth Or growth Or valuation) AND australia 
TitleCombined:(chief executive officer OR ceo OR executives OR directors OR 
leadership OR duality) AND TitleCombined:(performance OR fraud OR earnings 
OR outcomes OR wealth Or growth Or valuation) AND Australia 
TitleCombined:(chief executive officer OR ceo OR executives OR directors OR 
leadership OR duality) AND TitleCombined:(performance OR fraud OR earnings 
OR outcomes OR wealth Or growth Or valuation) AND Australia 
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APPENDIX 2: EMAIL TEMPLATE USED TO CONTACTING AUTHORS 
FOR REQUESTING CORRELATION VALUES 
Dear Professor/ Dr……. 
Hello 
My name is Abdallah Alzoubi, a PhD student at school of accountancy/ Queensland 
University of Technology (QUT). Associate Professor Gavin Nicholson and 
Professor Marion Hutchinson are supervising my research. As part of my PhD, I am 
undertaking a meta-analysis of studies that have investigated the relationship 
between board composition and firm performance in Australia. To undertake the 
meta-analysis, we need the correlation between board composition and performance. 
One of the studies that we would like to include in the meta-analysis is: 
(…………………….....). We need the correlations between the ratio of independent 
directors and firm performance measures. We also need to know the sample size; 
company years or number of companies used for that correlation (n). 
We would appreciate your assistance by providing this correlation. 
If you have not calculated the correlation, we would be delighted to receive the raw 
output files to complete the analysis. 
Thank you very much for your consideration. 
Kind regards 
Abdallah Alzoubi 
abdallahbadermahmoud.alzoubi@hdr.qut.edu.au 
Contacts of supervisors: 
Associate Professor, Dr. Gavin Nicholson 
g.nicholson@qut.edu.au 
Professor Marion Hutchinson 
m.hutchinson@qut.edu.au 
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APPENDIX 3: MODERATING META-ANALYSIS FOR BOARD 
COMPOSITION-PERFORMANCE; TWO MODERATORS  
 
 Number 
of (r)s 
included 
(n) (r) 95% CI Sig Effect 
size 
Analysis (all with random 
effects due to the 
heterogeneity) 
   Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
  
Financial performance * Composition measure 
Accounting measure * Ratio of 
independent directors 
9 5,143 .065 .016 .113 Yes Very 
small 
Accounting measure * Ratio of 
non-executive directors 
27 24,547 .020 -.007 .047 No Very 
small 
Market measure * Ratio of 
independent directors 
8 3,754 -.053 -.126 .021 No  Very 
small 
Market measure * Ratio of 
non-executive directors 
24 30,811 -.120 -.242 .006 No Small 
Financial performance * Design of the study  
Accounting measure * Cross-
sectional design 
20 23,667 .032 .003 .061 Yes Very 
small 
Accounting measure * Non-
cross-sectional design 
16 6,023 .029 -.012 .069 No Very 
small 
Market measure * Cross-
sectional design 
18 25,018 -.059 -.104 -.014 Yes Very 
small 
Market measure * Non-cross- 14 9,547 -.054 -.111 .002 No Very 
 232  Appendices 
 
sectional design small 
Design of the study * Composition measure 
Cross-sectional design * Ratio 
of independent directors 
9 6,409 -.010 -.067 .046 No Very 
small 
Cross-sectional design * Ratio 
of non-executive directors 
29 42,276 -.011 -.042 .020 No Very 
small 
Non-cross-sectional design * 
Ratio of independent directors 
8 2,488 .058 -.001 .117 No Very 
small 
Non-cross-sectional design * 
Ratio of non-executive 
directors 
22 13,082 -.031 -.062 .000 No Very 
small 
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APPENDIX 4: MODERATING META-ANALYSIS FOR BOARD 
COMPOSITION-PERFORMANCE; THREE MODERATORS 
 
 Number 
of (r)s 
included 
(n) (r) 95% 
CI 
Sig Effect size 
Analysis (all with random 
effects due to the 
heterogeneity) 
   Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
  
Design of the study * Financial measure * Composition measure 
Cross-sectional design * Acc 
measure *  Ratio of 
independent directors 
5 3,987 .026 -.044 .096 No Very 
small 
Cross-sectional design *  Acc 
measure * Ratio of non-
executive directors  
15 19,680 .032 -.010 .074 No Very 
small 
Cross-sectional design * 
Market measure *  Ratio of 
independent directors 
4 2,422 -.065 -.150 .021 No  Very 
small 
Cross-sectional design *  
Market measure *  Ratio of 
non-executive directors 
14 22,596 -.054 -.096 -.011 Yes Very 
small 
Non-cross-sectional design *  
Acc measure *  Ratio of 
independent directors   
4 1,156 .180 .076 .280 Yes Small 
Non-cross-sectional design *  
Acc measure *  Ratio of non-
executive directors 
12 4,867 -.004 -.057 .049 No Very 
small 
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Non-cross-sectional design *  
Market measure *  Ratio of 
independent directors 
(fixed model as the studies are 
homogeneous) 
4 1,332 -.038 
(-
.020) 
-.134 
(-
.073) 
.059 
(.034) 
No  Very 
small 
Non-cross-sectional design *  
Market measure *  Ratio of 
non-executive directors 
10 8,215 -.059 -.114 -.003 Yes Very 
small 
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APPENDIX 5: THE SIX SCENARIOS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL 
INSTRUMENT 
Scenario A 
Board of XYZ Ltd 
Resolution: That the board authorizes the Chair to negotiate a salary package up to a 
total of $310,000 with Mr. Richardson; the nominated Chief 
Executive Director (CEO). 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Background 
As a director at the XYZ’s board, you are aware that XYZ Ltd has been undertaking 
a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) search.  
At our last board meeting, all directors of XYZ Ltd agreed that Mr. Richardson 
would be an ideal appointment. We are now in a position to offer Mr. Richardson a 
contract. A key term of the contract is the salary. For your information: 
 The previous CEO of XYZ Ltd was on a package totalling $280,000. 
 Mr. Richardson, our preferred candidate, is currently paid $220,000 in a 
position of acting CEO at another company. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Notes on how boards work: 
 A “resolution” (the first statement above) is a recommendation made to the 
board of directors about the decision they are to make. A director normally 
supports the resolution unless he/she significantly disagrees with it. 
 Directors of a company making the appointment decision are faced with a 
paradox. Since they are obliged to work in the best interest of that company, 
they want to offer a large enough salary to secure Mr. Richardson as CEO. 
But, they also need to ensure that they do not overspend on executive 
remuneration. 
What is the upper limit that you would suggest for the salary negotiation with Mr. 
Richardson?  $_________________ 
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Scenario B 
Board of XYZ Ltd 
 
Resolution: That the board authorizes the Chair to negotiate a salary package up to a 
total of $310,000 with Mr. Richardson; the nominated Chief 
Executive Director (CEO). 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Background 
As a director at the XYZ’s board, you are aware that XYZ Ltd has been undertaking 
a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) search.  
At our last board meeting, all directors of XYZ Ltd agreed that Mr. Richardson 
would be an ideal appointment. We are now in a position to offer Mr. Richardson a 
contract. A key term of the contract is the salary. For your information: 
 The previous CEO of XYZ Ltd was on a package totalling $280,000. 
 Mr. Richardson, our preferred candidate, is currently paid $220,000 in a 
position of acting CEO at another company. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Notes on how boards work: 
 Directors of a company making the appointment decision are faced with a 
paradox. Since they are obliged to work in the best interest of that company, 
they want to offer a large enough salary to secure Mr. Richardson as CEO. 
But, they also need to ensure that they do not overspend on executive 
remuneration. 
What is the upper limit that you would suggest for the salary negotiation with Mr. 
Richardson?  $_________________ 
  
Appendices 237 
Scenario C 
Board of XYZ Ltd 
 
Resolution: That the board authorizes the Chair to negotiate a salary package up to a 
total of $240,000 with Mr. Richardson; the nominated Chief 
Executive Director (CEO). 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Background 
As a director at the XYZ’s board, you are aware that XYZ Ltd has been undertaking 
a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) search.  
At our last board meeting, all directors of XYZ Ltd agreed that Mr. Richardson 
would be an ideal appointment. We are now in a position to offer Mr. Richardson a 
contract. A key term of the contract is the salary. For your information: 
 The previous CEO of XYZ Ltd was on a package totalling $280,000. 
 Mr. Richardson, our preferred candidate, is currently paid $220,000 in a 
position of acting CEO at another company. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Notes on how boards work: 
 A “resolution” (the first statement above) is a recommendation made to the 
board of directors about the decision they are to make. A director normally 
supports the resolution unless he/she significantly disagrees with it. 
 Directors of a company making the appointment decision are faced with a 
paradox. Since they are obliged to work in the best interest of that company, 
they want to offer a large enough salary to secure Mr. Richardson as CEO. 
But, they also need to ensure that they do not overspend on executive 
remuneration. 
What is the upper limit that you would suggest for the salary negotiation with Mr. 
Richardson?  $_________________ 
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Scenario D 
Board of XYZ Ltd 
 
Resolution: That the board authorizes the Chair to negotiate a salary package up to a 
total of $240,000 with Mr. Richardson; the nominated Chief 
Executive Director (CEO). 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Background 
As a director at the XYZ’s board, you are aware that XYZ Ltd has been undertaking 
a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) search.  
At our last board meeting, all directors of XYZ Ltd agreed that Mr. Richardson 
would be an ideal appointment. We are now in a position to offer Mr. Richardson a 
contract. A key term of the contract is the salary. For your information: 
 The previous CEO of XYZ Ltd was on a package totalling $280,000. 
 Mr. Richardson, our preferred candidate, is currently paid $220,000 in a 
position of acting CEO at another company. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Notes on how boards work: 
 Directors of a company making the appointment decision are faced with a 
paradox. Since they are obliged to work in the best interest of that company, 
they want to offer a large enough salary to secure Mr. Richardson as CEO. 
But, they also need to ensure that they do not overspend on executive 
remuneration. 
What is the upper limit that you would suggest for the salary negotiation with Mr. 
Richardson?  $_________________ 
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Scenario E 
Board of XYZ Ltd 
 
Background 
As a director at the XYZ’s board, you are aware that XYZ Ltd has been undertaking 
a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) search.  
At our last board meeting, all directors of XYZ Ltd agreed that Mr. Richardson 
would be an ideal appointment. We are now in a position to offer Mr. Richardson a 
contract. A key term of the contract is the salary. For your information: 
 The previous CEO of XYZ Ltd was on a package totalling $280,000. 
 Mr. Richardson, our preferred candidate, is currently paid $220,000 in a 
position of acting CEO at another company. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Notes on how boards work: 
 A “resolution” (the first statement above) is a recommendation made to the 
board of directors about the decision they are to make. A director normally 
supports the resolution unless he/she significantly disagrees with it. 
 Directors of a company making the appointment decision are faced with a 
paradox. Since they are obliged to work in the best interest of that company, 
they want to offer a large enough salary to secure Mr. Richardson as CEO. 
But, they also need to ensure that they do not overspend on executive 
remuneration. 
What is the upper limit that you would suggest for the salary negotiation with Mr. 
Richardson?  $_________________ 
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Scenario F 
Board of XYZ Ltd 
 
Background 
As a director at the XYZ’s board, you are aware that XYZ Ltd has been undertaking 
a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) search.  
At our last board meeting, all directors of XYZ Ltd agreed that Mr. Richardson 
would be an ideal appointment. We are now in a position to offer Mr. Richardson a 
contract. A key term of the contract is the salary. For your information: 
 The previous CEO of XYZ Ltd was on a package totalling $280,000. 
 Mr. Richardson, our preferred candidate, is currently paid $220,000 in a 
position of acting CEO at another company. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Notes on how boards work: 
 Directors of a company making the appointment decision are faced with a 
paradox. Since they are obliged to work in the best interest of that company, 
they want to offer a large enough salary to secure Mr. Richardson as CEO. 
But, they also need to ensure that they do not overspend on executive 
remuneration. 
What is the upper limit that you would suggest for the salary negotiation with Mr. 
Richardson?  $_________________ 
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APPENDIX 6: CONSENT SHEET 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
An investigation of anchoring effects and social norms theory in 
board decision making 
 
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1400000606 
 
RESEARCH TEAM  
Principal 
Researcher: 
Abdallah Al‐Zoubi, PhD student 
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Researchers:  
Associate Professor Gavin Nicholson   and   Professor Marion 
Hutchinson 
 
School of Accountancy, QUT Business School, Queensland 
University of Technology (QUT) 
 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of a PhD study for Abdallah Al‐Zoubi. 
 
The purpose of  this  research  is  to  investigate how boards of directors make  their 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty. 
 
You are  invited  to participate  in  this project  so you may help us understand how 
people  make  their  decisions  under  conditions  of  uncertainty,  and  how  group 
mechanisms influence group decision making. 
 
PARTICIPATION 
Your participation will involve reading a hypothetical decision situation (1 page) like 
those faced by boards of directors, and answering one question at the end of that 
decision  situation;  the  question  asks  you  to  make  an  estimate  of  an  uncertain 
quantity. Your participation will be at three phases;  individually,  in a group of two 
other participants, and  then  individually again. At  the end of  the  third phase, you 
will  be  asked  to  provide  some  demographical  information.  Your  participation  is 
expected to take less than 60 minutes. 
 
Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you agree to participate you do not have to 
complete  any  question(s)  you  are  uncomfortable  answering.  Your  decision  to  participate  or  not 
participate will  in no way  impact upon your  current or  future  relationship with QUT  (for example 
your grades). If you agree to participate and then change your mind, you can withdraw at any time 
during the experiment without comment or penalty. Any  identifiable  information already obtained 
from you will be destroyed if you withdraw. 
 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
This  project  may  help  understanding  decision  making  under  uncertainty,  it  also  may  help 
understanding  the  mechanisms  of  group  decision  making.  Participating  in  this  experiment  may 
benefit you as you may gain more experience and understanding of how decisions are made under 
uncertainty and in a group. We also expect that the results of this experimental study may help you 
assess  and  improve  your  decision  making.  You  can  ask  for  a  copy  of  the  results  by  contacting 
Abdallah  Alzoubi  (abdallahbadermahmoud.alzoubi@hdr.qut.edu.au).  The  results  of  this  study  are 
expected to be ready on the first week of December 2014. 
 
Should you choose to participate you will be paid $15 in compensation for your time. 
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RISKS 
The research team does not believe there are any risks beyond normal day‐to‐day living associated 
with your participation  in this research.  It should be noted that  if you do agree to participate, you 
can withdraw from participation at any time during the project without comment or penalty. 
 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
All  comments and  responses will be  treated  confidentially. Only  the  research  team has  access  to 
your stimulus material. 
Any data collected as part of this project will be stored securely as per QUT’s Management of research 
data policy. 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
If you would like to participate in this study, please continue with the experiment. 
 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
If have any questions or require further information please contact: 
 
Abdallah Al‐Zoubi  A/Prof Gavin Nicholson 
abdallahbadermahmoud.alzoubi@hdr.qut.edu.au   g.nicholson@qut.edu.au  
 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  However, if you 
do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project you may contact the 
QUT Research Ethics Unit on +61 7 3138 5123 or email ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The QUT Research 
Ethics Unit is not connected with the research project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern 
in an impartial manner. 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your 
information. 
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